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iv. 
INTRODUCTION 
The story of the rise and fall of the Arab power of 
Tanganyika has never been clearly recounted. Studies con-
cerning the Arabs of East Africa concentrate on their 
activities in the Congo, Uganda, or the Lake Nyasa region. 
Tanganyika is treated merely as the country the Arabs passed 
through before reaching more important areas. The purpose 
of this study will be to show how Arab power expanded inland 
from the ancient coastal centers in the nineteenth century, 
to describe the Arab reaction to the European invasion of 
East Africa, and to explain their final 'defeat by these new 
invaders. 
The use of the term 'Arab' in this study needs defini-
tion. In East Africa, any individual with Arab ancestry 
in his background is considered as an Arab. In fact, persons 
of no Arab ancestry are often referred to as Arabs if they 
practise the Muslim faith. For our purposes, the term 'Arab' 
will be used to describe all the Islamic invaders of East 
Africa. It would be meaningless to make any division -- two 
of our most famous Arabs were Tippu Tip and Bushiri ibn Salim, 
both of mixed Arab and African ancestry. 
The research for this study was carried on by the author 
while holding a Ford Foundation Fellowship. This grant 
v. 
vi. 
allowed the author to visit the archival centers listed in 
the bibliography. It also allowed him to visit and travel 
over the main Arab routes and centers of East Africa. The 
archives in Salem were visited with the aid of a travel grant 
from the African Research and Studies Program of Boston 
University. 
Many people gave ready aid in all the archives visited 
in various countries, and the author here expresses his 
thanks. Above all, Sir John Gray must be given special 
thanks; his readily offered advice and the use of his exten-
sive collections of books and manuscripts were of primary 
importance. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE ARAB EXPANSION OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
In the early nineteenth century there were well-
established trade routes from the coast of Tanganyika to 
the interior of Africa. Although these routes probably 
had been in use for many oentur1es1, no extensive use had 
been made of them by traders from the East African coast 
and no settlements had been founded to control the areas 
reached. There were three main routes to the interior 
beyond. The first and most important to this study left 
the coast from the area opposite Zanzibar and with many 
side routes led to the Arab center of Tabora. It then 
divided to pass on to Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria and 
the areas beyond. A second route began in the southern 
area of the Tanganyika coast, near such towns as Kilwa, 
Lindi and Mkindani, and led to Lake Nyasa and the regions 
to the west of it. The third started in the north of 
present-day Tanganyika, near Pangani and Tanga, and went 
inland to the Kilimanjaro region and beyond to Lake Victoria 
and to the territories to the east and northeast of that lake. 
1sir John Gray, "Trading Expeditions from the Coast to 
the Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria Before 1857," Tanganyika 
Notes and Records, 49(1957), 226-248. 
1 • 
2. 
A. The Tabora-Ujiji Route 
The Arabs of Zanzibar, stimulated by the actions of 
the Sultan of Zanzibar, Sayd ibn Sultan, in developing the 
wealth of his East African dom1nions 2, began in the early 
nineteenth century to use these routes more actively to 
secure slaves and ivory for the markets of Zanzibar. At 
first most of the trade was carried on by inland African 
groups, particularly the Nyamwezi tribe of central Tanganyika.3 
These Africans themselves brought the goods they wished to 
trade down to the coastal ports. As news of their approach 
spread, touts were sent inland to attract them to particular 
ports and Indian agents left Zanzibar to trade with them on 
their arrival.4 These Indians at first were able to secure 
the main staple of the trade, ivory, at very advantageous 
prices -- 140 pounds of ivory for a string of beads or a 
coil of brass wire in one case -- but these Africans by the 
1840's were learning the real value of their goods and were 
2R. Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders (Oxford, 
1938), Chap. 1 o, explains tlie sUi tan 1 s role. 
3For the Nyamwezi, see P. F. Bosch, Les Bapyamwezi 
(Munster, 1930). 
4For example, "Dr. A. Roscher's Tagebuch uber seine 
Reise nach dem Lufidji," Mittheilungen aus Justus Perthes' 
Geograpbischer Anstalt uber wlchtige Neue Erforsohungen 
auf dem Gesamtgebiete der Geographie von Dr. A. Petermann ( 1862)' 2. 
3. 
holding out for higher prices. The slaves who were used 
to bring down this 1 vory were bought also for the .Zanzibar 
market.5 The negotiations necessary to conclude the actual 
sale of merchandise were long and tedious, often lasting a 
month,6 and could in certain instances be very damaging to 
future prospects of trade. If at one time a good price 
were given by the Indian merchants, the Africans would 
return home for more goods to sell, paying a correspondingly 
high price for them since they expected to receive the same 
good price again on the coast. If when they arrived the 
price for their merchandise had fallen, they had of course 
to sell; but on their return home this news would spread 
and no more traders would venture down to the coast for 
some time.7 Native wars were also a factor of instability 
and could close . the coastal markets for long periods of time.8 
5Joseph B. F~ Osgood~ Notes or Recollections of Ma 
Zanzibar Muscat, Aden, Moe a and t er Eastern Ports a em, 
1854), 5t; R. P. Waters to D. Pingreet 9. iii. 42, "Waters 
Papers," Peabody Museum {Salem, Mass.}; M. Shepard to ?, 
15-22. viii. 44, in log of the~.~· 
6R. P. Waters to J. Waters, 8. iv. 43, "Waters Note-
book," ~· 
1w. McMullan toM. Shepard, 5. ii. 51, "Shepard Papers," 
lli.a· 
8For examples, see B. F. Fabens to M. Shepard, 4. v. 46, 
"Fabens Papers," ibid.; c. Ward toM. Shepard, 2. ii. 48, 
ibid.; J. Eehardt-ro-H. Venn, 9. iv. 53, F. · o. 54/15, Public 
ReCOrd Office (London). 
4. 
Due to this instability and from a desire to increase 
profits at Zanzibar, expeditions were sent inland by the 
Sultan and other interested parties with growing frequency 
in the early nineteenth century. In this process Tabora 
in the Nyamwezi country was reached. The usual date given 
for the arrival of coastal traders to this area is 18259 but 
there are indications that earlier traders may have reached 
there. A member of the London Missionary Society in 1881 
reported from information gained from the Arabs of Tabora 
that the first Arabs had arrived there 120 years previously, 
that is in 1761. 10 An acute Belgian traveller visitiag 
Tabora in the same year received information from the oldest 
Arab inhabitant that he and others had founded the Arab 
colony seventy years previously, thus around 1811. 11 Such 
information is of course difficult to evaluate, and in any 
event no important settlement was established there for 
some time after all the above dates. 
Thus from at least the 1820's onwards this route to 
Tabora was used with increasing frequency by traders from 
the coast- and from Zanzibar. Lake Tanganyika was reached 
9Richard F. Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa 
{London, 1860), II, 224. 
10 w. Hutlet, in a paper entitled, "Mohammedanism in 
Central Africa, London Missionary Society Archives (London). 
11 Jerome Becker, La Vie en Afrique (Bruxelles, 1887), 
II, 29. 
5. 
before 1830, and the first Arab who reached Buganda did so 
in the 1840's. 12 The Sultan of Zanzibar himself did much to 
facilitate this exploration by despatching yearly caravans 
on his own account. 13 The length of time that these expedi-
tions spent in the interior clearly demonstrated that by 
developing inland markets they found it necessary to pene-
trate farther and farther from the coast to return with the 
desired amount of merchandise. In 1839 expeditions were 
reported of a year and a year and a half in duration; in 
1847, of two years; in 1848 and 1849, of three to three and 
one-half years. 14 The American me.rchants at Zanzibar were 
the chief customers for East African ivory at this time, 
and one agent reported that as a result of this increased 
penetration of the interior three times as much cotton cloth, 
the staple of the trade, .as was needed three years pre.vio.usly 
12The information on these expeditions is collected in 
Gray, "Trading Expeditions"; for Buganda, see Sir John Gray, 
"Ahmed . bin Ibrahim - The First Arab to reach Buganda, '' The 
Uganda Journal, 11(1947), 80-97. ---
13M. Shepard to 1, 15-22. viii. 44, in log of the Star, 
P. M.; "R. J?. Waters J-ournal," 23. iii. 39 and 24. vi. ~ 
.!.!?1!· 
14
"R. P. Waters Journal," 23. iii. 39 and 24. v1. 39, 
ibid.; ••waters Notebookr.'' 18. xi. 42, ibid.; B. F. Fabens to 
~hepard, 4. vi. 47, Fabens Papers,w-rbid.; c. Ward to 
M. Shepard, 2. v. 49, ibid.; w. Jelly an~ Masury to 
G. West, 28. vii. 49, WWiit Papers,"~· 
6. 
was now required for the coastal trade.15 This also implies 
that more and more African caravans were bringing ivory down 
for themselves; a development that would cause Arab trading 
groups to go even farther afield to gain their necessary 
quotas. 
With this increasing development of trade in the interior 
it was necessary to establish centers that would serve as 
bases of supply and as collection points for parties that 
remained inland for several years. Tabora, then often called 
Unyanyembe, was to become the most important center in central 
Tanganyika. Other centers would be established between it 
and the coast but they would either be very small and rela-
tively unimportant or would, as the more important center of 
Zungomero, be destroyed after a comparatively short existence.16 
Whatever the date of its founding, no description of the 
organisation of Tabora is available until the time of the 
first European visitors in 1857. 17 Tabora then appeared to . 
15c. Ward toM. Shepard, 28. iii. 50, "Shepard Papers," 
ibid.; for the role of the Americans in East Africa, see the 
authorh "Americans . in Zanzibar:1825-1845," Essex Institute 
Historical Collections, XCV(1959), 239-62 .and "Americans in 
Zanzibar: 1845-1865," ibid., XCVII ( 1961 ) , 31-56 •. 
-
16Burton, Lake .Regions, I, 95ff. 
17The accounts are given in Burton, Lake Regions and 
James Hanning Speke, What Led to the Discovery of the Nile 
Sources (London, 1864). 
7. 
be a rather disorganised Arab community grouped around 
various individuals recognised as leaders by the general 
body of Arab and coastal settlers. These principal men 
were Musa Mzuri, Snay ibn Amir, Sayd ibn Muhammad, Muhinna 
ibn Sulayman and Sayd ibn Ali al Hinawi. The most powerful 
' 
appeared to be the Indian Muslim trader, Musa Mzuri, and his 
agent, Snay ibn Amir. The power structure was further com-
plicated, however, by the fact that all these men were 
traders and were thus absent from Tabora for varying lengths 
of time. When away other Arabs were very likely to push to 
the forefront and control affairs in the inland settlement. 
There had been some form of centralised leadership in the 
past; an Arab, Abdullah ibn Salim, backed by 200 armed 
slaves had ruled with a firm hand until his death around 
1842. No one since had been able to secure the power that 
he had once exercised. 
Since there were rarely more than twenty-five Arabs 
at one time in the Tabora of this era, some modus vivendi 
had to be established with the local Nyamwezi chief. This 
relationship was precarious at best and was to lead in the 
1860's to a long and bloody local war when a cooperative 
old chief was replaced by a new and ambitious African leader. 18 
18Burton, Lake Regions, II, 32, mentions the old chief. 
8. 
In the period immediately following our first glimpse 
of Tabora a change was taking place in the character of the 
trade in the area between that center and the coast. Up 
to this time slaving operations had been actively carried 
on, up to and including the Nyamwezi.19 By 1860, however, 
the British Consul at Zanzibar reported that the area 
opposite the island of Zanzibar was becoming exhausted due 
to constant raiding and that most slaves were now coming 
from the Lake Nyasa region. Thus in 1860, out of 19,000 
slaves imported into Zanzibar, only 4000 came from the area 
opposite; the rest were from the Nyasa regions.20 This 
situation was to continue and Tabora would in the future 
never supply large amounts of slaves to coastal markets. 
This change served to improve the conditions of trade in 
this area of Africa. Inland tribes now could visit the 
coast in conditions of relative security. The British 
Consul noted that many more Nyamwezi were coming to trade 
in Zanzibar since they no longer feared being taken and sold 
l9Lt. W. Christopher, "Extract from a Journal kept 
during a partial Enquiry into the p,resent Resources and 
State of North Eastern Africa •••• ,' Transactions of the 
Bombay Geofraphical Society, VI(1844), 377, reports seeing 
Nyamwezi s aves for sale In Zanzibar. 
20Rigby to Wood, 1. v. 60, F. 0. 54/17, P.R. 0.; Rigby 
to Anderson, 11. ii. 60, E-27, Zanzibar Archives. 
9. 
as slaves. 21 This was a factor of great importance as in 
this era the great bulk of the ivory brought to the coast 
and to Zanzibar would come from the Nyamwezi regions.22 An 
index of the success of this trade and of Zanzibar's other 
trade was shown in the growth of the city of Zanzibar due to 
its increasing prosperity -- as an observer said, "entire 
new quarters have been built.n23 
In Tabora by 1861 the uncertain Arab administration 
had broken apart because of native difficulties.24 The 
former chief had died in 1859 and war had resulted when the 
Arabs had intervened in the succession to place a nominee 
of their own in power. They had displaced Mnywa Sere when 
he tried to levy a tax on all merchandise entering the 
country to secure a share of the profits flowing to the 
Arabs. When he refused to back down in the face of Arab 
threats, he was deposed. As a result a continuous guerilla 
war had been going on and trade had -completely stopped. 
21Rigby to Anderson, 14. iv. 59, E-26, Z. A. 
22Playfair to Russell, 6. x. 63, F. o. 54/20, P. R. 0. 
23caleb Cooke, "Journal at Zanzibar, 1860-1864," Essex 
Institute (Salem, Mass.). 
1 o. 
The Arabs were in desperate straits and were unable to 
organise a well-planned offensive to defeat the Nyamwezi 
leader. Snay ibn Amir, one of their chief leaders, had been 
slain in battle against him. When Speke visited Tabora in 
1861 he was asked by the Arabs to arrange a truce but he 
declined when he learned that the Arabs planned treachery. 
As a result this war was to go on until 1865 when Mnywa Sere 
was finally killed by the Arabs. 
At this time Musa Mzuri remained the most influential 
Muslim in Tabora. Musa was always against this war since it 
interfered with his trading activities. 25 ·He was not able 
to stop it, thus revealing his want of authority. Musa 
had apparently allowed Snay ibn Amir to do most of the 
actual leading at Tabora, though it is unclear just what 
the actual relationship was between the two. The active 
role now fell to Muhinna 1 bn Sulayman, but he was never 
able to direct the Arabs of Tabora effectively.26 Mus a 
died in 1861, 27 and with this passage of the pri-ncipal . 
Mzuri 
25J. A. Grant, "Summary of Observations on the Geography, 
Climate, and Natural -History of the Lake Regions of Equatorial 
Africa, made by the Speke and Grant Expedition," Journal of 
the Royal Geographical Society, 42(1872), 246 • . 
26Grant, Walk Across Africa, 71. 
27Grant, "Summary ••• ," 247. 
1 1 • 
founders o! Tabora a change in the internal organisation 
of the Arab center was to result. 
A Governor (Lewali) of Tabora is now mentioned in the 
literature. Sayd ibn Salim al Lamki, the companion of 
Burton and Speke, and later of Speke and Grant, assumes 
this role. 28 The explorer Cameron reported later that the 
Sultan of Zanzibar had confirmed Sayd in this position.29 
This office of Governor must not be thought of, however, 
in European terms. The position had in all probability 
been assumed in Tabora by Sayd ibn Salim, and the Sultan 
acted to confirm an accepted fact. The Sultan was astute 
enough to realize that by such an acceptance he would gain 
an official who might insure order in this area of the 
interior and thus increase the profits that Zanzibar drew 
from trade. The Sultan sent no support to the Arabs in the 
interior in ordinary times. As long as Tabora was quiet 
and trade flowed to the coast, he had no great interest in 
what happened there. Even when the trade route was blocked 
in the early 1860's the Sultan took no active rol.e and 
28sayd later said in 1878 that he had been in office 
for fifteen years-- thus since 1863, A. Mackay, "Journal," 
13. v. 78, c. A6/0 16, Church Missionary Society Archives . 
(London). Speke left Sayd there in 1861, Speke, Journal of 
Discovery, 94. 
29william .R. Foran, African Odyssey: The Life of Verney 
L. Cameron (London, 1937), 72. 
12. 
merely waited for those Arabs in the interior to solve 
their problems.3° He did act, however, when Africans nearer 
to the coast interfered with trade routes.)J With regard to 
the Governor's position Livingstone was convinced that Sayd 
was not a representative of the Sultan at all; he denounced 
him as part of ua slaving coterie, or ring, of which Ludha 
Damji C the Customs Master at Zanzibar ) was the head and 
chief money-lender at Zanzibar, and Syde bin Salim •••• was 
the chief inland."32 Such an arrangement, however, would 
really be part of the Zanzibari system of administration in 
which this Indian official played a major role. The Sultan 
supported him as long as he gave stability and protected his 
trade. 
3°see Felly to Stewart, 18. iv. 62, 11. v. 62, 1. vii. 62, 
all in E-31, Z. A. They report no action in regard to the 
closed trade route. 
31For an expedition against the Zaramo, Felly to Forbes, 
1. i. 62, ~-
32 
. Livingstone to Rawlinson, undated, Proceedings of the 
Royal Geo~raphical Society, XVIII(1873-4}, 273. Livingstone 
had some arsh words to say about Sayd. He said: "Syde bin 
Salim ••• the so-called Governor, who is merely a trade agent 
of certain Banyans of Zanzibar, and a person who is reputed 
dishonest by all. As an agent he pilfers from his employers, 
be they Banyans or Arabs; as a Governor, expected to exercise 
the office of a magistrate, he dispences justice to him who 
pays most; and as the subject of a Sultan, who entrusted 
him because he had no power on the mainland to supercede him, 
he robs his superior shamelessly. No Arab or native elder 
ever utters a good word for him, but all detest him for his 
injustice." See Livingstone to Granville, 14. xi• 71, given 
in The New York Herald of 17. viii. 72. 
13. 
Many Arabs went inland in the decade of the 1860's to 
strengthen these trading centers. The new immigrants, how-
ever, were not always a source of strength. Speke reported 
in 1861 of the disorder resulting from new arrivals;33 he 
called them ''fugitive renegades of the Harsi caste. 11 34 This 
group was coming inland as a result o~ troubles with the 
Sultan in Zanzibar and, of course, were not likely to be 
receptive to any form of control from the distant seat of his 
autbority.35 The al Hartbi tribe were firm enemies of the 
Sultan Majid and remained so inland; in 1869 they were yet 
described as "by no means loyal subjects of Seyyid Majid."36 
This migration inland was constant. In 1866 the French repre-
sentative in Zanzibar reported strong emigration still going 
on. He said that 3000 Arabs bad left the island following 
the discontent rising from the Sultan acting with the English 
against the slave trade.37 The number given is too large, 
33 ; Speke to Rigby, 12. v. 61 in Russell, Rigby, 239. 
34 ) Speke to Rumanika, 3. iii. 62, ~. VII(1862-3 , 232. 
35 See R. Coupland, The Ex~loitation of Ea~t Africa: 1856-
1890 (London, 1939), 14ff forte events leading to this exodus. 
36 Sir Reginald Coupland, Livingstone's Last Journey 
(London, 1945), 93. 
37 Jablonski a Drouyn de Lhuys, 28. v. 66, "Correspondance 
Commercial, Zanzibar," III,Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 
(Paris). For events in Zanzibar, Coupland, Exploitation of 
East Africa, 152ff. 
14. 
even with the addition of the Arabs' numerous followers, 
but the report does confirm the movement inland. In the 
same despatch this French official could report that the 
caravans leaving then were bringing the first luxury items 
to the growing community of Tabora. This proved as a later 
visitor said, that Tabora was becoming 11 a second Zanzibar, 
in fact, without the sea, the hindis, and banyans."38 In 
other words the Arabs were establishing in the interior a 
new homeland and a community was to grow up that would spend 
most of its time in the interior and seldom come to the coast 
to visit Zanzibar. 
In the 1870's information becomes more plentiful. Sayd 
ibn Salim continued as Governor and older Arabs connected 
with the early days of Tabora continued to play an important 
role. One such Arab was Sultan ibn Ali, one of the oldest 
Arabs in Tabora.39 New leaders were rising, however, to 
dispute the control of Tabora and they were to disprove 
the statement of a noted student of East African history: 
that the Sultan nclaimed, and usually obtained, the loyal 
obedience of his Arab subjects who were trading there Con 
the mainland of Africa ) • u40 
38nodgshun to Mullens, 8. i. 79, L. M. s. 
39navid Livingstone, Last Journals (London, 1874), II, 
7, 178, 180; Stanley said in 1874 that -he had been twenty-five 
years in Taborat Henry M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent 
{New York, 1878}, I, 44. 
40 Coupland, Livingstone's Last Journey, 30. 
15. 
This crisis in leadership was brought to a danger point 
due to the involvement of the Arab community in a war with 
the powerful Nyamwezi chief, Mirambo. 41 As in the earlier 
war with Mnywa Sere these difficulties grew from an African 
leader's desire to share in the profits af the coastal trade. 
Mirambo dominated the route to Tanganyika and Victoria and 
tried to collect duties from caravans passing that way. 
Refusal led. to war. Mirambo was an able military leader 
and the Arabs were to find a very difficult opponent in this 
"Black Napoleon" -- as Stanley called him. 
When H. M. Stanley arrived in Tabora in mid·-- 1871 , the 
Arabs were preparing for a major effort against Mirambo.42 
The Governor, Sayd ibn Salim, however, advised the Arabs 
not to take the offensive; he considered it wiser that they 
seek a peaceful solution of their problem.43 This would 
appear to support Livingstone's contention that Sayd was an 
agent of the Indian Customs Master of Zanzibar. Sayd knew 
that war would disrupt trade and thus acted to protect his 
interest. Perhaps he knew also the Arab weaknesses that 
41 For Mirambo's career, see Ronald J. Harvey, "Mirambo,u 
!liE' 28(1950), 10-28. 
42 Henry M. Stanley, How I Found Livingstone (New York, 
1872), 268ft. 
43 . ~., 268; Coupland, Livingstone's Last Journey, 163. 
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soon were to be obvious to all. Stanley accompanied the 
Arabs in their campaign against Mirambo and his reports show 
clearly that the Governor exerted no clear control over this 
ill-disciplined military effort. After some initial success 
the Arabs were ambushed by Mirambo's men while heavily laden 
with plunder. The whole force then beat an unruly retreat 
to Tabora. 44 Mirambo then attacked Tabora, destroyed much 
of it, and retreated with large amounts of booty, leaving 
the Arab community completely disorganised. 
A long dragged out campaign against Mlrambo now followed 
and during it rivals of S~yd ibn Salim tried to drive him 
from office. It might be noted that the Nyamwezi chief of 
Tabora was an old man at this time45 and appeared to play 
no role in this power struggle. He apparently was content 
to be a tool of the Arabs in return for whatever benefits 
they gave him. The threat to Sayd's position was to come 
principally from two brothers, Shaykh ibn Nasib and Abdallah 
ibn Nasib. Both were long-time traders in. this part of 
Africa; Burton had met Abdallah in 1857 and when Stanley 
arrived in Tabora in 1871 he had found Shaykh ibn Nasib one 
44The Arab account differs from Stanley's. They reported 
they were attacked at night, not while halted on return from 
the battle as Stanley reported. See de Vienne a de la Valette, 
20. x. 71, C. C. Z., III. 
45stanley, Livingstone, 258. 
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of the most powerful Arabs of that center.46 
Before this internal struggle was ended, however, reports 
of the defeats of the Arabs against Mirambo had reached 
Zanzibar. The ivory trade had grown to large proportions 
by this date and Zanzibar prosperity depended upon its un-
interrupted flow. For example, Bagamoyo, a chief coastal 
center of this trade, had trebled in extent between 1867 and 
1871. 47 Therefore some resolute action was necessary from 
Zanzibar to keep the trade routes open. An early rumor in 
Zanzibar stated that the Customs Master planned to organise 
on his own account a small army to uphold his interests in 
the interior. 48 The role of this official is unclear in 
the reports of the time, but an expedition was sent at length 
to help pacify the area. It appeared to be entirely under 
the Sultan's orders. It is interesting to note that in 
October 1871 a Nyamwezi messenger arrived in Zanzibar 
offering to initiate peace negotiations. He offered to 
return the booty taken during the Arab defeat if terms 
favorable to the Nyamwezi leader in relation to his share 
46Ibid., 220, 266; Isabel Burton, The Life of Captain 
Sir Richard F. Burton (London, 1893), I, 288. 
47Kirk to F. o., 18. ii. 71, E-61, Z. A. 
48de Vienne a de laValette, 20. x. 71, C. C. Z., III. 
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of the trade were made. 49 No further mention is made of this 
embassy and no treaty was made. 
This Zanzabari expedition was not sent for some time 
and trade became entirely stopped. John Kirk in fact felt 
that the Sultan was incapable of acting that far in the 
interior.5° He said of him that on the mainland he was 
known "as a distant feudal lord whose direct interference 
in local affairs is unknown."5 1 Kirk felt that for all 
practical purposes the Nyamwezi country was outside of the 
limits of Zanzibar jurisdiction.52 
The Sultan was determined to act, however. When the 
news of the Arab disaster reached the coast a caravan had 
just started inland carrying powder to Mirambo. The Sultan 
issued orders to try and prevent its reaching him.53 He 
later issued a decree to control all sales of powder in his 
dominions. Kirk upheld this decree in face of some German 
protests. The German merchants had previously monopolised 
49 ~., postcript of 18. x. 71. 
50Kirk to F. 0., 22. ix. 71, E-61, z. A. Kirk was the 
dominant figure in the East Africa of this period. For his 
role, Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 38ff. 
51Kirk to F. o., 25. i. 72, E-62, ~· 
52Kirk to F. o., 2. ix. 72, ~· 
53Kirk to F. 0., 22. ix. 71, F. O. 84/1344, P.R. O. 
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this trade and controlled the sale of powder to Indian 
agents who retailed it to those wishing to buy powder in 
the Zanzibar market. This law became a permanent feature 
of the economic life of Zanzibar. 54 Other merchants were 
justly skeptical of this so-called war measure; they thought 
that Sultan Bargash had passed this act to secure all the 
profits of the powder trade.55 The Sultan in fact did in 
the- future have all powder sold to him; then he sold it to 
Indi.ans for the retail trade. 
The Arabs at Tabora pressed for aid,56 and as the war 
continued and the trade routes remained blocked,57 the Sultan 
by mid-1873 was ready to act. In July 1873, as reports 
reached the coast of Arab gains in this war5~ the Sultan 
prepared to despatch an expedition to end these struggles.59 
60 An Arab with long experience in the interi-or, Amir -ibn -Sultan, 
54
see Kirk to Veers, 31. xii. 75, E-70, Z. A. 
55w. Hathorne to A. Hines, 6. iii. 78, "Hathorne 
Papers," P. M. 
56
sayd ibn Salim to Sultan Barghash, 29 El Kaada 1288, 
in Kirk to F. o., 10. iv. 72 and other enclosures, E-62, z. A. 
57For example, Kirk to Bombay Government, 30. xi. 72, 
.E-62, ibid.; Kirk to F. o., 6. vi. 73, E-63B, ~., quoting 
reports-from v. L. Cameron. 
58Kirk to Schneider, 4. vii. 73, E-63B, ~· 
59Kirk to F. 0., 10. vii. 73, ~· 
60rn mid-1871 Stanley had met him returning from a ten-
year stay at Tabora - Stanley, Livingstone, 219-20. 
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was chosen to command this force, and in addition was named 
to replace Sayd ibn Salim as Governor of Tabora.61 The 
Sultan took this decisive step since reports were reaching 
the coast that Sayd was aiding Mirambo in this struggle. 
These reports would continue for a number of years as the 
war with Mirambo dragged on. 62 The English officials at 
Zanzibar were also dissatisfied with Sayd due to the hin-
drances · put in Livingstone's path and may have prompted 
the Sultan to this step. Kirk wrote home of Sayd: "he is 
the one on whom the war ••• is laid, and if he had been 
killed we should all have been better satisfied."63 These 
charges against Sayd will be discussed below64 and it will 
suffice to say here that this step of the Sultan helped 
to insure the failure of his expedition by creating internal 
difficulties in Tabora. 
Amir ibn Sultan arrived in Tabora near the end of 1873 
with a force of over 1000 men. He immediately ran into 
opposition from Sayd ibn Salim. Shaykh ibn Nasib and 
Abdallah ibn Nasib also refused to accept him as the 
61 Prideaux to F. 0., 21. iv. 74, E-64, z. A. 
62 See below, p. 22, 27. 
63~, XVI(1871-2), 103. 
64see below, p. 22. 
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commander-in-chief. One reporter said they refused his 
demands "as they were both seniorto him in the Sultan's 
service." Sayd took the same stand.65 What this actually 
meant was that the Arabs of Tabora were resisting the 
imposition of this official upon them from the distant 
Sultan of Zanzibar. Their power in Tabora came from their 
standing in the Arab community of that center and they 
were not prepared to bow to any interference from Zanzibar. 
Sayd and the brothers Nasib may have been contenders for 
power in Tabora among themselves, but they would not recog-
nize the right of the Sultan to settle their dispute to his 
own satisfaction. 
This dissension prevented any campaign from being 
undertaken against Mirambo and the reports reaching the 
coast were so serious that the British representative said: 
"it seems a question whether His Highness the Sultan will 
be able to maintain his position in the interior much 
longer."66 In November 1873 the Sultan refused to honor 
any more bills drawn upon him at Tabora since he considered 
that conditions there would insure that his aid would be 
wasted. 67 Matters did not improve and in December 1874 it 
65v. L c • ameron, Across Africa (London, 1877), I, 196; 
Foran, Cameron, 103. 
66Prideaux to F. 0., 21. ix. 74, E-65, Z. A. 
67Kirk to F. 0., 7. xi. 73, E-63B, ~· 
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was reported that the Sultan, in spite of renewed pleas of 
aid from Tabora, "would no longer afford any assistance 
whatever to the Arab colonists in Unyanyembe, and disclaimed 
all authority over that country."68 This report proved to 
be true and the Sultan ordered Amir ibn Sultan to return 
with all his men to Zanzibar and ••to abstain from interfer-
ing with the disturbances in the interior." The Sultan said 
that Amir had his full confidence but that he could do no 
more than he had done by sending this force and that he 
was determined now to 11leave the Arab colonists to fight 
their battles."69 
Amir ibn Sultan had returned to Zanzibar by July 1875 
with a force greatly decimated by illness. The earlier 
report that all the difficulties with Mirambo were due 
to_ the conduct of Sayd ibn Sultan was confirmed by these 
returning Arabs and was in fact made even more serious. 
Now it was said that the troubles resulted from the important 
Arabs of Tabora refusing to obey Sayd ibn Salim. He there-
fore had stirred up Mirambo to act against these Arabs to 
break their power. These Arabs blamed Sayd£or warning 
Mirambo in advance of their plans and also£or supplying him 
68 4 Elton to F. 0., 22. xii, 7 , with enclosures from the 
Tabora Arabs, E-65, ~· 
69 Elton to F. 0., ?. xii. 74, ~· 
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with powder to resist them.70 These charges are difficult 
to assess. In 1872 a report had Sayd leading the forces of 
Tabora against Mirambo.71 He had been present also at the 
defeat of 1871.72 He could have been guilty as charged 
but lack of evidence prevents any positive decision. We 
must remember that the available reports on his supposed 
conduct emanate from his enemies among the Arabs in Tabora 
and Zanzibar.73 In any event Sayd ibn Salim was to retain 
his post for several years after these charges were made. 
Shortly after the return of Amir ibn Salim the road 
was opened for trade again. Mirambo it appeared had been 
rendered harmless by the ban on powder sales on the coast. 
Mirambo as a consequence was ready to nesotiate for peace. 
He sent a present of ivory to the Sultan and said he would 
take no further warlike actions until his messengers returned. 
Sultan Barghash refused to accept this gift but instructed 
the Church Missionary Society to sell it and to return the 
70 Smith to F. 0., 31. vii. 75, E-75 and an undated, 
unsigned note in E-67, ~· 
71 Stanley, Li vinsstone, 611. 
72 
.ill.2.·' 282. 
73some of these charges are given in a letter by Dr. 
Dutrieux in La Flandre Liberal, 30. v. 78. This clipping 
is located in "Extrait de la Press, Association Internationale 
Afriacine," I, Ministere des A.ffaires Etrangeres (Brussels). 
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proceeds to Mirambo.74 Such action would appear to have 
been a face-saving move on the part of the Sultan. When 
presents were sent in East Africa the custom for the receiver 
was to return a present of equal value. If Mirambo chose to 
regard this as such an action and opted for peace, the 
Sultan could gain his desired aim of peaceful conditions for 
trade and yet he could not be accused of bowing to the 
enemy of his subjects in the interior of Africa. Manifestly 
in the Sultan's view it was up to the Arabs of Tabora to 
solve the problem of Mirambo themselves. Apparently they 
were willing to accept a period of peace as a large caravan 
arrived on the coast as early as May 1874.75 An interesting 
sidelight is that during these troubled years Arabs had 
continued to leave Zanzibar to try to make their fortunes 
in Africa.76 Though our informant does not mention the 
destination of these Arabs, many of them took the central 
route through Tanganyika and penetrated to areas far into 
the interior. 77 
Sayd ibn Salim managed to remain in power until late 
in 1877 or early in 1878. He bad apparently visited 
74Kirk to F. 0., 12. i. 74, E-64, Z. A.; Kirk to F. o., 
10. vii. 73, E-63B, ~· 
75Prideaux to F. o., 30. v. 74, E-64, ~· 
76de Vienne a de laValette, 15. x. 73, C. C. Z., III. 
77As a result by 1877 an estimated 2000 tusks of ivory 
a year were reaching Zanzibar. See Thomson to Mullens, 
19. vii. 77, L. M. S. 
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Zanzibar in 187678 without any serious action being taken 
against him. In July 1877 an English visitor bad thanked 
him for his kind treatment while in Tabora,79 but a later 
undated report by this same observer stated that Sayd had 
been driven out of Tabora and was living in a small village 
nearby. 80 During his stay there several English missionaries 
visited Sayd and he was anxious to report his side of the 
story to them. Two described him: na bland, kind old 
gentleman, apparently quite frank and artless"81 and "a 
corpulent, flabby fleshed little man, to whom every movement 
must be pain.n82 Abdallah ibn Nasib bad driven Sayd from 
Tabora with the aid of Siki, son of the former Nyamwezi 
leader ot that settlement, and he now ruled Tabora with the 
aid of his brother Shaykh ibn Nasib.83 Kirk reported that 
Abdallah bad acted on his own account and bad no mandate 
from the Sultan of Zanzibar to take this step.84 Abdallah 
ibn Nasib claimed, however, that he had authorization from 
the Sultan for this act. 85 . Kirk's report is probably nearer 
78smitb to Wigram, 22. x. 76, C. A6/M1, c. M. s. 
79Morton to Smith in Smith to W1gram, 19. ix. 77, lli1_. 
8owilson to Wigram, 1 • i. 78, O.A6/0 25, ibid. 
-
81nodgshun to Mullens, 23. i. 79, L. M. s. 
82Mackay, "Journal, 11 C. A6/0 1 6, C • . M. s. 
83rn 1876 it had been reported that Abdallah ibn Nasib 
was returning to Tabora for four or five years - Smith to 
Wigram, 13. ix. 76, C.A6/0 25, ~. 
84Kirk to Derby, 4. iv. 78, F. o. 84/1514, P. R. 0. 
85Mackay to Smith, 16. v. 78, C.A6/0 3, c. M. S. 
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to the truth as his closeness to the Sultan allowed him a 
very complete knowledge of what was going on in Zanzibar. 
And Kirk was such an avowed opponent of Abdallah ibn Nasib 
that it is doubtful that the Sultan would have courted 
trouble by selecting him for this important post. Kirk 
said that he was happy to see Sayd ibn Salim go but ''his 
successor in office is worse in every respect and is a man 
to be avoided." Sayd ibn Salim, he added, was at least noted 
for his hospitality to his European visitors, whatever his 
other defects. 86 
According to Sayd ibn Salim the reason for his expulsion 
from Tabora was his friendly attitude to the English 
missionaries then visiting Tabora in increasing numbers.87 
He claimed that the Nasibs and the other Arabs of Tabora 
involved in the slave trade had driven him away since they 
felt that he would spy upon them and report their doings 
to the English. 88 He for his own part declared that he . did 
not participate in the slave trade and that he had in fact 
spent large sums to liberate slaves brought to Tabora by 
other Arabs.89 Sayd had apparently been counting on aid 
86Kirk to Hutchinson, 20. x. 78, O.A6/0 13, ~· 
87For this activity, see below, p. 81. 
88Mackay to Wigram, 25. iv. 76, C.A6/0 16, c. M. s. 
89unfortunately for Sayd many observers were able to 
report on his slaving activities. See Wilson to Wigram, 
23. ix. 78, C.A6/0 25, ~., and a letter of Stanley's of 
28. x. 76 in The New York Herald, 10. x. 77. 
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from the English for a long time befere he was actually 
driven from office. In a meeting with a missionary in early 
1877 Sayd reported that he was in fear of being deposed 
due to the enmity of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and to the 
confusion of this visitor made a rather humorous proposal; 
the Englishman reported that in this eventuality "according 
to the interpreter he intends to join the British navy, but 
I scarcely know what as."9° In a more serious vein Sayd 
had written to the British officials on the coast for aid 
now that he was no longer at Tabora. Kirk replied that he 
could do nothing for him as far as his former position was 
concerned. But he did offer to guarantee personally his 
security if he returned to Zanzibar as the Sultan was 
requesting.9 1 Kirk made this request to help insure that 
there would be peace in the interior, an especially important 
point with the increasing European penetration of this part 
of Africa. 
More important was the immediate factor of Sayd's ties 
to the warrior Mirambo. Mirambo had been ready in 1878 to 
make peace "on honourable terms, provided they C the Arabs ) 
9°smith to Wigram, 1. i. 77, O.A6/0 22, c. M. s. 
91Kirk to Saeed bin Salim, 2. vii. 78, N-25, z. A. and 
Kirk to F. 0., 31. v. 79, Q-22, ~· 
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will pay him a tribute as a recognition of his power and 
status."92 Sayd had apparently favored this approach but he 
did not have enough general backing to carry his plans 
through to fruition. It was at this stage of events that 
Sayd was deposed by the Nasib group which, though acting 
for its own interests, was sure to be r~cognised by the 
Sultan due to Sayd's unpopularity at the coast.93 With 
his flight Sayd entered into close relations with Mirambo, 
closer as we shall see than this Arab desired. A plan was 
reported drawn up between Sayd and Mirambo to restore the 
former Governor to his previous position at Tabora. At 
the same time an ally of Mirambo's would be made the African 
leader of that center.94 Mirambo then would be able to 
exercise much influence over the Arab traders and insure 
that he would get the share he desired of trading revenues. 
But Sayd was old and ill and he soon wanted to retire from 
politics and return to Zanzibar. Mirambo, however, refused 
to let him go95 since he was of great use in his quarrel 
92Wilson to Wigram, 8. ii. 78, C.A6/0 25, c. M. s. 
93see footnote 32 for an example of this feeling. 
94see a letter from the German Association members in 
Mittheilungen der Afrikanischen Gesellschaft in Deutschland 
I(1B7S-9), 163. 
95southon to Mullens, 18. ix. 79, L. M. s. 
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with the Arabs. The English missionary at Mirambo's court 
did his best to secure Sayd's release but he was not able 
to succeed.96 Finally Sayd became very ill, and though he 
at first recovered,97 his days were closing and he died in 
December 1879. 98 
Before leaving Sayd ibn Salim it might be recounted 
that although he lived in close proximity to Tabora he never 
seemed to be in much actual danger from his enemies there. 
One missionary thought that he was in much danger; he said 
that Abdallah ibn Nasib 11 was continually trying to take his 
life and our friend was a man driven to despair."99 This 
was probably a tale told by Sayd to gain English sympathy. 
Another observer was probably closer to the truth when he 
reported that Abdallah ibn Nasib would have liked·: to finish 
off Sayd but had been prevented by "some powerful friends.n100 
These friends were able to protect him and it seems were 
also able to save his family. Abdallah ibn Nasib asked a 
missionary to bring Sayd's wives and children to his place 
of refuge outside of Tabora.101 Thus it appears that the 
96southon to Kirk, 9. ix. 79, K-1, Z. A. 
97southon to Mullens, 1. xi. 79, L. M. s. 
98southon to Mullens, 24. xii. 79, ~· 
99copplestone to Wigram, 17. xi. 79, C.A6/0 9, c. M. s. 
100stokes to Wigram, 23. x11. 78, C.A6/0 24, ~· 
101c. T. Wilson and R. Felkin, Uganda and the Egyptian 
Sudan (London, 1882), I, 134. 
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Arabs in their internal struggles were following a rough 
code of rules that barred the use of underhanded measures 
against their opponents. Sayd's property was all taken, 102 
but otherwise he was free to return to Zanzibar if he had 
been able to escape from Mirambo.103 
Abdallah ibn Nasib was a popular governor of Tabora.104 
There are different accounts as to his origins: Sayd ibn 
Salim called him "an upstart from Mombasa, and ••• not 
even an .Arab;"105 .a European reported that he was an Arab 
who had come to Zanzibar from Oman. 106 In any case he was 
able to work closely with the other important Arabs of 
Tabora - Shaykh ibn Nasib, Sultan ibn Ali, Zayd ibn Juma, 
107 Salim ibn Sayf - in keeping the- community: under hi-s fir-m 
102 Mackay, "Journal," 13. v. 78, C.A6/0 16, c. M. s. 
103Perhaps this treatment of Sayd was due to the high 
rank of his family in the affairs of Zanzibar. His father 
had been Governor of Kilwa and he had earlier commanded the 
Sultan's forces at Saadani - Capt. Burton, "Zanzibar;. and 
Two Months in East Africa, .. Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 
LXXXIII (1858), 211. 
104Jerome Becker, 
(Bruxelles, n.d.), 89. 
letting his men retain 
local wars. 
La Trois feme Exp~·di tion Belge 
Becker claimed that this was due to 
a large share of the booty taken during 
105Mackay, "Journal,'' 13. v. 78, C.A6/0 16, c. M. s. 
106Adolphe Burdo, Les Belges .dans l'AfriSue Centrale 
de Zanzibar au Tanganika (Bruxelles, 1885), 2 5. 
107Becker, Troisieme Exp~dition, 172. Salim ibn Sayf 
incidentally was not in trade. Unusual among Arabs, he had 
large landed estates in Tabora and lived entirely from their 
proceeds. 
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direction. He apparently tried to honor the directions 
sent to him from Zanzibar, if they did not interfere with 
matters of immediate interest to him and his group. For 
example, he once tried to prevent some French missionaries 
from paying a visit to Mirambo to seek porters when they 
saw they could find none in Tabora. When they presented a 
letter from the Sultan enjoining full cooperation from all 
his subjects, he immediately allowed them to go and deal 
with his enemy. 108 There is a dissenting view on this 
obedience, however. Sayd ibn Salim, of course an interested 
party, claimed that Abdallah was a supporter of a brother 
of the Sultan who was working to depose him. This inter-
pretation has some support from a missionary. He ~ stated 
that the Sultan had sent many letters of recall to Tabora 
summoning Abdallah back to Zanzibar. 109 No other inform-
ation supports this claim, however, and Abdallah was to act 
as Governor for several years with the apparent backing of 
the Zanzibar authorities. Perhaps the Sultan did send these 
letters at the instigation of Kirk, but they would have been 
merely form letters since he had no power to effect such a 
recall. 
108 f A t ' J. Cussac, L Apotre de 1 Ouganda: Le Pere Lourdel 
(Paris, 1944), 50. . 
109Mackay to Wigram, 2 · xi. 78, C.A6/0 16, c. M. s. 
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Abdallah ibn Nasib and his group continued to keep a 
firm control over the Nyamwezi chief of Tabora, Siki, son 
of the former ruler, Mkasiwa. 110 Siki was later to win 
renown as a fierce fighter but in the years around 1880 the 
European visitors to Tabora pictured him as a rather pathetic 
creature entirely under the thumb of the Arabs. 111 Some such 
control was of vital necessity to the Arabs. Siki might have 
been a weak vassal, but only through him could the Arabs get 
labor, collect taxes, and secure support for their wars. 
In return Siki received all the goods he wanted and thus was 
willing to delegate all control of trade to the Arabs.112 
On some observers Siki made a favorable impression; one 
reported: "He is a very plain-featured, but otherwise is 
the most civilised native I have yet seen."113 
Abdallah ibn Nasib was governor during the period when 
Europeans began to visit this part of Africa in increasing 
numbers and to inaugurate non-governmental settlements.114 
110 Burdo, Les Belges, 53. 
1 1 1 Becker, Troisieme Exp~dition, 91. 
11 2 Burdo, Les Belges, 305. 
11 3Joseph Thomson, To the Central African Lakes and 
]!£! (London, 1881 ), II, 257. 
114For the Europeans and their reception, see below, 
p. 113. 
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The Governor and his group aided these visitors in varying 
degrees as long as they did not wish to compete with the 
Arabs for the trade of the area. If they tried to compete, 
various pressures were used to expel them. Also, if the 
Arabs thought that these invaders were usurping power over 
some of their African vassals, they might work to hinder 
their progress.115 
As a result of one of these interferences with a 
European trader Abdallah ibn Nasib was called to Zanzibar 
by the Sultan in 1881.116 When he arrived he was disgraced 
by the Sultan. He never regained his position and he died 
in Zanzibar in 1883. 117 This is the first time that a 
governor had obeyed an order of recall issued by the Sultan 
of Zanzibar. Why did Abdallah obey this order? No definite 
reason has been found for his compliance. The Sultan's 
power had not increased in the interior and his attitude 
toward the interior had not changed. Kirk could report 
three years later that the Sultan as always demonstrated 
"utter apathy to what takes place away from Zanzibar so long 
as he receives his revenue."118 The present writer would 
115nr. Richard Bohm, Von Sansibar zum TanganJika 
(Leipzig, 1888), 73-74. 
116 Becker, La Vie en Afrl9,ue, II, 10; see a letter of 
R. P. Guillet of 8. ill. 82, _In._n_a_l_e_s __ d_e __ l_a __ P_r_o.p_a~g.a_t_i_o_n_.d_e __ l~a 
l£1, 55(1883), 65. 
11 7Becker, La Vie en Afrique, II, 448. 
118Kirk to F. 0., 23. ix. 84, E-81, Z. A. 
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postulate that the Sultan recalled him due to European 
pressure. 119 He no doubt cared little if Abdallah ibn 
Nasib or some other Arab ruled Tabora and acted merely to 
keep affairs tranquil. Abdallah may have obeyed this order 
because he had important property holdings in Zanzibar 
which the Sultan threatened to seize, a common method of 
pressuring Arabs to return to the coast, or perhaps the 
Sultan did not make it clear to Abdallah that his order to 
return was issued to punish him and thus misled him into 
obeying. 
Shaykh ibn Nasib had ruled in Tabora during his brother's 
absence.120 The Sultan, however, had a change in mind and 
appointed Muhammad Massudi, a brother of the famous Tippu 
Tip, to replace Abdallah ibn Nasib. 121 Muhammad had been 
a former resident of Tabora and prepared to leave for his 
new post with a strong caravan in 1883. Perhaps this 
appointment might signify that Tippu Tip was intervening in 
the affairs of Tabora to bring it under his influence. His 
fa.ther was a long time resident in that center and in Tip,pu' s 
11 9Kirk as we have shown above was always his strong 
opponent. For example, see Southon to Mullens, 24. xii. 79, 
L. M. S. 
• 
Vie en Afrique, II, 448. 
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many visits there he may have seen a chance for his taking 
over direction of this important center.122 At this time 
the war with Mirambo was still going on in a sporadic fashion. 
The Arabs of Tabora seemed incapable of ending it. In 1880 
envoys from the Sultan had visited Mirambo to negotiate over 
these difficulties but nothing came of the visit. 123 In 1882 
Mirambo sent ivory to Tabora as a present for its rulers 
and envoys went along to see what they could accomplish. 
Shaykh ibn Nasib feigned illness and would not see them.t24 
Mirambo then began to make advances to Tippu Tip. Tippu was 
willing and sent his son to meet with Mirambo. The Arabs 
of Tabora were very unhappy at this action and even threatened 
Tippu's son Sefu for his efforts. Mirambo now let Tippu's 
caravans pass in peace and Tippu was ready to plead Mirambo's 
cause at Zanzibar. Tippu said that he had been asked to 
become governor of Tabora, but developments in the Congo 
were to require his presence there.125 Therefore his brother 
122 For Tippu Tip's father,~., I, 173-74. 
123southon to Mullens, 23. iii. 80, t. M. s. 
124Becker, La Vie en Afrique, II, 181. 
125Maisha a Hamed bin Muhammed el Mur 
lli· Historical Introduction by Miss 
lation by w. H. Whiteley. Supplement 
Swahili Committee, Journals No. 28/2, 
January 1959, 17-20, 137-39. 
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I 
was made governor, and it appears thus that Tippu had made 
his bid for the control of Tabora. 
Muhammad Massudi, however, seems never to have played 
an important role at Tabora. When Sultan Barhgash wrote to 
the Arabs of Tabora in 1884, he addressed his letters to 
Zayd ibn Juma.1 26 Zayd had been important in the affairs 
of Tabora for several years and was one of the wealthiest 
Arabs there. 127 He was to remain the principal Arab there 
for the next few years,1 28 and, though it is unclear when 
he was named or confirmed as governor, he did hold this 
position in 1886.1 29 This period will be considered below 
as conditions in the interior began to change as the result 
of European assumption of political control in various areas 
of East Africa. 
The second Arab center of importance in inner Tanganyika 
was at Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika. The village of Ujiji had 
been visited from the coast at least by 1830. 13° By the 
126Ledoulx: aM. E. A., 22. x. 84, "Politique, Zanzibar," 
VI, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Paris}. This despatch 
encloses a letter of Zayd ibn Juma. 
127Becker, La Vie en Afrique, I, 332. 
128Boustead, Ridley and Co. to L. M. s., 15. ii. 86, 
L. M. S. 
129Kirk to F. 0., 3. vi. 86, E-90, Z. A. 
130Mr. Macqueen, "Notes on African Geography •••• Visit 
of Lief Bin Saeid to the Great African Lake,"~. 15(1845), 
371ff. 
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1840's the Arabs from Zanzibar werel using it as a base to 
cross the lake. Sayd ibn Habib, pelrhaps the greatest of 
all Arab travellers from Zanzibar, crossed the lake on his 
trans-African journey around 1844.131 Richard F. Burton, 
the explorer, said later that an ~~ab party that left 
Zanzibar around 1842, probably SayCL ibn Habib's group, 
uwere almost the first traders that crossed the Tanganyika 
Lake." 132 Sayd ibn Habib after crossing Tanganyika went 
south .througb. the territory of the K.azembe,133 visited 
Katanga, and eventually reached thE! Atlantic coast in 
Angola. He traded, of course, all during this expedition 
and went back on his tracks several times. He met LiVing-
' . 
stone twice during these travels. 1 }4· Not much information 
was gained, however, from these trt!v>els. As Sayd ibn 
Habib said: "I have never written down anything I have 
observed during my travels, becaus~~ Arabs have no interest 
in the discovery of foreign countrle1s, and do not care to 
131 Said bin Habeeb, "Narrativ1e.... of an Arab Inhabitant 
of Zanzibar," Transactions of the :~mba.y Geographical Society, 
X:J(1860), 147. 
132PRGS, III(1858-9), 363. 
133For the Kazembe, see R. F. Burton, The Lands of 
Oazembe. Lacerda's Journey to Oaz~1be in 1728 (London, 1873). 
134I. Shapera (ed.), David Liv ngstone: Family Letters, 
1841-1856 (London, 1959), II, 225,""'1~65. 
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hear of anything unconnected with the acquisition of riches."135 
Sayd ibn Habib did not return to Zanzibar until 186o, but a 
group of Arabs travelling with him left the Atlantic coast 
in 1853 and arrived in Mozambique :tn November 1854.136 
Our first direct information of Ujiji dates from 1858.137 
It was then a very small and unhealthy town that was used 
mainly as a trading depot. Carav~ts came up from Tabora, 
secured as quickly as they could the desired merchandise, 
and then left. The names of several Arabs then present are 
mentioned but no one of them seems to have exercised any 
overall control. The African chief of the area was yet in a 
strong position. Ujiji as a district was under one chief 
who, though he never visited the vlllage of Ujiji, had a 
representative there as in all his other districts to 
exercise the forms of his control. ~138 Burton characterised 
the inhabitants as a troublesome l()t and mentioned that the 
traders had to endure many impositlons to satisfy the chief. 
Burton himself had much difficulty with his representative 
at Ujiji. 
l35said bin Habeeb, "Narrati v1~," 148. 
136PRGS, I(1855-6), 58, 75. 
-
l37Burton, Lake Regions, II, ·!i-6 ff; Speke, What Led to 
the Discovery, 199ff. 
138cameron, Across Africa, I, 244. 
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The main activity of Ujiji centered around the sending 
out of expeditions to trade and raid in the Lake Tanganyika 
area. This process had been going on since the early 1840's, 
and by 1858 a great many of the areas on the lake had been 
visited by the Arabs.139 The westward penetration was as 
yet not undertaken by many, however, and remained very 
dangerous- a resort for "debtors and desperate men."140 
For example, one Arab, the owner of the only dhow then on 
the lake, crossed the lake just after Burton and Speke left. 
He and his party were murdered.141 
In later years the Arabs and coastal people took the 
administration of Ujiji in hand. Livingstone, before he 
visited Ujiji, noted in his journal that the Customs Master 
of Zanzibar had an agent there.142 Who he was or what his 
powers were is unclear. In 1869 a brief reference in a 
doubtful source mentions a governor at Ujiji.143 The indi-
vidual concerned had not visited that part of Africa and 
was no doubt reporting news that he had heard in Zanzibar. 
139Burton, Lake Regions, II, 61, 116, 120-21, 147-52; 
Speke, What Led to the Discovery, 199. 
140Burton, Lake Regions, II, 149. 
141 Richard F. Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island, and 
Coast (London, 1872), II, 300. 
142 Livingstone, Last Journals, I, 8. 
143R. M. Heanley, A Memoir of Bishop Steer~. (London, 
1890), 75. 
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But the statement may have validity if we recognise that 
the sense of the term governor for Ujiji implied merely an 
individual with an unofficial sway over the inhabitants of 
that village. In 1867 and 1868 Livingstone had met at the 
Kazembe's and aided one Muhammad ibn Salah who had been 
thirty-five years in the interior of Africa, twenty-five of 
them as a prisoner of the Kazembe. Livingstone with the 
help of his letter from the Sultan of Zanzibar secured his 
freedom. In May 1869 Muhammad ibn Salah arrived in Ujiji 
again after this long exile.1~y 1874 he was called the 
"practical head" of the Arab community, though he had no 
authority from Zanzibar. 145 There were, however, other 
important figures there who perhaps rivaled him in actual 
power; in 1871, Sayd ibn Majid, Abid ibn Suliman, Muhammad 
ibn Gharib, and Mwinyi Kheri;146 in 1874, Mwinyi Kheri, 
Muhammad ibn Gharib, Hassani ibn Gharib, Sayd ibn Mazrui, 
Abdallah ibn Habib, and Sayd ibn Habib.1 47 At the same 
time Livingstone again reported an agent there, this time 
of the Governor of Tabora,l48 and thus indirectly of the 
Customs Master at Zanzibar. 149 
144 Livingstone, Last Journals, I, 276, 287, II, 9. 
l45oameron, Across Africa, I, 242. 
146stanley, Livingstone, 410, 416. 
147oameron, Across Africa, I, 242-43, 246. 
148 
. Livingstone to Granville, 14. xii. 71, in the!!! 
York Herald, 17. viii. 72. 
149see above, p. 12. 
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During this period, when power among the Arabs was 
gravitating into a relatively few hands, new developments 
to the west of Lake Tanganyika were changing the character 
of Ujiji and bringing ever increasing numbers of Arabs 
there on their way to the regions beyond. In the late 
186o's Arabs, pushing west and southwest from Ujiji and 
also returning from going around the southern end of 
Tanganyika, found rich new ivory lands in what is today 
the Congo. The first Arabs returned around 1867150 with 
reports of these riches, .and by 1870 "a sort of California 
gold-fever" was raging in Ujiji. 151 What sold for $120 in 
Zanzibar could be bought for twenty-five cents worth of 
copper.152 Little positive news of this new area had 
reached the coast but all soon had heard of it. Kirk 
said of Manyema in the Congo: "I can get no correct accounts 
of Manyema; everyone knows it, but I find no one who has 
been there •••• it seems to be rather a new and special 
line of trade."153 Caravans were soon reported returning 
15°stanley, in a letter of 26. xii. 71 in the New York 
Herald, 15. viii. 72. 
151Livingstone to Murchison, iv-vii. 70, ~. XVIII 
(1873-4), 276. 
l52Kirk to Murchison, 10. xi. 71, New York Herald, 
11. xii. 71. For the role of copper in Central African 
trade, A. H. Quiggin, "Trade Routes, Trade and Currency in 
East Africa," The Occasional Papers of the Rhodes-Livingstone 
Museum, 5(1949), Bff. 
153Kirk to Murchison, 25. ix. 71, New York Herald, 
11. xii. 71. 
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with 18,000 to 35,000 pounds of ivory,154 and thus the rush 
to secure a share of these profits soon became general. 
With this inrush155 to the Congo a prosperous and busy 
center developed at Ujiji; but in a different way :from the 
Arab center of Tabora. While many of the more important Arabs 
passed through Ujij1 on their way to and from the Congo -
as T1ppu Tip,156 Juma Merikani,157 Sayd ibn Habib158- this 
colony was administered by a group of men who seldom if ever 
came to Zanzibar.159 Kirk in fact in 1872 said of them: "no 
true Arab has yet passed that way. 11 160 This statement shows 
that none of Kirk's many contacts was with the leaders of 
this center, and of course he was in touch with all returning 
to Zanz1bar. 
154Livingstone to Maclear, 17. xi. 71, PRGS, XVII 
-( 1872-3) J 70. 
l55For the story of -the Arabs in the Congo, P. Ceulemans, 
La question arabe et le Congo (1883-1892) (Bruxelles, 1959). 
156Maisha ya Hamed bin Muhammed, 121. 
157cameron, Across A:frica, I, 297. 
1581.lli·, 246. 
159These passing Arabs though powerful would need their 
aid to supply their men. They would be careful to observe 
the correct attitude to the local rulers. See Maisha ya 
Hamed bin Muhammed, 121. 
16
°Kirk to Bombay Government, 9. ii. 72, E-62, z. A. 
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Muhammad ibn Salah, who had not been east of Ujiji since 
1842,161 remained chief Arab at Ujiji until his death in 
1876. 162 Mwinyi Kheri, a Swahili from the East African 
coast, was second to him in power in 1874; in that year he 
married the daughter of the chief.163 He soon took over 
the foremost position; Stanley reported him Governor in 
1876.164 Stanley also commented OI). the excellent .feeling 
present betlveen I•1winyi Kheri and the African chief of Ujiji. 
Both leaders administered justice, but in very difficult 
cases they cooperated to get the best solution.165 
In this period before frequent European visitors arrived 
Ujiji was a busy slave mart. Though many slaves from beyond 
Lake Tanganyika never reached the Indian Ocean, many were 
taken and sold at Ujiji, Tabora, or other inland markets. 
They were extensively used in Ujiji for domestic service 
and for the rougher types of labor. The average trader 
kept from twenty to one hundred slaves in his household, 
161 cameron, Across Africa, I, 242. 
162stanley, Dark Continent, I, 509. 
l63cameron, Across Africa, I, 243. 
164 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, 2. Stanley was confused 
over leadership in Ujiji; in another letter of 1876 lil.e ..; said 
that Muhammad ibn Gharib was Governor - Emile de Laveleye, 
L'Afrigue Centrale et le Conference Geographigue (Bruxelles, 
1878)' 143. 
165 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, 7. 
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and the African inhabitants also held many slaves.166 A 
later traveller commented that Ujiji was very unhealthy for 
those engaged in hard labor and that their average life 
span there was only one year.167 When these slaves first 
arrived from areas like Manyema or Marungu they were usually 
in a wretched condition. Life in Ujiji was not much better 
for them. One observer wrote: utb.e slaves of Ujiji are the 
most degraded class and the most wretched I have seen in 
Africa. They are ill-fed and beaten, eaten up alive with 
itch and the scurvy, and they are driven like cattle to work 
in the fields and to build houses. •t168 Livingstone commented 
also on this trade and on those behind it: 
Banyan money carried on all the slaving in Manyema •••• 
They work it quietly and well, for the Manyema women 
are very pretty and are usually sold off for very 
large prices .as soon as captured, or at least long 
before they reach the coast. No gang in chains 
is ever sent down, but these wretched British 
Indian subjects who would not hurt a flea are by 
their money, arms, ammunition, and goods, in the 
hands of Arab agents really the worst cannibals in 
all . Af'rica. 169 
166Hore to Mullens, 16. iv. 79, L. M, s. 
• 1 and 1 trans. M. J. A. Bergmann 
168 F. Pocock, 20. vii. 76, in New York Herald, 7. iv. 77. 
Stanley comments on 250 such slaves belonging to an agent of 
Sayd ibn Salim of Tabora in a letter of 28. x. 76 in~., 
1 o. x. 77. 
169nav1d Chamberlin, Some Letters from Livingstone 
(London, 1940), 273. 
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It is well to point this out now as the slave trade went 
underground on the arrival of long-term European settlers 
and passed unnoticed by many observers. 
With the arrival of European missionaries, in 1878 
and later, the firm control of Mwinyi Khrei was soon demon-
strated. One of these missionaries, E. a. Hore, mentioned 
that there were two factions in Ujiji, one led by Mwinyi 
Kheri and the other by an Arab, Abdullah ibn Siliman. 
Mwinyi Kheri seemed to have the upper hand, because the 
district chief at Ujiji, Abi, "a sad drunkard," was entirely 
under his influence.170 Hore soon learned, however, that 
no one could approach the great African chief of all Ujiji 
without the approval of the leader of the Arab community. 
This African chief, who for religious reasons could not 
look upon the lake, lived in the mountains two days• journey 
from U~ijiJ7 1 and had sent friendly messages to the English 
visitors. But such messages could not be acted upon without 
Arab consent. 172 The Arabs thus made sure that no meetings 
were held with the African chief without their approval in 
advance. Mwinyi ruled and made it certain he would continue 
17°Hore to Mullens, 17. ix. 78, L. M. s. 
171L'Assaut des Pays Negres, 304. 
172 i 7 L M S Hore to Mullens, 10. • 9, • • • 
to do so. Hore concluded: "he is to all intents and 
purposes the king of the co~try.nl73 
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Mwinyi Kheri was sure enough of his position to leave 
on an expedition to the north of the lake. Mwinyi had much 
power there where he had a trading station at Uvira on the 
northwestern corner of the lake.174 As was usual at Ujiji 
many other Arabs left at the same time to carry out their 
activities in the various parts of the interior. Mwinyi 
Hassani, another Swahili, represented Mwinyi Kheri during 
his absence. Though he maintained the same policy as his 
chief and the Arab inhabitants went along with his deci-
sions,175 this organisation was very fragile. While Mwinyi 
Kheri was away, a rumor spread that Mirambo was to attack. 
Much disorder resulted and no effort was made for a common 
defense. If an attack had actually come, the whole Arab 
community might have been swept away.176 
Though Ujiji was becoming a much busier center, it 
retained its earlier character. It continued to be of 
more importance as a stQp on the road than as an actual 
l73~., 27. v. 79. 
174 . ~es Missions Catholi§ues, XII(1880), 386; Edward c. 
Hore , fanganyika {London, 1 8 2) , 1 59. . 
175 6 Hore to Mullens, 1 • iv. 79, L. M. s. 
176L'Assaut des Pays Negres, 309-10. 
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center of trade.177 It was used by all the Arabs working 
in the lake area and by those passing to the Congo. Here 
one could find the goods necessary for the progress of a 
caravan. This was the reason for the existence of Ujiji 
and for its continued success.178 As long as Mwinyi Kheri 
kept order there would be no movement against him. There 
were never many Arabs there at any one time, perhaps twenty-
four at the most, 179 and Ujiji remained their oasis in an 
African sea. Some Europeans seeing it for the first time 
commented on its poor appearance and seeming lack of 
wealth.180 I~ they had arrived, however, when a large 
caravan was passing through on its way to the coast, the 
place of Ujiji in the Arab system would have been clear.181 
The Arabs of Ujiji never mentioned any connection with 
Zanzibar unless it appeared necessary to secure a disputed 
point. Usually they would not admit of any jurisdiction 
by the Sultan over themselves or their property. They 
l77Hore, Tang!Alika, 69. 
178L1 Assaut des Pays Negres, 299. 
l79Ibid., 300; Francois Coulbois, Dix Ann6es au 
Tanganyk~imoges, 1901 ), 68. 
180Thomson, Central African Lakes, II, 89-90; Norman 
R. Bennett, "Captain Storms in Tanganyika: 1882-1885," ,m, 
54(1960), 57; Hermann Wissmann, Unter deutscher Flagge guer 
durch Africa von West nach Ost (Berlin, 1889), 234. 
181 Hutley to Mullens, 20. ii. 80, L. M. s. 
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would say that they were ~ree settlers on the independent 
territory of Ujiji and thus under its rule -- though they 
of course ran this territory. 182 These settlers did have a 
feeling of loyalty to the Sultan, however, that did appear 
on occasion. When Kirk once wrote about the intrigues of 
the Governor of Tabora, Abdallah ibn Nasib, and advised 
them to avoid him, they became aroused since they looked 
upon him as the nearest representative of the Sultan, one 
to whom they might need to appeal if ever in trouble. 183 
Perhaps the Sultan was not necessary in Ujiji, but the 
authority of Ujiji did not extend very far. 
Two instances of the Arab influence in Ujiji demon-
strate how they ruled the African inhabitants there. In 
1880 the African chief of the entire district of Ujiji died. 
The Swahili leader of nearby Kigoma, Mwinyi Akida, was sent 
for by the Africans to supervise the election of a successor. 
He was a long-time resident of the area and held a position 
at Kigoma similar to that of Mwinyi Kheri at Ujiji. There 
was no Arab settlement there, however, so he did not have the 
power of the leader of Ujiji. Since Mwinyi Kheri was still 
away (he had been gone over a year) .Akida acted for him. 184 
182Hore to Mullens, 18~ ii. 79, lJll.!. 
183Hore to Mullens, 16. iv. 79, 12ll· 
184H ore to Kirk, 9. ii. 80, N-7, z. A. 
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In another example in 1880, due to ill-treatment from the 
slaves of the Arabs, the Africans closed the local market. 
The problem was referred to the Arab elders and to the 
African leaders. A council was necessary since the local 
African chiefs could act only in their own areas and could 
solve no major problems. 185 The council decided that all 
the Arabs except Mwinyi Kheri, Mwinyi Akida, and Mwinyi 
Hassani were to leave Ujiji. The Arabs agreed at once, but 
said that the three leaders would have to go along also. 
They all then left the village together. Before they could 
go very far the Africans recalled them and all was settled 
in peace.186 Many Africans depended upon the Arabs for a 
livelihood and they served also to protect the area from 
its many enemies. Both sides benefited from peace and 
continued trade, and neither would act to end this alliance 
as long as neither oppressed the other to a great extent. 
It might be noted as an explanation of this friendly cooper-
ation that as late as 1881 the chief of Ujiji was getting 
tribute from passing Arab caravans. 187 
185"Notes, 11 "Storms Paperstt Musee Royale du Congo 
Belge (TervurenO • . 
186Hutley to Mullens, 7. xi. 80, L. M. s. 
187Hutley to Mullens, 11. ii. 81, ~· 
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All during the time that the English missionaries had 
been in Ujiji they had tried to get permission to buy land 
for a mission base there. One pretext after another had 
been used to keep them from getting t his land. The Arabs 
continually referred the missionaries to Zanzibar saying 
that they could not sell without the permission of the 
Sultan. When he wrote on several occasions to give this 
permission, they held the letters to be unclear and asked 
the English to ask him again. 188 Hare thus began to work 
with Kirk to get firm Zanzibar authority established in 
Ujiji. He threatened that "if this is not done we shall 
conclude that the Sultan has no authority in these regions 
and no rights to be respected by us." 189 Following Hare's 
suggestions Kirk had the Sultan write to Abdallah ibn Nasib 
at Tabora and order him to establish direct and effective 
authority over the subjects of Zanzibar residing in Ujiji. 
Kirk told Hare that he had written to Abdallah himself in 
"plain terms" to insure that this order would be carried 
out. 19° In his letter to the Governor of Tabara the Sultan 
explained to his representative that it was his duty to 
protect the Europeans at Ujiji. Thus he should send men 
188Hore to Mullens, 1 o. iii. 80; Hare to Boustead, 
and Co., 17. iii. 80; Hare to Kirk, 16. ix. 80: ~-
189Hore to Kirk, 21. vi. 80, N-7, z. A. 
19
°Kirk to Hare, 21 • vi. 80, ibid. 
-
Ridley 
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there to hoist the flag of Zanzibar and assume sovereignty. 
If the Governor thought that he could trust Mwinyi Kheri 
and his aides, he could leave him in office. There is an 
interesting passage in this draft that bears the word "omit." 
It reads: 
Also we understand that the Belgians are establish-
ing themselves on the shores of the Lake in a position 
fortified with trenches and forts. You should see 
what is being done.... and no time should be lost in 
hoisting our flag in the district where this settle-
ment has been made. 191 
Did Kirk write this draft himself and then tone it down? 
Did the Sultan write it and then bow to Kirk? Usually it 
was Kirk who pointed the way for the Sultan to act - especially 
in the interior. 192 
Hore went te the station of M;winyi Kheri at the north 
of Lake Tanganyika and discussed this matter with him. He 
was not able to get any definite commitment.193 The Swahili 
leader returned to Ujiji in March 1880, and Hore then thought 
191
sultan Barghash to Abdallah ibn Nasib, ?. vi. 80, 1£!1. 
192Kirk at that time would say of the King of the 
Belgians: "he is such a true friend of Africa that I can do 
no less than aid and support all he tak.es in hand. tt Kirk to 
Mackinnon, 4. ii. 80, uMackinnon Papers," School of Oriental 
and African Studies, London University • . In view of the above 
draft, perhaps his support of the Belgians was not as he says 
here. 
193Hore to Kirk, 26. xii. 79, in Kirk to F. 0., 27. ii. 80, 
Q-24, z. A. 
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he was thinking about cooperating with the Sultan's plans. 
Hare used Kirk's prestige in trying to win Mwinyi Kheri 
over. He said: 
I further reported to him your offers of friendship 
and interest, dependent upon his liberal policy with 
regard to our settlement here and gave him a hint 
as far as I deemed advisable of the probable future 
arrangements for the maintenance of order and 
civilisation in Ujiji. 
Mwinyi Kheri was not prepared to act, however. He said that 
some Arabs among the population of Ujiji were forcing him 
not to cooperate.194 Hare thus left Ujiji for a visit to 
the coast without any assurance that the Swahili leader 
would act. Hare stopped off at Tabora and talked over 
matters with Abdallah ibn Nasib. This Arab seemed confused 
as to what he should do if Mwinyi Kheri refused to cooperate 
with the Sultan's orders. Hare advised him to act forcefully 
and left Tabora in confidence that Abdallah would act to 
carry out the Sultan's orders.195 He might not have been so 
confident if he had known that the year previously Abdallah 
ibn Nasib had told an English missionary that he had no 
right to act in Ujiji as it was not Zanzibar territory. 196 
194Hore to Kirk, 16. ix. 80, K-1, ibid. Earlier the 
Arab leader at Ujiji, Abid ibn Siliman,-said tha Arabs wished 
to cooperate and that Mwinyi Kheri was the cause of the 
delays. See Hare to Kirk, 15. iv. 79, Q-27, ~· 
l95Hore to Kirk, 7. xii. 80 in Kirk to F. o., 12. vi. 81, 
Q-25, ~· 
196nodgshun to Kirk, 27. i. 79 in Kirk to Salisbury, 
5. iii. 79, Slave Trade Correspondence Presented to Parliament 
in 1879. 
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Mwinyi Kheri solved .this dilemma by accepting the 
wishes of the Sultan of Zanzibar, by recognizing his author-
ity, and by hoisting his flag. 197 He no doubt saw that 
resistance would lead only to future difficulties, while 
an acceptance of the Sultan's wishes would not hurt his 
power but on the contrary strengthen it by reinforcing his 
own local power with whatever power Zanzibar had in the 
interior. With the hoisting . of the flag Mwinyi Kheri made 
a few minor changes at Ujiji. He moved the market closer 
to his home so that he might supervise it more closely. 
All who sold meat now had to be Muslims - so that the meat 
would be guaranteed pure for his co-religionists. He also 
tried to fix the prices in the market but was not able to 
carry this measure through. As a result the English 
missionaries were satisfied and one observed that the 
people of Ujiji could rest happy with the change since 
"they have obtained the best possible man amongst a lot 
all bad." 198 Mwinyi Kheri was incidentally not only the 
Governor of Ujiji now but also of Uvira and Uguha with 
the Sultan's approval.199 The pure Arabs did not take 
197Mwinyi Kheri a Sultan Barghash, 28 Cherral 1299 in 
Ledoulx aM. A. E., 10. xii. 81, C. C. Z., III. As no offi-
cial notice was given the French did not recognise this act -
Ledoulx aM. A. E., 3. xii. 81, P. Z., V. 
198 8 Rutley to L. M. S., 21. vi. 0, L. M. S. 
199Griffith to L. M.S., 29. v. 81, 1£1!. 
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kindly to the change, however, and complained to a later 
traveller of their annoyance that the Sultan had appointed 
a non-Arab, a Swahili, as Governor.200 Yet they did not 
contest the appointment. 
Mwinyi Kheri apparently ruled just as he had before 
the Sultan entered the scene and did not flaunt his role 
as the representative of Zanzibar. In December 1881 a 
visitor met him and was not aware that he was a represent-
ative of the Sultan. He thought he was just the local 
leader of Ujiji.201 With this attitude Mwinyi Kheri played 
a quiet role in the period after his appointment. He no 
doubt concentrated on his trading activities as he always 
had in the past, and felt that as long as trade remained 
open no administrative action was necessary. In April 1884 
a Belgian visitor to Ujiji did not even mention him - per-
haps he was away on a trading venture - and called Sayd ibn 
Habib the most powerful outsider there. 202 No other official 
was appointed to displace him, however, and he remained 
Governor until his death in 1885. 203 With his death new 
problems arose for the Arabs of Ujiji due to European efforts 
200 Wissmann, Unter deutscher Flagge, 234. 
201 coulbois, Tanganyka, 63-4. 
202storms a Association Internationals Africaine, 
16. iv. 84, "Storms Papers." 
203Kirk to Salisbury, 26. x. 85, E-87, z. A. 
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to control the area. These actions will be discussed below. 
B. The Kilwa-Nyasa Route 
The route beginning at Kilwa204 in the southern part of 
Tanganyika and leading to areas around and beyond Lake Nyasa 
was the major route for slaves for East African markets from 
the mid-nineteenth century on into the period of the establish-
ment of European rule. At Kilwa we have the oldest inform-
ation available on Arab parties going inland in search of 
slaves and ivory. In the 1770's a Frenchman interested in 
establishing a trading post on the East African mainland 
reported an active trade with the interior and mentioned a 
body of water that can be clearly identified as Lake Nyasa.205 
Later French visitors confirmed this trade and reported that 
Arab traders were themselves reaching Lake Nyasa.206 In 
this early period the trade was mainly in the hands of the 
204Background material for Kilwa may be found in Sir 
John Gray, "A History of Kilwa," TNR, 31 ( 195·1), 1-24, and 
32 ( 1 952) ' 11 -37. . -
205M. Morice, 11 Projet d'un etablissement ala cote 
orientale d'Afrique," 45-6, 64, 85. The original of this 
document is in the Rhodes House Library, Oxford. The author 
used a copy belonging to Sir John Gray. The French scheme 
is well treated in Sir John Gray, "The French at Kilwa, 1776-
1784," ,m, 44(1956), 13-27. 
206M. Malte-Brun, "Observations sur la Carte de Zanguebar 
par M. le Chevalier Saulnier de Mondevi t, Fai tes en 1781 •••• , tf 
Nouvelles Annales des Vo~ases, de la GeograRhie et de 
1 1Histoire, VI(182o), 34 • 
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African tribes of the interior. Such tribes as the Yao and 
the Bisa were reported by 1796 as carrying on the major 
share of this trade with Arabs from Zanzibar; "not only 
because they got more for their ivory, but also because 
Zanzibar is nearer than our possessions," as a Portuguese 
contemporary complained.207 These African tribes continued 
to play a dominant role throughout most of the nineteenth 
century,208 and gave the trade in this part of Tanganyika 
a character dissimilar to the other trading areas of this 
country. 
By the 1840's Kilwa and its neighborhood became the 
leading slave-exporting area of East Africa.209 An indi-
cation of its growth in importance was the increase of the 
Indian trading population of Kilwa; they grew in numbers 
from between forty and sixty in 1844 to over 150 in 1859.210 
In 1860 the British Consul reported that the large majority 
of the slaves reaching Zanzibar were from the Nyasa regions 
207Burton, Lands of Cazembe, 37, 39, 57, 95. For the 
Yao and the slave trade, J. C. Mitchell, The Yao Village 
(Manchester, 1956), 18-9. 
208For example, William D. Cooley, "The Geography of 
N'yassi, or the Great Lake of Southern Africa •••• ,"~' 
1 5 ( 1 845 ) , 1 99. 
209Hamerton to Willoughby, 2. 1. 42, E-4, Z. A.; The 
Missionary Register, (1851), 83ff, has statistics by J:-1. 
Krapf on this trade; M. Guillain, Documents sur l'histoire, 
la ~eographie et le commerce de 1 1 Afrigue orientale (Paris, 
185 ), III, 305, 331, gives details on the trade in ivory 
and slaves. 
210christopher, "Present Resources and State of North 
Eastern Africa," 378; Burton, Zanzibar, II, 342-43. 
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and came to Zanzibar by way of Kilwa and its surrounding 
towns-- as Lindi and Mkindani. 211 
The Arabs themselves did not play a large role in the 
actual penetration inland until the period around 185o.212 
Even then they continued to utilise the services of African 
groups to gather their merchandise of slaves and ivory. 
The explorer Speke, for example, heard in 1857 and again 
in 1864, while at Tabora, that the Bisa were going to the 
southern part of Lake Tanganyika to secure ivory for the 
Arab traders of Kilwa.213 
In the 1860's when the first Europeans reached Lake 
Nyasa, reports become available of a busy activity by the 
Arabs in search of ivory and slaves in that part of Africa.214 
A report of 1863 said that such activity was going on ,.at a 
fearful rate."215 The Arabs from Kilwa were not the only 
visitors to Nyasa seeking these goods. Livingstone met 
211 R1gby to Anderson, 11. ii. 60, E-27, z. A. 
212~., 21. i11. 60. 
213speke, What Led to the Discovery, 199; .mg§, VIII 
( 1863-4), 258. 
214John Kirk, "Notes on two Expeditions up the River 
Rovuma, East Africa,n JRGS, 35(1865), 154-67, comments on 
routes to this area in-rsQ1 and 1862. 
21 5c. Livingstone to Murchison, 8. i. 63, ~, 33 
( 1 863) ' 257. 
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Arabs from Bagamoyo who had travelled overland to reach 
Nyasa.216 These remained a minority group, however, and 
the Kilwa traders were able to dominate this area. Portu-
guese traders also followed Livingstone up the Zambezi and 
Shire' Rivers to Lake Nyasa in their search for slaves, 217 
but their activities are outside the scope of this study. 
So active were these Arabs coming to the Nyasa area, 
whether from Kilwa or Bagamoyo, that they pushed far into 
Portuguese territory in their quest for increased profits. 
In 1864 it was said: 
The distances reached by traders who start from 
Zanzibar are astonishing. They undersell the 
Quilimane and Mozambique merchants at Tete and 
other places on the Zambezi, although they have 
to travel entirely overland to do so. 218 
This trade to the Portuguese was carried on in part to avoid 
the high duty on ivory levied by the Sultan of Zanzibar.219 
In this trade the individual Arab trader would receive credit 
from an Indian merchant for a particular trading venture. 
21 6George Seaver, David Livingstone: His Life and 
Letters (New York, 1957), 507; traders from the coast oppo-
site Zanzibar would continue to visit Nyasa -- see William 
Beardall, "Exploration of the Rufigi River under the orders 
of the Sultan of Zanzibar, 11 ~' III(1881 ), 645. 
21 7James Duffy, Portug:ue.se Africa (Ca~bridge, Mass., 
1 959) ' 185. . 
?18 . ' . 
- Gertrude Ward (ed.), Letters of Bishop Tozer (London, 
1902), 65. . 
21 9rt was reported at one time that the elders running 
Kilwa took as much as 6o% of the value of ivory brought 
there. See Kirk to F. o., 8. xi. 77, Q-18, z. A. 
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This was the usual pattern of Zanzibar trade. When this 
trader had collected a large amount of ivory in the inter-
ior, instead of returning to Kilwa he would visit a Portu-
guese port where he would get a higher price; the Portuguese 
had lower duties on ivory. Then the Arab trader would buy 
gunpowder which was much cheaper than at the ports of 
Zanzibar, no doubt due to the Sultan's monopoly of the 
sale of pow·der in his dominions. 220 With this commodity 
the Arab trader would return to the interior and secure a 
new lot of ivory. Then he would return to Kilwa and settle 
his accounts with his Indian financier as if he had spent 
all his time in working on that merchant's account. If 
all had gone well, the Arab would make a much larger profit 
than the Kilwa trade alone would allow.221 
This trade from the neighborhood of Kilwa did not have 
the same importance to our theme of Arab power in Tanganyika 
as the commerce along the Tabora-Ujiji route. No Arab 
centers were established inland until the Arabs reached 
what is present-day Nyasaland. In 1876 an English observer 
reported that the Arab coastal settlements ended from ten 
220see above, p. 18. 
221 Kirk to Granville, 22. xii. 84, E-84, z. A. 
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to twelve miles outside of Lindi, a port near Kilwa.222 
This is basically the same extent given for Arab settle-
ments outside of Kilwa by a Portuguese traveller of the 
early seventeenth century. 223 This failure to settle far 
from the coast was due in large part to the dangerous 
nature of the country between Nyasa and Kilwa. The Arabs 
at times were even threatened in their coastal towns. In 
1866 and 1868 hostile Africans raided right up to the out-
skirts of Kilwa and in the latter instance defeated an 
Arab expedition sent out to drive them away.224 Similar 
difficulties occurred in 1875. 225 Arab caravans returning 
to the coast also ran into dangerous bodies of hostile 
Africans.226 By 1873 there were reports of a ten-day desert 
in the area outside of Kilwa. Similar areas existed farther 
inland on the trade routes where the incursions of raiding 
African tribes had driven away all of the indigenous in-
habitants. 227 
222E. Steere, A Walk to the Nyassa Country (Zanzibar, 
1876), 3. 
223sir John Gray, "A Journ.ey by Land from Tete to 
Kilwa in 1616," m, 31(1951), 39. 
224 . Seward to Gonne, 27. xi. 66, E-36, z. A.; Seward to 
F. 0., 23. xii. 76, ibid.; Sir John Gray, "The British 
Vice-Consulate at Kii"Wa"Kivinje, 1884-1885," !m!, 51(1958), 180. 
225 . . - -Kirk to F. O., 15. iv. 75, E-68, Z. A. 
226E. D. Young, The Search after Livingstone (London, 
. 1868), 154, reporting events of 1867. 
227 Kirk to F. 0., 27. viii. 73, E-630, Z. A. 
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About 1878 an effort was made to pacify this trade 
route. The Sultan of Zanzibar sent envoys to meet with the 
African warring groups and a peace was concluded. Mission-
aries of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa aided 
in settling the dispute. This peace lasted for some years 
and smoothed the way for the Arab caravans proceeding inland 
from the coast.228 
Even with this peace no significant Arab settlement 
occurred in this part of Tanganyika. Caravans continued 
to pass to Nyasa and beyond and had a large trade without 
such settlements. The pattern of trade was established by 
a relationship between the .Arabs a11d the warlike tribes 
around Nyasa. A caravan from the coast would visit such 
a tribe, as the Yao, and supply them with arms and ammunition. 
This tribe would then raid other groups and take slaves for 
the Arabs as a payment for the implements of war supplied 
them. 229 Other caravans travelled with combined forces 
to Nyasa. There they divided into smaller groups and went 
on to trade in Eisa or in Katanga. 23° Much trade was carried 
228PRGS, !(1879), 788; Joseph Thomson, "Notes on the 
Basin oftli"e River Rovuma," ibid., IV(1882), 75, 77; Henry 
Rowley, Twenty Years in Oentrar-Africa {London, 1881 ), 276-77. 
229Livingstone, Last Journals, I, 78; Livingstone to 
Clarendon, 20. viii. 66, in A. J. Hanna, The Beginnings of 
Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia (Oxford, 1956}, 7. 
23°An undated and unsigned note in E-67, Z. A. 
on with Katanga and Kirk could speak of that area as 
celebrated 
••• for its copper mines of malachite which 
supply Central Africa with copper and pro-
duce wire and masses of the metal thirty 
pounds in weight in the form of crosses that 
reach the coast here together with ivory by 
the caravans.231 
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African groups also continued to play an important role. 
They visited the coast with slaves and ivory taken in all 
the areas between Nyasa and the Indian Ocean.232 
fhe British made a strong attempt after 1876 under 
the leadership of Kirk to close this slave route.233 By 
1880 consular officials reported the slave trade there 
practically at an end and a new prosperity comi~g to Kilwa 
and the other ports from exports of India rubber, cereals, 
gum copal, and sesamum.234 Although these exports played 
231Kirk to Barttley, 3. ix. 72, E-62, ibid. One 
observer reported that no copper came to zanzibar directly, 
but was all brought first to Mozambique by the Bisa -- James 
Christie, Cholera Epidemics in East Africa (London, 1876), 
267, 437. Many Arabs visited Katanga, however. For a popular 
account of Katanga, see Rene J. Cornet, Katanga (Bruxelles, 
1944). 
232Prideaux to F. 0., 19. ix. 74, E-65, Z.A.; Dr. Laws, 
"Journey along Part of the Western Side of Lake Nyassa," 
~, I(1879), 320. 
233see Coupland, Exploitation of East Africa, 227-32. 
This writer overstates the success of this effort. 
234Holmwood to Kirk, 30. i~ 80, in Kirk to F. o., 
8. iii. 80, Q-24, Z. A. 
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an important part in the prosperity of these ports, the 
slave trade was by no means over on the route to Nyasa. 
Missionaries travelling on the routes to the interior 
reported seeing large groups of slaves moving down to the 
coast. 235 Arabs on the coast continued to try and stimulate 
this trade, as certain missionaries in the interior learned 
to their discomfort. 236 The slave trade would go on but in 
a different form. African tribes near the coast would 
absorb many of these slaves due to their increased prosper-
ity from the increased legitimate exports on the coast.237 
And, one British official reported: 
Near the coast is a network of cross communi-
cations; these are of great service to the slave 
dealers in enabling them to bring their wares to 
whichever spot seems, from the reports of those 
sent in advance, to be most favourable. 238 
This trade would continue through this part of Tanganyika 
until the British defeated the slave traders in Nyasaland 
in the 1890's.239 
235As Chauncy Maples (ed. Ellen Maples), Journals and 
Pa;ers (London, 1899), 37, 42, and Central Africa, 11(1884), 
19 • 
170. 
236H. B. Barnes, Johnson of Nyasaland (London, 1933), 38. 
237Maples to Allen, 11. vi. 83, Central Africa, 1(1883), 
238Lt. Charles s. Smith, "Explorations in the Zanzibar 
Dominions," Royal Geographical .Society Supplementary Papers, 
II(1887), 104-5. 
239 For a good article dealing with the entire problem, 
Lewis Gann, "The End of the Slave Trade in British Central 
Africa, 1889-1912," The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 15(1954), 
26-51. 
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c. The Northern Route 
The northernmost of the three routes through Tanganyika 
led to Mount Kilimanjaro, to Lake Victoria's eastern shores, 
and to areas to the northeast of this lake. It is unclear 
when the Arabs began to push inland in large numbers on this 
route. Early visitors to East Africa did note that Tanga, 
though in a period of decline in the 1820's, had earlier 
been a very important center for ivory.240 As Tanga was a 
center for the later trade along this route, perhaps it 
played the same role at this early date. Indications of 
the nature of this trade can be gained from Mombasa, even 
though this center falls outside of the limits of this 
study. In the 1840's Mombasa traded with the same areas 
as the Tanganyika ports, but was not able to deal directly 
with the interior. Inland tribes, particularly the Kamba, 
served as middlemen for this trade and did not allow the 
Arabs to go inland. 241 Some coastal peoples did manage to 
reach these regions. A reference is made in 1849 to a 
Swahili who had spent si;r:-years at Kilimanjaro among the 
24-0w. F. w. Owen, Narrative of Vo a es to ex lore the 
shores of Africa, Arabia, and Madagascar ondon, 1 , I, 
142; Sir John Gray, The British in Mombasa (London, 1957), 4. 
241 J. Lewis Krapf, Travels. Researches. and- Missionary 
Laboursl during an Eighteen Years' Residence in Eastern 
Africa London, 1866), 144, 172, 287, 552. 
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Chagga. 242 By 1850 we have clear proof that trade from 
the Chagga and Masai areas was raaching Tanga.243 Also at 
this early date Swahili caravans of 600 to 1000 men were 
going inland through the dangerous Masai country often 
they were all lost in battle with this tribe.244 Such 
caravans succeeded in passing this territory as by 1848 
reports of a large lake were heard in Mombasa,245 and later 
information in Tanga confirmed this.246 
By the 1850's regular expeditions were leaving the 
northern ports of Tanganyika in search of ivory. Tanga 
then had twenty Indian merchants working there and they 
sent caravans of 400 to 500 twice yearly to the Chagga 
and Masai areas. One observer reported that this port 
claimed to export 70,000 pounds of ivory a year, but he 
felt that they were exaggerating. Pangani was also a busy 
port. There were twenty Indian merchants there; the 
measure of their business activity can be seen by the fact 
that they were owed about $26,000 from individuals parti-
cipating in this inland trade. From Pangani caravans of 
242Ibid., 251. 
243Ibid., 339, fn395-96. 
-244Ibid., 364. 
-245Guillain, Documents, III, 296-97. 
246James Erhardt, "Reports respecting Central Africa •••• 
with a new Map of the Country,"~' I(1855-56), 9. 
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up to 1000 men went to the interior in search of ivory.247 
The main deterrents on this northern trade route were 
the harsh condit~ons due to the arid nature of much of the 
country passed through and the presence of such hostile 
groups as the Masai. Though Krapf, the missionary, could 
report in 1851 that large caravans were no longer necessary 
to pass through the. Masai, 248 information from Tanga and 
Pangani shows that such conditions were at best temporary. 
In fact in the 186o's - and long afterwards - the Masai 
often took the offensive and raided right down to the 
coastal towns. 249 
By the 1870's the penetration through northern 
Tanganyika had gone far into the interior. Kilimanjaro 
was regularly visited. Caravans were then reaching areas 
near Lakes Naivasba and Baringo, and visiting Kavirondo 
near northeastern Lake Victoria.250 Pangani and Tanga 
remained the main centers of this trade; Mombasa continued 
to play an important role. For a time the Masai became 
247Burton, Zanzibar, I, 331, II, 74, 117, 146. 
248Missionary Register, (1851"), 171. 
249For example Mgr. Gawne, Voyage a la Cote Orientale 
d'Afrigue pendant 1 1annee 1866 par le R. P. Horner (Paris, 
1 872) , 17Bff. 
25°charles New, Life Wanderings and Labours in Eastern 
Africa (London, 1873), 28l!t, 46oft; T. Wakefield, ''Routes 
of Native Caravans from the Coast to the Interior of Eastern 
Africa,u ~' 40(1870), 310. 
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less troublesome and in 1873 groups of traders in parties 
as small as one hundred could pass through them. It might 
be noted that on this route . : · .. :. very little slaving activity 
was attempted. The tribes were either too powerful or else 
held positions on waterholes or similar locations necessary 
to the traders. Another difference from the other routes 
was that the Africans in this area did not work for the 
Arabs in the carrying of the ivory down to the coast. Thus 
each trading caravan had to bring inland a large body of 
porters. Since they could not be replaced, the necessity for 
peace with the. local Africans was all the more essential. 251 
Finally, in 1874 the ivory brought to the coast by this 
route was considered the best in the Zanzibar market.252 
The Masai and other troublesome Africans did not remain 
quiet. By 1879 Pangani had declined greatly due to the loss 
of one ·or its largest caravans in the interior. 253 Pangani 
did recover by 1882, however, and regained its position of 
leadership in the trade of this area. 254 In 1884 it received 
251 6 Kirk to F. 0., 31. v. 73, E- 3B, Z. A. 
252Elton to Prideaux, 9. iii. 79, E-64, ~· 
253Keith Johnston, "Notes on a Trip from Zanzibar to 
Usambara •••• ," PRGS, I ( 1879), 546. 
254 J. P. Farler, 11 Native Routes in East Africa from 
Pangani to the Masai Country and the Victoria Nyanza," 
ibid., IV(1881), 730; for the routes used, "Native Routes 
thrOugh the Masai Country, from information -obtained by 
the Rev. T. Wakefield,"~., 743ff. 
and exported 35,000 kilos of ivory.255 
D. The Route to Uganda 
68. 
The Arab route to Uganda followed the route from the 
coast opposite Zanzibar to Tabora and then branched off 
through new territory. Goods from the coast first reached 
Buganda in the years between 1763 and 1780. They continued 
to arrive in small amounts through the rest of this century.256 
There ls no record of Arabs participating in the trade at 
this early date. Nyamwezi traders probably brought these 
goods. "Their trading ventures were doubtless more or less 
casual and were probably not conducted upon any very large 
scale. 11 257 Reports of Arabs reaching the area south of Lake 
Victoria were found by Burton in his explorations.258 The 
first Arab to actually reach Buganda, Ahmed ibn Ibrahim, 
reported that he arrived there in 1844.259 The then ruling 
Kabaka, Sunna (d. 1856), encouraged traders to visit his 
court, but the distance to Buganda was so great that only 
a half-d.ozen Arabs had made the journey by Burton's time. 260 
255nr. G. A. Fischer, Mehr Licht im Dunkeln Welttheil 
(Hamburg, 1885), 11. For a trip through the Masai areas 
and to the countries beyond with reference to Arab contacts, 
Joseph Thomson, Through Masai Land (London, 1885). 
256Gray, "Trading Expeditions,'' 227. 
257Gray, "Ahmed ibn Ibrahim," 80. 
258Gray, ttTrading Expeditions," 237. 
259Gray, "Ahmed ibn Ibrahim,u 82. 
260Burton, Lake Regions, II, 193. 
No major Arab establishments were set up between 
Tabora and Lake Victoria. Even on the shores of Victoria 
no settlements comparable to Tabora or Ujiji were founded. 
Trade to Buganda went through a "corridor state tt to the west 
of Victoria - Karagwe - in the first three-quarters of the 
nineteenth century. This route was used since there were 
then no dhows on the lake and a journey by canoe was held 
too dangerous for the shipping of valuable cargoes in view 
of the many storms on Victoria.261 The capital of Karagwe, 
Kafurro, was a center of this trade and a few Arabs did set 
up there. They were always a very small group; Stanley in 
1876 found only two or three permanent residents.262 
Though Sunna of Buganda treated the Arabs very ravorably263 
trade did not reach large proportions during his regime. 
One reason for this situation was a ban by Sunna on the sale 
of cloth to the common people of his kingdom.264 Mutesa, the 
successor to Sunna, retained this ban at first to help keep 
the Arabs under his firm control, but released it when he 
felt his power was secure. By 1862 Arabs were coming to 
261see letter of Sir John Gray in~' 25(1948), 80. 
262stanley, Dark Continent, I, 453; for Karagwe, J. Ford 
and R. de z. Hall, "The History of Karagwe (Bukoba District)," 
!!lit 24(1947), 3-27. 
263Apolo Katikirio and the Rev. Henry Wright Duta, 
"How Religion Came to Uganda,u J:!l, I(1947), 110. 
264c. Ehrlich, "The Economy of Buganda, 1893-1903, 11 
Qi, XX(1956), 21. 
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Buganda in considerable numbers. 265 Slaves and ivory, the 
only goods able to pay the high cost of transportation to 
the coast, were the basis of this trade,266 The gaining of 
this merchandise took place outside of Tanganyika and will 
not be treated in this study, 
This trade route to Buganda and other nearby areas267 
was an important route during the period of our study, The 
Sultan of Zanzibar and the Kabaka both realised the importance 
of continued contacts, and the two exchanged gifts at an 
early date. 268 According to Stanley the Sultan had an 
important accredited representative for Karagwe, Shaykh ibn 
Nasib of Tabora,269 but his role is unclear. This Arab 
had been an early visitor to Karagwe270 and he probably 
was used, in the usual Zanzibari way, to smooth relations 
with the local Africans. 
After 1876, the conditions of trade with Buganda changed 
somewhat, but the Arab colony in Buganda remained small.271 
265Gray, "Ahmed ibn Ibrahim, 11 82-5. 
266Ehrlich, "Economy of Buga~da," 21; J. M. Gray, 
"Mutes a of Buganda," lli[, I ( 1934), 24. 
267For the first Arabs to Bunyoro, Gray, "Trading 
Expeditions," 240, 
268Livingstone, Last Journals, I, 273, II, 176-77; Kirk 
to F. 0., 13. xi. 71, E-61, Z. A. 
269stanley, Livingstone, 266. 
27°wilson and Felkin, Uganda, II, 133. 
271Georg Schweitzer, Emin Pasha, His Life and Work 
(Westminster, 1898), I, 39. 
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The main route to Buganda then switched from Karagwe to 
ports on the southern coast of Victoria as Arabs began to 
construct dhows. 272 Kageyi was such a center. There, 
Songoro, a Swahili trader,273 established close relations 
with the local chief, and married into the royal family of 
nearby Ukerewe.274 This trader met a violent end, but 
Arab influence continued strong there. In 1880 a missionary 
reported against setting up a station there due to the 
presence of so many Muslims.275 By 1882 the Arabs had 
virtual control of Kageyi and the chief was a puppet in 
their hands. 276 
Though the ultimate port to be used to reach Bu.ganda 
might vary in the period of Arab penetration along this 
route, the conditions of Arab settlement remained the same. 
These centers were merely posts on the way to the more 
important Buganda; they never had any inherent importance 
in themselves, and they always remained small in numbers. 
272For a useful survey of trade on the lake, V. a. R. 
Ford, The Trade of Lake Victoria (East African Institute of 
Social Research, 1955). 
273 Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, I, 85. 
274stanley, Dark Continent, I, 144, 254. 
275Mackay to Wigram, 24. ix. 80, G3.A6/0 1, c. M.s. 
276Mackay to Whiting, 12. iii. 82, ibid. Robert P. 
Ashe, Two Kings of Uganda (London, 1889):-41, confirms this 
for 1883. 
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E. Summary 
By 1885 there were well-established trade routes used 
by Arabs from Zanzibar running through Tanganyika. Only 
one of these routes, the Tabora-Ujiji one, had important 
Arab settlements located on it. The others led to areas 
outside of Tanganyika, and any settlements founded are 
outside the limits of this study. In Tabora and Ujiji 
the Arabs from Zanzibar had a form of administration, but 
controls from the Sultan of Zanzibar were never effective 
in these centers. The traders there set up their own 
organisations and, unless unusual circumstances occurred, 
they ran their own affairs. Such centers, because of the 
inherent fragmentation of political authority, were never 
able to put a substantial check on any of the European 
efforts to set up in the interior of Tanganyika. Europeans 
succeeded also in establishing posts in areas where Arab 
routes passed to countries beyond Tanganyika. Here both 
Arab and European found themselves dependent on the friend-
ship of local Africans for their safety, and again the Arabs 
were not able to take effective action against the new 
invaders. 
CHAPTER II 
THE COMING OF THE EUROPEANS 
A. Reasons · for European Interest 
European influences in Tanganyika before 1884-85 did not 
extend to a governmental occupation of territory. Britain, 
the dominant power in the area, did not seek territorial 
gain, but rather attempted through John Kirk to extend the 
influence of Zanzibar on the mainland as a means of ending 
the slave trade. 1 European efforts on the coast and in the 
interior came from various missionary societies and from 
branches of the International African Association resulting 
from the Geographical Conference of 1876 in Brussels. 
The missionary impetus came first.2 In 1856, when 
Livingstone returned to England after his trans-African 
trip, there were no missions located in Tanganyika, and East 
Africa had only one mission in all its extent - the Church 
Missionary Society station at Mombasa. Livingstone's efforts 
lsee Coupland, Exploitation of East Africa, passim. 
2The background to missionary effort is well-recorded 
in Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa 
(London, 1952), Chapter I. 
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turned the attention of Europe to Africa, but until the 
end of the 1860's no mission society would undertake work 
in Tanganyika. In addition, English action against the 
slave trade centered mainly on the Atlantic trade until the 
end of the 1860's. Following 1857, however, East Africa 
came into public view due to a series of explorers who were 
seeking the sources of the Nile in this area. These men -
Burton, Speke, Grant, Baker, Livingstone - gave the world 
reports of new places and peoples; above all they painted 
vivid pictures of the slave trade and its horrors. Stanley's 
meeting with Livingstone added to this interest. Livingstone's 
death and the dramatic circumstances of his body's journey 
to the coast greatly heightened this interest. With his 
burial in Westminster Abbey in 1873 a new chapter of East 
African history began. Stanley took up his unfinished work, 
and when in 1875 his famous letter to the Daily Telegraph 
was published, the missionary penetration of East Africa 
began. 
B. The Church Missionary Society 
The Church Missionary Society decided to answer Stanley's 
call for a mission in Buganda. The c. M. S. had been repre-
sented in East Africa, at Mombasa, since the 184o's. It had 
not taken any forceful action for years. Now a missionary 
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party was organised to aim for Kabaka Mutesa 1 s court in 
Buganda; way stations were planned on the route to Buganda 
in present-day Tanganyika. These stations were to be of 
a permanent character. At that time there was some feeling 
that the missionaries should follow a route through modern 
Kenya,3 but this idea was not accepted due to the harsh 
climatic dangers of this route and the presence of the 
hostile Masai.4 The plan adopted called for the party to 
go to Zanzibar first, and then to start inland from the 
coast opposite this island.5 A layman, Lt. Shergold Smith 
of the Royal Navy, was appointed to lead this group. He was 
instructed to seek all the advice available from British 
officials in Zanzibar, but all the final decisions were to 
be made by himself alone. Part of these .instructions called 
for a station in the Usagara area on the route to Tabora. 6 
Full resources were available for this effort. There was 
no limit as to the amount of money they might expend. In 
addition they had much advice from the explorers Grant and 
Cameron, men who knew this area well.7 
3Price to Hutchinson, 4. ii. 76, C.A5/M 4, C. M. s. 
4Kirk to c. M. s.' 1 2. xli. 76, C.A6/0 13' ~· 
5Hutchinson to Kirk, 7. iv. 76, C.A6/L 1, ~· 
6wright to Smith, 5. v. 76, 
.!ill· 
7Hutchinson to 0 1 Neil and Mackay, 2. vi. 76, ~· 
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The London Missionary Society was moving inland at this 
time also. It had a plan involving the use of ox-carts on 
a road made for that purpose.8 The c. M. s. planned to 
help the L. M. s. in this attempt, both as an aid to the 
L. M. s. mission venture and as a way of opening up East 
Africa to western civilisation.9 The main aim of the c. M. s. 
however, was the station in Usagara at Mpwapwa; road-making 
would follow its establishment.10 
The c. M. S. had many problems in its work in East 
Africa. The members of its mission hindered progress as 
much as, and perhaps more than, any Arab or African with 
whom they came in contact. As with other Protestant missions 
' in this part of Africa, internal dissension was a serious 
hindrance. The c. M. S. was a society of the Church of 
England, but all of the members did not look at religious 
affairs in the same way.11 In fact, one gets the impression 
that individual members of this mission were willing to 
break up the group when disagreements arose among them. 
In addition to this problem, these missionaries suffered 
8see below, p. 85. 
9Hutchinson to Kirk, 17. xi. 76, C.A6/L 1, c. M. S. 
Hutchinson added: "This road will be the key to East 
Africa •••• " 
10Hutchinson to Clark, 17. xi. 76, ~· 
11 wilson to Wright, 2. x. 76, C.A6/0 25, ~· 
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from an excess of individualism. The failure to suppress 
this for the common good did much to delay them. The well-
known Alexander Mackay, later famous for his work in Buganda, 
had to be reprimanded almost at once for his "self-
opiniationess."12 
In spite of these dissensions, the c. M. s. was able to 
establish its first station at Mpwapwa. This station was the 
most important C. M. s. post in Tanganyika. It is of special 
interest to this study since it was located on the main Arab 
route to the interior -- the Tabora-Ujiji route. From a stud~ 
of its establishment the attitude of the Arabs to these new 
invaders can be ascertained. In July and August 1876, the 
men of the c. M. s. began to go inland in small groups. The 
British in Zanzibar of course did all that they could to 
help the mission on its way. The mission would be of value 
to these officials as a center of British influence, and 
could supply them with first-hand information on the slave 
trade. The missionaries took differing views of this aid. 
Lt. Smith praised Kirk: "he has given us great assistance 
by, in some measure, identifying himself with the expedition."13 
Mackay, as usual in disagreement, opposed this view: "I must 
say our Mission party has been treated by Kirk •••• with 
12 Wright to Mackay, 9. ii. 77, C.A6/L 1, ~· 
13
smith to Wright, 22. viii. 76, C.A6/M 1, ~· 
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perfect nonchalance." 14 This last statement was unfair and 
untrue. Kirk did all that he could to clear their way; 
without him they would have been blocked on the coast for 
many months instead of leaving almost at once as they did. 
With this aid they had every reason to hope for success. 
Their leader said: "I feel convinced that no expedition 
ever started so well found in everything luxurious as we 
are."15 
The road to Mpwapwa was not an easy one.16 One 
missionary had to be sent home due to illness.17 The 
missionary directed to set up at 1\fpwapwa, Clark, 18 was 
unwell and consequently not much work was attempted at 
first. No problems occurred with the local chief; he 
quickly gave permission to build and promised them the 
necessary land.19 There was both a local ruler and one 
called a representative of the Sultan of Zanzibar at Mpwapwa. 
The exact status of the latter is unclear. Both, .in any 
1!2!.<!· 
14Mackay to Wright, 28. vii. 76, ~· 
15smith to Dickenson, 31. viii. 76, ~· 
16wilson to Wright, 27. ix. 76, ~· 
17smith, Mackenzie and Co. to Hutchinson, 15. xi. 76, 
18rnstructions to Clark, 28. iii. 76, C.A5/L 1, ~· 
19smith to Wright, 22. x. 76, and Dr. Smith to Wright, 
22. x. 76, ~· 
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case, welcomed the missionaries and put no difficulties in 
their way. 20 No progress was made under Clark. He became 
ill and had to leave East Africa to regain his health. 21 
Meanwhile the other c. M. s. members continued inland 
toward their goals in the interior - Karagwe and Buganda. 
Progress was not very rapid. In December 1876, after passing 
Tabora, the caravan was forced to halt. The porters, of 
the Sukuma tribe, left for their homes in the neighborhood. 
The missionaries had been deceived, or had misunderstood the 
Africans' terms of hire; they thought that their porters 
would continue on to the lake. Smith thus had to return to 
Tabora for aid. Sayd ibn Salim, the Governor, gave him 
full, if slow, aid. He said that he favored missions since 
they would help to pacify the country, thus making his trading 
activities more profitable. In January 1877 Smith and his 
party went on with their new men.22 
In February the party reached Lake Victoria at Kageyi.23 
This port was to be the place of departure for Buganda and 
the missionaries began preparations for this trip. . At 
20clark to Wright, 3. ix. 76, C.A6/M 1, ~· 
21 c1ark to Wright, 6. xii. 76 and 20. iii. 77, ~· 
22smith to Wright, 1. i. 77, with a postscript of 
16. i. 77, C.A6/0 22, ~· 
23wilson to Wright, 22. ii. 77, C.A6/o 25, ~· 
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Kageyi was the Swahili trader, Songoro,24 with whom the 
missionaries soon had very close relations. This trader had 
much influence there, and in addition was building a dhow. 
Thus his friendship was of great value to them.25 He was, 
however, to cause serious difficulties for the mission. A 
dispute arose between Songoro and a nearby African ruler. 
Lt. Smith unwisely intervened to try to save Songoro's life. 26 
As a result, Smith and another missionary lost their lives 
along with Songoro.27 This was the first serious check to 
the advance of the c. M. s. It did not result from Arab 
opposition, but from intervention to help an Arab- and a 
slaver at that. 
The Sultan af Zanzibar offered to settle affairs for 
the c. M. S. with the guilty African chief. The directors 
of the Society thanked him for his offer, but stated that 
they were against any retailiation by force. A war would 
upset the whole area and block their route to Buganda.28 
The C. M. S. recognised the dangers inherent in opening new 
areas to western influence and saw rightly that any retali-
ation would make its progress even more difficult. 
24 7 See above, p. 1. 
2
.Ssee a letter of Sir John Gray in 1lJli, 25(1948), 80-1. 
26smith to Wright, 10. xii. 77, C.A6/o 25, c. M. s. 
27wilson to Wright, 8. ii. 78, and 23. v. 78, ~· 
28Hutchinson to Kirk, 5. iv. 78, C.A6/L 1, ~· 
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The c. M. S. meanwhile was preparing to reoccupy its 
station at Mpwapwa as one of a line of posts between the 
coast and Buganda.29 H. M. Stanley was at this time giving 
advice to the c. M. s. on their activities in this part of 
Africa. He stressed the "extreme importance of not placing 
confidence, beyond what is absolutely necessary, in the 
.Arabs, nor of taking them into your confidence in regard to 
plans."30 This was basically the policy that the c. M. s. 
had been following all along - in June 1877 they had warned 
Mackay about Tabora31 - but now it was clearly stated for 
their members. 
Several missionaries were designated to set up the new 
station at Mpwapwa. Their instructions were "to establish a 
self-supporting station at Mpwapwa with a view to its becom-
ing the centre for missionary work among the natives of 
Usagara and throughout the populous district of Ugogo 
beyond, but also as furnishing an important link in a chain 
of missions tow·ards the interior. tt32 Mpwapwa had special 
importance to the Arabs of Tanganyika. It was on the main 
caravan route to the interior and had been an important 
29wright to Smith, 29. vi. 77, ~· 
30wright to Mackay, 5. iv. 78, ~· 
31wright to Mackay, 29. vi. 77, ~· 
32rnstructions to Last and Henry, 6. xi. 77, l£11. 
'82. 
stopping place for caravans for many years.33 The mission 
was sure therefore to have frequent contacts with the Arabs 
who played an important part in the slave trade. 
The missionaries early felt that the Arabs were working 
against them. When the C. M. s. men wanted to build on the 
site granted by the African chief, they found that he had 
changed his mind. He declined to let them build and returned 
the gifts given him for his earlier permission. The mission-
aries attributed this act to the Arabs since the site in 
dispute had a very strategic location from which all passing 
caravans could be seen. The missionaries thus would have 
seen many slaves on their way to the coast.34 Their suspicions 
were probably correct. 
The missionaries soon took active measures against the 
slave trade. When slaves escaped from passing caravans and 
reached the mission, the missionaries refused to return them 
to their Arab owners unless the slaves were willing to return. 
The Arabs, in fact, s.eldom came after their slaves when they 
went to the mission. If they did, the Arabs knew that their 
activities would be reported to Zanzibar where they would 
be punished. There were soon enough former slaves at 
33cameron, Across Africa, I, 60-1. 
34Baxter to Wright, 6. ii. 78, C.A6/0 5, c. M. s. 
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Mpwapwa for the missionary in charge to request that a 
European be present with authority from the Sultan of 
Zanzibar to deal with them in cases of civil disobedience.35 
Such activities soon led to trouble. Once an Arab 
came after a fugitive slave and said that he was ready to 
fight to regain him. This Arab thought that, unless he took 
some action, the rest of his slaves would flee also. When 
the Arab prepared for action, the local African chief said 
that he would support the mission; thus the Arab withdrew.36 
Another report noted that one Arab had been successful in 
regaining his slaves by threat of force,37 but the mission-
aries never mentioned this incident. A third report came 
from a Belgian who had to intervene on the mission's side in 
a similar case. This reporter also noted that the English 
flag at Mpwapwa gave immediate freedom to those who fled to 
its security.38 This interpretation was of course incorrect, 
although the Belgian was no doubt recounting what the 
missionaries had told him. 
35 Baxter to Wright, 21. iii. 80, ~· 
36 Baxter to Wright, 21. iii. 80, ~· 
37 J. L. Dutreuil De Rhins, "Note sur les , Vo7ages ,et 
les Travaux de M. Bloyet," Bulletin de la societe de geo-
graphie, 7e - III(1882), 356. 
38 Burdo, Les Belges, 204, 214-5. 
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This friction at Mpwapwa did not lead to any major 
difficulties with the Arabs. The other c. M. s. stations 
in Tanganyika did not go to such extremes of action, but 
each reported to Zanzibar about the Arabs of the interior 
and their relation to the slave trade.39 The c. M. s. 
posts at Mpwapwa, Mamboia, Uyuvi, and on the shores of 
Lake Victoria became, in reality, extensions of the British 
consular establishment in East Africa. The c. M. s. men 
did not suffer at Arab hands due to the disunity of the 
Arabs of the interior and, more important, to the prestige 
of the British in East Africa. If an Arab wished to return 
to the coast to enjoy the fruit of his toils, he had to 
have a clean record as far as the English of the interior 
were concerned. If he did not, the Sultan, due to pressure 
from the British Consul, would soon have him punished. 
Thus the C. M. s., a missionary society dedicated to 
ending the slave trade, never suffered to any extent at 
Arab hands. Minor crises might arise, but until the occu-
pation of the interior by European states, no major effort 
to drive them out would occur.40 
39For example, Smith to Kirk, 19. v. 77, in Kirk to 
Derby, 22. viii. 77, F. O. 84/1486, P. R. O. 
4
°For the story of the C. M. S. in this area, E. Stock, 
History of the Church Missionary Society (London, 1$99) and 
the relevant letters in the Church Missionary Intelligencer 
for this period. 
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c. The London Missionary Society 
The London Missionary Society, basically a Congregation-
alist group, also responded to the call for missionary 
development in East Africa. 41 An experienced missionary, 
Roger Price, visited East Africa in 1876 to draw up plans 
for this group's inland expeditlon.42 Price had spent many 
years in South Africa and therefore decided to draw upon 
his experience to attempt a revolution in the mode of 
travel in East Africa. He planned to use ox-wagons to carry 
the goods of the L.M.S. inland. Previously in East Africa 
all transport had been done by manpower due to the ravages 
of the tsetse fly. Price thought that he could find a route 
to avoid this pest.43 
Price seemed to have good reason to hope for success. 
He took oxen inland on a testing trip over the road he 
planned to use. Kirk reported that Price had investigated 
the route "from the opposite coast to beyond the mountains 
that limit the central plains of the continent."44 His 
41The Story of the L.M.S. is given in R. Lovett, A 
History of the London Missionary Societ~ (London, 1899}. 
42 For his life, Edwin W. Smith, Great Lion of Bechuanaland: 
The Life and Times of Roger Price, Missionary (London, 1957). 
43Price to Mullens, 4. v. 76, L.M.S. The story of this 
venture is given in Smith, Lion of Bechuanaland, 206ff and in 
Edwin W. Smith, "The Earliest Ox-Wagons in Tanganyika - An 
Experiment which Failed," !!lli• 40(1955), 1-14 and 41(1955),1-15. 
44 . Kirk to F. o., 28. vii. 77, Q-23. Z. A. 
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investigations led him to conclude that his plans for this 
new means of travel were feasible.45 Kirk was enthusiastic, 
although he had earlier reported the presence of the fly in 
this part of East Africa.46 
By mid-1877 the L~M.S. was ready to push inland. The 
goal of the society was "to establish itself at the point 
where Livingstone had last been seen by Europeans,"47 that 
is, at Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika. Such a plan, with no way 
stations between the proposed goal and the coast, has been 
characterised by a modern student as "a bold and almost 
foolhardy decision.n48 It was certainly a dangerous venture, 
but the L.M.S. group was determined to meet all obstacles 
with vigor and to succeed in reaching the lake. It was 
soon obvious that Price's original study of the route was 
45Price's report is given in a document printed for 
private circulation, Re ort of the Rev R. Price of his Visit 
to Zanzibar and the Coast o Eastern Afr ca London, 1 7 . 
The author used a copy in the British Museum. 
46Kirk to F. o., 18. ii. 71, E-61, z. A. Kirk's enthu-
siasm is shown in Kirk to Mackinnon, 29. vi. 76, "Mackinnon 
Papers." 
47R. w. Thompson, British Foreign Missions (London, 1899), 
99; l-1ullens. to Thomson, 4. ii. ¥8, L.M.S. 
48A. J. Hanna, "The Role of the London Missionary Society 
in the Opening up of East Central Africa," Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, 5(1955), 43. 
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inefficient; the oxen began to sicken and die.49 Needing 
porters badly, the L.M.S. men visited Mirambo, the powerful 
Nyamwezi chief.so They found him 11 truly anxious" to aid 
them. Mirambo wanted them to settle with him so that he 
might profit from their knowledge.51 Though the L.M.S. 
never did get effective aid from Mirambo in the form of 
porters,52 this chief proved a firm friend of the society 
in the years ahead. 
These relations between Mirambo and the European 
missionaries roused the ire of the Arabs of Tabora. The 
Arabs did all that was possible to block any further contact 
between the L.M.S. and their sworn enemy.53 The Arabs, as 
usual in this period when dealing with Europeans, did not 
go to extremes, and the L.M.S. group with only a minimum 
of delay was able to proceed peacefully to Ujiji. Later the 
mission decided to establish a station at Mirambo's.54 The 
49Thomson to Mullens, 21. i. 77, L.M.S. For criticisms 
of this L.M. S. scheme, Dr. Dutrieux, La Question Africaine au 
Point de Vue Oommerciale (Bruxelles, 1BBO), 12-3; Les PP. 
Baur et LeRoy, A Travers le Zanguebar (Tours, 1899), 281-82. 
50 See above, p. 15. 
51 Hore to Mullens, 18. iv. 78, L.M.S. 
52 Thomson to Mullens, 12. v. 78, ll!£1. 
53 Thomson to Mullens, 4. viii. 78, ill!!· 
541~ullens to Thomson, 26. vii. 78, 1!?1.!!· 
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Arabs accepted this even though they were very much upset 
by such a step. During the entire trip to the lake, the 
only serious problem to face the L.M.S. came from actions 
of Mirambo and not from the Arabs. A missionary, in fact, 
later praised the aid given at Tabora by the Arabs.55 They 
gave this aid to offset Mirambo and to prevent the Europeans 
from drawing too close to him. They did not succeed in 
this endeavor. 
The L.M.S. party reached Ujiji in August 1878. The 
Arab community received them favorably; the leader of the 
Arabs, Mwinyi Kheri, said they might choose any location for 
their mission buildings. Later he changed his attitude; he 
requested that they take no action until they had finally 
made known their purpose in coming to Ujiji.56 The leader 
of the party, the Rev. J. B. Thomson, gave this explanation 
of their aims: 
I said that we had come to help open up the 
country, to instruct the people, to improve 
their social and moral state as well as to teach 
them all sorts of handicraft and to better their 
domestic position. Further I told them we wished 
to examine the lake and make ourselves acquainted 
with the people on its shores. In short I told 
them that we had not come to trade but wished to 
encourage trade and to do all we could to benefit 
55Dodgshun to Kirk, 27. i. 79 in Kirk to Salisbury, 
5. iii. 79, Q-25, Z. A. 
56Hore to Mullens, 17. ix. 78, L.M.S. 
the people morally and socially and for these 
purposes we wanted to build or to buy houses 
and boats in such places as we could carry on 
our work with vigour and in health. 57 
This rather eloquent speech did not impress the Arabs. 
They took a stand upon their loyalty to the Sultan of 
Zanzibar and said they could alienate no land until he had 
given his express permission.58 Thus the missionaries had 
to write to Zanzibar and await a reply before they could 
take any action.59 Letters from Zanzibar did come, but 
the Arabs continued to prevent any land purchase by the 
missionaries. Some of the Arabs said, in fact, that if ten 
letters came from the Sultan they still would not give their 
permission. 60 The Arab obstinacy probably was caused by 
the not unjustifiable fear that these missionaries would 
influence the Bri.tish government to take vigorous measures 
against the slave trade at Ujiji. As a missionary reported: 
"It is too deeply rooted in the minds of the Arabs that we 
are emissaries of the British government."61 
Although the Arabs thus opposed the missionaries, they 
never resorted to actual violence to drive them away. In 
57Thomson to Mullens, 30.viii.78, ~· 
58For the attitude of the Ujiji Arabs to Zanzibar, 
see above, p. 47. 
59Hore to Mullens, 17. ix. 78, L.M. S. 
60Hore to Boustead, Ridley and Co., 17. iii. 80, ~· 
61 Hutley to L.M.S., 11. ii. 81, ~· 
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two instances the Arabs came close to such action, but they 
always drew back before any actual harm resulted to the 
L.M.S. men. The Arabs once demonstrated with force against 
an unauthorised land sale; the demonstration worked and no 
trouble occurred. 62 In another incident the Arabs had to 
take action against the missionaries raising an English flag. 
They tore this flag down, but did not attempt any violence 
against the Europeans.63 This act of raising a flag roused 
the ire of the L.M.S. leaders in England, and care was 
taken that it did not happen again. They assured the 
Foreign Office that they could "be relied upon to use their 
best efforts to prevent any proceedings on such matters on 
the part of their agents which may tend to irritate the 
Arab or Swahili authorities or to produce complications 
with Her N.ajesty's Government. "64 This remonstrance was 
effective and no such difficulty happened again. 
Since they were making no progress in face of the 
delaying tactics of the Arabs, the missionary in charge 
at Ujiji, Hore, began to look to the Consul in Zanzibar 
for aid. Hore wrote to Kirk and called attention to "the 
62Hore to Kirk, 17. iii. 80, N-7, z. A. 
63Kirk to F. o.' 23. ix. 79, Q-22, illi· 
64 Pauncefote to Kirk, 1 2. i. 80, Q-23, .l:.Ei£. 
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desirability of your being represented in the interior."65 
Kirk was in favor of such action; he knew the Foreign Office 
would not approve a fully representative official in the far 
interior since he could not be protected by the government, 
but he felt able to make another suggestion. He asked if Hore 
would consent to be his "official correspondent" in the 
interior of Africa. Hore would then have been Kirk's contact 
with the Arabs and Africans; Kirk thought this would be 
the "thin edge of the wedge" of British influence in Central 
Africa.66 Hore was ready to accept and wrote home to London 
for permission. 67 He knew, however, that it was against 
the policy of the L.M.S. to have any ties with secular 
governments. He wrote Kirk: 
Personally I agree with you as to the advantage likely 
to accrue to our mission by such an arrangement 
but there are many good reasons to make the directors 
of our Society very cautious in allowing any of 
their agents to be looked upon as being connected 
with Government. 68 
65Hore to Kirk, 17. viii. 80, N-7, ~· The desire 
to act against the slave trade also prompted this action. 
Hore wrote: "I itch to take more energetic measures than 
prudence perhaps and at any rate my missionary work would 
justify." From Hore to Kirk, 25. ii. 80, ~· 
66Kirk to Here, 23. iii. 80, L.M.S. The Foreign Office 
agreed with Kirk, Lister to Kirk, 21. v. 80, Q-23, Z.A. 
67Hore to Kirk, 20. vii. 80, L.M.S. 
68Hore to Kirk, 20. vii. 80, P-16, Z.A. 
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Hore was right in his feeling about the Directors; they 
refused to sanction this arrangement.69 The importance of 
this episode to our study is that is the closest that the 
missions ever came to being tied officially to government 
in the period before European control of this area. The 
missions continued to act for their own ends alone; this 
perhaps explains why the Arabs were content never to take 
violent action against them. 
The L.M.S. made no progress in overcoming the delaying 
tactics of the Arabs and began to look elsewhere for 
missionary locations on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. 
The first such station was established at Mtowa, a village 
on the western shore of the lake and opposite to U~iji. The 
missionaries moved there near the latter part of 1879. 70 
There were no Arabs located at Mtowa, but the Ujiji Arabs 
did have some of their slaves working in the area.71 The 
L.M.S. attempted for several years to build a center at 
Mtowa for missionary work, but in the end had to admit 
failure. In 1885 they withdrew the stat1on.72 The Arabs 
69Whitehouse to Hore, 4. v. 81, L.M.S. 
70Griffith to L.M.S., ?. x. 79, ~· 
71 Hutley to L.M.S., 20. ii. 80, ibid. For a description 
of this area, see Rutley's "Uguha andltS People," in Rutley 
to L.M.S., 29. ix. 80, ~· 
72 8 Jones to L.M.S., 17. iii. 5, ~· 
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never took any obvious measures to drive the Europeans away; 
they rather worked in the background to spread their influence 
among the African population.73 In Mtowa we find apparently 
one of the few efforts of the Arabs from Zanzibar to spread 
Islam by active measures. A missionary reported: 
Almost every Arab and half-caste trader in these 
parts (and they are numerous) are zealous propa-
gators of Islamism. They neglect no opportunity, 
by persuasion and by force of arms (especially the 
latter) to accomplish their object. 74 
This is in contrast to the usual Arab view that the Africans 
were incapable of learning a 11 more advancedn religion.75 
The L.M.S. looked also to other areas on Lake Tanganyika. 
The explorer, Joseph Thomson, recommended in 1880 that they 
set up at Liendwe at the southern end of the lake. He called 
it "the most desirable spot, if not the only suitable one, 
for a mission station at the south end of Tanganyika.n76 
The L.M.S. was to put a steamer upon the lake; when it did 
the missionaries visited this location and began to make 
plans for occupying the area. The putting of this steamer 
upon Lake Tanganyika was a very dramatic affair. Hore and 
his men carried it in sections from the East African coast 
73Palmer to L.M.S., 6. v. 81, ibid. 
-74 Griffith to L.M.S., 13. iii. 82, ~· 
75For example, Livingstone, Last Journals, I, 24. 
76Boustead, Ridley and Co. to L.M.s., 17. iii. 80, 
L.M.S. 
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to the lake in 1883. Hore truly said: "we only want a 
newspaper reporter to make it the greatest work yet done 
in Central Africa."77 The Arabs were naturally fearful of 
this new manifestation of European power in their territory 
but after token opposition allowed the missionaries to 
launch it in May 1883.78 
The L.M.S. made no progress at Ujiji, and therefore 
with steam transportation to aid them began to plan the 
evacuation of Ujiji for a more likely location.79 In 1885 
they moved to an island in the lake not too far from Ujiji; 
later they would shift their operation to the territory at 
the southern end of the lake.8° Thus the Arabs of Ujiji 
succeeded in their efforts to prevent a European settlement 
in their center. They did this without violence and the 
English missionaries had good words to say for the many 
efforts the Arabs made to aid them in matters not related 
77 4 8 Hore to L.M.S., • iii. 3, ~· 
78 Griffith to L.M.S., 25. iii. 83, ~.; Hore to 
L.M.S., 25. v. 83, ~· 
79The L.M.S. members had long talked of leaving Ujiji. 
See Wookey to L.M.S., 7. iii. 81, ~· 
80For a description of their island home, Annie B. 
Hore, To Lake Tanganyika in a Bath Chair (London, 1886), 
174ff. 
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to their plans for a permanent occupation.81 Here, as else-
where in Tanganyika, the Arabs left the missionaries in peace 
as long as they were not implicated in governmental plans 
for assumption of authority over Arab areas of influence. 
D. The International African Association 
In September 1876 King Leopold of Belgium presided over 
a geographical conference in Brussels; the meeting was 
concerned with the opening up of Central Africa to western 
civilization. Leopold of course had his own motives for 
calling this meeting,8 2 but we are concerned here only with 
the expeditions actually sent to East Africa and their 
relations with the Arabs. At this conference it was 
decided to send a group to East Africa.83 Way stations 
were to be set up on the road to Lake Tanganyika, while 
the main base was to be located somewhere on the shores of 
this lake.84 They were to be organised as centers of civi-
li~ation, as points of provisioning for independent explorers, 
and as centers that would pacify the area in which they were 
located.85 The international character of the Association 
81 A. J. Swann, Fighting the Slave-hunters in Central 
Africa (London, 1910), 76; Hore, Tanganyika, ix. 
8 2For a discussion of Leopold's plans, P. A. Roeykens, 
La Dessain Africain de Leopold II (Bruxelles, 1956) and La 
Plri odeinitiale de 1toeuvre Africaine de LeoEold II (Bruxelles, 
1 957). 
83There were other plans discussed. See A. J. Wauters, 
Histoire Politigue du Congo Belge (Bruxelles, 1911), 18. 
84Bulletin de la Societe de Geographie de Marseille, I 
(1879), 246. This journal was edited by a man close to 
Leopold and is very useful for East African events. 
85( E. Banning ), L'Association Internationale (continued) 
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did not have a long life. The English early decided to push 
ahead on their own. The Royal Geographical Society declined 
to act with the new group; an interested group of British 
capitalists acted in a similar fashion. A leader of the 
latter group wrote Kirk that, while his associates "desire 
and expect to remain in friendly communications with the 
International Association, they believe that any practical 
results must be obtained by a commercial adventure unjoined 
with a philanthropic object. tt86 t-1embers from other nations 
took a similar view, and the original Association became a 
preponderantly Belgian body. 
British opinion as represented by officials in East 
Africa did not look with favor on this Association. One 
official wrote: 
The question naturally arises in one's mind, why 
should England, who has placed herself in the van 
of the slave trade suppression and of Central 
African exploration, and has not shown herself 
unable to provide either competentness or suffi-
cient funds for the accomplishment of both ends, 
now, when the heat and toil of the day are nearly 
over, form a National Committee for the accomplish-
ment of these objects, subordinate in a measure, 
and with resources at the disposal of a Central 
Belgian Committee? 
, "' Africaine et le Comite d'Etudes du Haut-Congo: Travaux et 
Resultats de D~cembre 1877 i Octobre 1882 (Bruxelles, 1882), 
7. 
86Grahame to Kirk, 6. iii. 77, unindexed, Z. A. For 
the R. G. s., Coupland, Exploitation of East Africa, 330. 
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He went on to oppose any such cooperation, since "amateur 
cooperation is not necessary." Furthermore: 
At its best -- its very best -- such cooperation 
can never be otherwise than disjointed, and 
embarrassed by unforeseen eventualities that may 
arise, by jealousies, and by the want of that 
perfect concert vitally necessary for the accomplish-
ment of great works. Our singlehanded work has 
borne some fruit; why should it be hampered and 
stunted in future yield by binding rules, regu- -
lations, and continental conventionalities -- in 
a word, why should we be bound to work under a 
"rule of thumb." 87 
This attitude must be kept in mind. The British would aid 
the Association in East Africa, but they always took care 
to protect their own interests. This attitude also colored 
their reports of the work of the Association in this area, 
and led them to belittle its success to an undue extent.88 
Kirk was requested to aid the expeditions89 and he 
readily promised to do so.9° He reflected the above attitude 
on a non-British venture, but felt compelled to act since the 
aims of the Association were good and no similar British 
groups were in the field.9 1 The lack of British competition 
87Elton to Derby, 1. iii. 77, Q-21, z. A. 
88For an unfair treatment of the Association, Thomson, 
Central African Lakes, II, 181-89. For a more balanced view, 
Hare to L.M.S., 26, v. 80, L.M.S. 
89Rutherford to Kirk, 10. vii. 77, unindexed, Z.A. 
9°Kirk to F. 0., 13. viii. 77, Q-22, Z.A. 
91Kirk to F. o., 7. iii. 77, Q-18, 1£1£. 
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bothered him; he later wrote: "It is I think a disgrace that 
no British Company should have before this time stepped in 
to share the chance of success and reap the advantages that 
must attend to those who are first in the field."92 
The first group of Association men arrived in Zanzibar 
in December 1877. This party - Crespel, Cambier, Maes, 
Marno - tried to preserve an international character, but 
did not succeed in convincing the Sultan of their status. 
He did not understand their aims and gave them a very cool 
reception.93 The Association began investigating the routes 
inland at once, but it soon ran into heavy difficulties. 
Two members took a preliminary trip;94 while they were 
travelling the other two members of the party died in 
Zanzibar. One of the two remaining then returned to Europe, 
and Cambier was left to conduct the Association's expedition 
inland without European companions. This Belgian officer 
ran into many difficulties on his route inland; atone point 
92 Kirk to F. o., 8. iii. 80, Q-24, ~~, 
93de Freycinet a M.A.E., 31. i. 78, C. C. Z., IV. 
94Ernst Marno, 11 Bericht uber eine Excursion von 
Zanzibar (Saadani) nach Koa-Kiora .(Janner-Marz, 1878),'1 
Mittheilungen der kais. koni,l. Geo,raphischen Gesellschaft 
in Wien, XXI (neuer Folge XI (1878 , 354-422; Lt. Cambier, 
"Rapport de l'excursion sur la route de Mpwapwa," in 
''Correspondance et Documents. Afrique. Conf. Geog. de 
Bruxelles. A. I. A. 1876-1884,u Ministere des Affaires 
Etrangeres (Bruxelles). 
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325 of his men deserted in a body.95 Gambier finally 
managed to reach Mirambo's capital; he had orders to see if 
it might be possible to establish a way station for the 
Association there. He soon discovered that Mirambo would 
promise much but would do little, and decided against a 
station.96 Mirambo had, in fact, given Gambier such a 
difficult time that he left with a legacy of bad feelings 
that would cause problems for the Association at a later 
date. 
Gambier, after leaving Mirambo, went to Tabora to re-
organise his caravan. The Arab community there more or less 
cooperated with him, and Gambier was able to continue his 
journey.97 1Vhile he was waiting there, Gambier received 
a letter from H. M. Stanley, then in Zanzibar, directing him 
to establish his station near the area of Karema on Lake 
Tanganyika.98 Stanley was then on his way to the Congo to 
work for Leopold; he planned to go inland from the mouth of 
the Congo and to meet the members of the Association coming 
95cambier a A.I.A., 8. viii. 78, ~· 
96cambier a de Ferry, 30. i. 79 in de Ferry a M.A.E., 
5. iii. 79, C.C.Z., IV. 
97Burdo, Les Belges, 46. 
98 ' de Ferry a M.A.E., 25. vii. 79, c.c.z., IV. Stanley 
had commented on this location in his explorations; see 
Stanley, Dark Continent, II, 29. 
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across Africa from the eastern coast.99 Cambier followed 
Stanley's directions and eventually reached Karema. He 
bought land there and soon vras at work building the 
Association's first station in East Africa.100 
The Association sent further expeditions to carry on the 
work inaugurated by Cambier.101 The most interesting of 
these groups was a party led by an Englishman, Carter; its 
aim was to conduct four Indian elephants to Lake Tanganyika 
as beasts of burden to test the effects of the climate upon 
them. 102 Kirk gave the Belgians full aid; if this attempt 
had worked, it would have revolutionized East African travel 
for the benefit of all. Although most of these elephants 
did not live to reach Karema, Carter considered the expedition 
a success. He wrote while en route that he considered "the 
expedition a complete success and not an experiment and he 
wishes his orders were to cross the continent and not work 
along the old and beaten track. ''1 03 
99For Stanley's w·ork there, Henry .Morton Stanley, The 
Congo and the Founding of its Free State (London, 1885).---
100Burdo, Les Belges, 53ff. 
101 A convenient summary of these expeditions is given 
in Becker, La Vie en Afrigue, I, 389ff. 
102 Association Internationals Africaine •. Comi.te' 
National Belge. S~ance Publigue du ler Mars 1880 (Bruxelles, 
t88o), 26. 
103Kirk to Strauch, 23. viii. 79, "Corr. et Doc. 1876-
1884." 
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\fuen the Association attempted to follow up this initial 
success they suffered their only losses through violence in 
East Africa. Carter, with an aid, was instructed to leave 
Karema for the coast. There he was to meet new elephants; 
they were to be brought inland to serve as the nucleus for 
a station that rrould capture and train East African elephants 
for labor in the area.104 On the return journey Carter and 
his companion were caught in a village while Mirambo attacked 
it; both were killed when this African chief's men stormed 
and captured the village. 105 The actual guilt of Mirambo 
for this tragedy was unclear, but in any case the elephant 
experiment was not carried on. Leopold now centered most of 
his efforts on his schemes for the Congo. Work in East 
Africa continued, 106 but now played a secondary role. 
The Arabs were never in serious difficulties with the 
Association. As we have seen, in the first attempts of the 
Belgian group, the Arabs rather aided them in their pene-
tration inland. Later expeditions received the same treat-
ment. The Association, in 1879, established a one-man station 
at Tabora to serve as a collecting point for supplies. The 
104K1rk to F. o., 4. iv. 80 and 1. vi. So, Q-24, z. A. 
105Kirk to F. o., 20. viii. So, 24. viii. So, 21. ix. So, 
1 S • X • SO , 121!!. 
106For a summary of future action at Karema, Bennett, 
"Captain Storms," 51ff. 
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officer in charge never had any difficulties with the 
Arab community. He remained there until the Fall of 1881; 
the Association then sold its station to the White Fathers. 107 
From these friendly relations there evolved a theory of the 
need for close ties to the Arabs in the civilizing of Central 
Africa. Its main proponent was A. Burdo, an experienced 
African traveller in the service of the Association. In 
several works he advised that the Belgians tie themselves 
closely to the Arabs and thus assure the reaching of their 
aims; he felt that ''negro bandits" like Mirambo would only 
hinder progress if taken into the Association's plans. 108 
Another Belgian, J. Becker, who became the closest European 
friend that Tippu Tip ever had, echoed these sentiments. 109 
The directors of the Association never agreed with these 
ideas and a joint European-Arab offensive for the develop-
ment of East Africa never materialized.110 
Other European nations belonging to the Association 
sent expeditions to East Africa. After the conference in 
107L'Assaut des pays negres, 337, 340. 
108A. Burdo, "De l'Avenir des Etablissements Belges 
en Afrique," Bulletin de la Societe Belge de Ge'ographie 
(1881 ), 237-52. 
109For his ideas, Becker, La Vie en Afrique, II, 520; 
For one meeting of Becker and Tippu Tip, Bennett, "Captain 
Storms," 52. 
110The Association withdrew from East Africa in 1885; for 
details,~., 61-3. 
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Brussels in 1876, various nations had founded branch societies 
in their own states. France organised her Association in 1877; 
Ferdinand de Lesseps was appointed president.111 The French 
society at first devoted its activities to giving the 
Belgian-led expeditions to East Africa financial aid.112 
Soon, however, its members planned purely French ventures in 
East and West Africa. 11 3 The French government backed their 
plans with a subsidy of 100,000 francs;114 Leopold donated 
40,000 ·from his own funds to help them along. It was decided 
to send Captain Bloyet, a merchant seaman, to build a station 
in the Usagara region of Tanganyika.115 
Bloyet left Europe in May 1880 and reached the location 
of his station, Kondoa in Usagara, in July. He had a very 
difficult time in reaching his station since all the country 
on his route was unsettled due to the raiding activities of 
Mirambo.116 Bloyet found that he had arrived at a very 
1l1Bull. Soc. G:og., 69 - XIII(1877), 420, 555. 
11 2ill.!!., 6e-XIV( 1877), 211 , 21 5. 
11 3Bull. Soc. Geog. Marseille, III(1879), 104. 
114 lill·, 275-76. 
11 5Bull. Soc. Geo§., 69 -XIX(188o), 87; Bull. Soc. 
Geog. Marseille, IV(18 O), 194. 
116nutreuil de Rhins, "Voyages et Travaux de Bloyet, tt 
355ff. 
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i~opportune time. The Arab community at Kondoa, a small 
but influential group, planned revenge for the acts of the 
C.M.S. missionaries at Mpwapwa against the slave trade. 
Bwana Sefu, the leader of the Arab group, and the most 
influential man between Bagamoyo and Tabora, said in 
strong terms that Kondoa needed no Europeans. He also said 
that he had no territory to cede to the Association in any 
case. Bloyet tried several times to change his attitude, 
but had no success. Then a local Arab resident intervened 
and saved the situation for Bloyet. Mwinyi Mbogo, an 
important resident of Kondoa, let Bloyet live in his own 
house, and succeeded in changing the mind of Bwana Sefu. 
He pointed out that Bloyet was not English and therefore was 
not engaged in activities against the slave trade. Mwinyi 
Mbogo said also that this Frenchman was too ill to cause 
them any harm at present; therefore there would be no danger 
to allow him to stay until the Arabs got to know him. This 
delay solved all difficulties for Bloyet, and he soon 
established close and friendly relations with the Arab 
community. 11 7 He did not recover at once from his illness; 
thus no significant work was attempted at the new station 
for some time. 118 
117Burdo, Les Belges, 452-53; Bull. Soc. BelEe G{og. 
{ 1 880) ' 61 5. 
118 ' Becker, Troisieme Expedition, 52. 
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Bloyet finally had to return to the coast and. try to 
regain his health. 11 9 His wife met him in Zanzibar in 
September 1881; she planned to go inland with him and to 
aid him in his work. She was the first European woman to 
reside that far inland in Tanganyika. 120 When they first 
returned to Kondoa, a period of difficulties with coastal 
settlers began. Africans working for Bloyet were molested. 
He 1rrote to the Sultan of Zanzibar to stop this; his plea 
was successful.12l A period of good relations now began 
that v1as to last until the Association station was with-
drawn. Bwana S~fu himself even began to punish all those 
who molested the workers of Bloyet.122 
Bloyet thus began his work. He mapped the area. He 
sent many specimens home for study in Paris. His presence 
in Kondoa prevented Africans from raiding in the area, and 
a large settlement of Africans seeking a quiet life grew 
11 9Ledoulx \ a :tvi.A.E., 8. iii. 81 ' o. vi. 81 , 25. viii. 
c.c.z., IVbis. 81 ' 
120 , M.A.E., 21. ix. 81 ' 20. 81 ' 1 o. xii. 81' Ledoulx a x. 
ill.!!.· 
1 21 ' 8~, 8. iii. 82, ~.; Ledoulx a M.A.E., 8. ii. 
Bull. Soc. Belge Geog. (1882), 232. 
122
nutreuil De Rhins, "Voyages et Travaux de Bloyet," 
361. 
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up around him. 123 The area became so settled that he soon 
was able to take long trips while leaving his- wife at home 
under the protection of the local inhabitants.124 
This station of the Association came to an end with the 
European partition of East Africa. The directors gave Bloyet 
orders of recall in 1885. He offered the station to the 
Holy Ghost Fathers at a price of 5500 francs; they accepted 
and took over the station in May 1885. 125 In June Bloyet 
and his wife left Africa for Europe. 126 Before leaving, he 
had given the new Catholic occupants full aid and they 
succeeded to the friendly relationships he had made in the 
area. 
127 
Here we have another instance of peaceful living between 
Arab and European. Bloyet came as the representative of an 
organization devoted to the ending of the slave t .rade. He 
123Baur et LeRoy, A Travers le Zanguebar, 195, 239ff. 
Bloyet was later given a gold medal by the Paris Geographical 
Society for his map work- Bull. Soc. Geog. Marseille, X(f•885), 
170.1 
124 Ledoulx a M.A.E., 11. ii. 82, 29. i. 83, 28. iii. 83, 
c.c.z., IVbis. 
125Bulletin General de la Congregation duSt. Esprit 
et de Ime~ Coeur de Marie, XIII, 1082, 1130. 
126 - \ 8 Piat a M.A.E., 1. vii. 5, P.Z., VII. 
127 de Courmont, ''Seconde Tournee dans le Vicari at 
ApoSt_ol:tq\:tE;. ' · · de Zanguebar," Les Miss ions Oatholigues, 
XVI I I(1886), 596. 
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did not, however, act directly against the slave trade, but 
rather tried to set an example that would work against it 
in the long run. The Arabs would never react against such 
a man. 
The Germans sent an expedition to East Africa under 
the auspices of a branch of the Association founded in their 
country. This group did not have any important dealings 
with the Arabs. It ran into potential danger when it 
established its headquarters at the village of an African 
vassal of the Arabs of Tabora, but no serious problem 
occurred since the Germans soon turned their efforts else-
where. Two of this group 1 s members, Reichard and Bohm, 
led an exploring party to Katanga, a major feat of African 
travel. The other members either died or returned to 
Europe; Bohm died on the expedition to Katanga. 128 This 
German section of the Association had only casual contacts 
with the Arabs and was not important to our study. 
The English did not act, in this matter of the Asso-
elation, as the other European nations. They sent no 
national expedition to East Africa to build a station. 
Their only effort was through the medium of the Royal 
Geographical Society. This organization sent out an exploring 
128For the German Association, see their journal, Mitt. 
Af. Gesell. Deutsch., and Bohm, TanganJika. 
108. 
expedition to Eastern Africa. Joseph Thomson led it, 
after the early death of the original leader, and accom-
plished a major feat in African travel. He returned to 
England, however, after his explorations; no more work 
followed on the part of England for the International 
African Association. 129 
E. The White Fathers 
The White Fathers were a society of Roman Catholic 
missionaries founded by Cardinal Lavigerie for service in 
North Africa in 1868. The society was successful, and in 
the mid-1870's was looking for new African fields. The 
creation of Leopolds Association spurred Lavigerie to 
action. In a memorandum to Pope Piux IX, he noted that 
the new African Association had a non-Catholic majority. 
He thus offered to have his missionaries act in the same 
general area as the Association; they both could aid each 
other in their efforts to introduce western civilization 
to Africa. Pope Leo XIII, who had succeeded Piux IX, 
agreed; the White Fathers then prepared to start work in 
East Africa at once. 13° 
129The expedition is described in Thomson, Central 
African Lakes. 
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In April 1878 the main body of the first mission party 
arrived in Zanzibar and began preparations for the journey 
inland. The Sultan looked upon them with favor and they 
were ready to leave in only five weeks.131 Kirk was much 
impressed with this first group of missionaries. He described 
the leaders as "men of intelligence and considerable exper-
ience," and said of the other members that "nothing could 
exceed .their energy.»132 Kirk was also suspicious of this 
group; he said: ''If I mistake not, they will enter into 
native politics once they get settled and have an 1nfluence."133 
This suspicion was not founded upon fact, but it colored the 
views of Kirk and other Englishmen in their dealings with 
these Frenchmen. 
The first group to proceed inland had a very difficult 
trip.134 In September 1879 they neared Tabora, but were 
stopped by a mass desertion of their men. They had to send 
to the authorities of Tabora for aid, both to reach Tabora 
and to get the necessary men to conduct their goods to Ujiji 
(Alger, 1888), I, 505ff; for a general account of this society, 
J. Bouniol, The White Fathers and their Missions (London, 1929). 
l3lLe P. Charmetant, D'Alger a Zanzibar (Paris, 1882), 115ff. 
l32Kirk to Derby, 29. v. 78, F. O. 84/1514, ~. R. O. 
l33Kirk to Mackinnon, 26. vii. 79, Box 22, "Mackinnon 
Papers. 11 
134This trip is covered in full in L'Assaut des pays 
n~gres, 14ffi and in the journal of the White Fathers, Missions 
d 1 Afrigue (D Alger), for 1879. See also Le R. P. Levesque, 
"Dans 1 1Afrique Orientale," Bulletin de Societe de . Geographie 
de Lille, 14(1888), 306-31. 
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and Buganda. The Arabs welcomed them and promised aid - but 
at exorbitant prices. The Whi te Fathers had no choice but 
to accept the terms of the Arabs; they did try to reach an 
agreement with Mirambo, but were unsuccessful.135 
The mission party divided at Tabora once it had secured 
the necessary resources. In November one party set off for 
Buganda. They visited the deposed Governor of Tabora, Sayd 
ibn Salim, at Uyuvi, and he gave them very useful assistance 
on their trip to Lake Victoria. This group reached the lake 
in December and were in Buganda in the early months of 1879.136 
The other party of White Fathers, bound for Ujiji, left 
Tabora in December 1878. The Arabs of Tabora gave them 
letters to the Arabs of Ujiji and promised there would be 
no difficulties; they said that the French w·ere not "the 
stealers of slaves" as the English, and thus the Arabs ~vould 
treat them in a friendly manner. 137 The mission group reached 
Ujiji in January 1879. They were welcomed by both the Arab 
community and the L. M.S. members. The White Fathers, how-
ever, were better observers than the English missionaries, 
and soon realized that a mission station could not succeed 
at Ujiji due to the presence of the Arabs. 138 
l35L'Assaut des pays negres, 160ff. 
136cussac, Pere Lourdel, 52ff. 
l37L'Assaut des pays negres, 276ff. 
l38For the English aid, Hore to L.M.S., 18. ix. 79, 
L.1"1.S. 
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The French missionaries made a careful study of all the 
available information on the various regions of Lake Tanganyika, 
and finally decided to establish at the northern part of the 
lake. The Urundi region was chosen since there were no Arabs 
settled in it. 139 The chief Arab of Ujiji, Mwinyi Kheri, 
aided them in settling there. Hore, the English missionary 
in Ujiji, reported some details on this decision. He felt 
that the inhabitants of this area of Urundi did not approve 
of this settlement, and had .consented only to avoid being 
raided by the men of Mwinyi Kheri. Hore also asserted that 
the White Fathers had to pay Mwinyi Kheri for his services.140 
This may be true, but we have no positive evidence. The 
Frenchmen left Ujiji to build in Urundi in May 1880. Disaster 
followed a period of early success. The White Fathers, as 
other Catholic missionaries, ransomed child slaves to form 
the basis of their religious communities. A quarrel arose 
over such a transaction in Urundi; as a result several of 
the missionary party were killed.141 Some reporters blamed 
the event on the Arabs; they said they worked behind the 
139L'Assaut des pays negres, 17. 
140 6 H0 re to Kirk, 17. viii. 80, N- , Z.A. 
141 Burdo, Les Belges, 469-72. 
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scenes to stimulate the Africans to act.142 Other sources, 
perhaps on doubtful information, entirely exonerated the 
Arabs.143 The present writer's view is that the Arabs were 
not to blame for this tragedy. Mwinyl Kherl was basically 
in sympathy with the Frenchmen, and also had to remember 
that the Sultan of Zanzibar would react strongly, if action 
against Europeans occurred, to maintain good relations with 
the officials of their countries in his city. Mwinyi Kherl 
thus sent a letter at once to Zanzibar to attest his innocence. 
He claimed, in opposition to Hare's reports, that the French-
men had set up in Urundl without seeking his permission, and 
thus he had not been able to take proper measures for their 
protection at once. Mwlnyi said, however, that he would 
lead a party of men there 'tct punish the gull ty Africans. 144 
This expedition was successful and the local African ruler 
responsible was killed along with many of his people.145 
Mwinyl Kheri's claims of innocence must be believed until 
we have proof to the contrary; he had nothing to gain and 
much to lose from the death of these missionaries. 
142coulbois, Tanganyka, 71. 
143see comment of the C.M.S. leader, R. Oust, in 
~' IV(1882), 27. 
144Mwiny1 Kheri's letter is enclosed in Ledoulx a M.A.E., 
10. xil. 81, c.c.z., IVbis. 
145Grlffith to L. M.S., 29. v. 81, L. M.S. 
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Other members of the White Fathers, meanwhile, established 
mission stations in other sections of Tanganyika. One group 
was sent to build at Mduburu on the road to Tabora. The 
Sultan had a representative there, 146 and he ~velcomed the 
missionaries to his village. This mission attempt did not 
succeed, but the failure was not due to the Arabs. These 
1Vhite Fathers then thought about repeating their experiment 
at Tabora. They contacted Shaykh ibn Nasib, then ruling 
for his brother Abdallah ibn Nasib, and asked his permission 
for a settlement. They wanted to set up an orphanage to 
educate and train African children. Shaykh ibn Nasib was 
very receptive to this idea; he had good reason to be, since 
he had a great many children on his hands whom he could sell 
to the mission. The matter was referred to Zanzibar and 
permission was granted for this new mission venture. 147 
The missionaries had good relations at Tabora after this 
orphanage was created, both with the Arabs and the African 
ruler, Siki. The situation did not change until the later 
period of difficulties in Tanganyika led to a general 
feeling of hostility against all Europeans.148 
146For details o~ this official, Bennett, "Captain 
Storms," 53-4. 
Pres 
147L'Assaut des pays negres, 328ff. 
148coulbois, Tanfanyka, 47; C Les Peres 
des Grands Lacs Lyon, 1885), 1ff. 
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The White Fathers continued to take an active interest 
in the regions around Lake Tanganyika. A new attempt was 
made to build a station in Urundi, this time in the district 
of Uzige at the very north of Lake Tanganyika. This was an 
area of Arab penetration, however, and the new mission 
station became untenable. Arab threats made the missionaries 
leave so that the inhabitants of the area would not suffer 
from an Arab raiding venture. 149 An English missionary 
reported that the French had to leave because they had not 
sought permission in advance from Mwinyi Kheri. 150 This view 
could be true; if they had asked, Mwinyi Kheri might have 
refused permission due to his raiding activities in the 
region. If they had not, he might have felt it necessary 
to act, as he apparently did in this instance. 
The White Fathers continued to search for a location 
for an effective station. They turned next to the western 
coast of Lake Tanganyika. The village of Massanze on the 
Uh"lvari peninsula was chosen because there were no Arabs in 
the vicinity. The African leader of this area visited Ujiji 
to solicit their coming; :r<lwinyi Kheri was in favor, and thus 
a settlement was made. 151 There were no immediate problems 
with the Arabs in this location. 
149coulbois, Tanganyka, 71ff. 
150 84 s Jones to L. M.S., 21. xii. , L.M •• 
151L 1 Afri9ue exploree et civilisee, rrre annee (1881-
1882), 229; Pres des Grands Lacs, 49ff. 
11 5. 
Apart from the difficulties the White Fathers had with 
the Arabs over particular locations for mission stations, 
no major problems arose betvreen Arab and French missionary. 
Mvrinyi Kheri at Ujiji alvrays remained their firm friend. 
He said once that the Arabs and these missionaries had much 
in common. They both had but one God, and differed only 
"a little" in their systems of worship. Thus Mwinyi Kheri 
always considered the White Fathers as being under his 
personal protection. He never felt this way about the 
English since he knew they wrote reports about his activities 
to the Consul in Zanzibar. 152 The French of course did the 
same, and I"lwinyi Kherl probably knew this, but the French 
did not follow an active policy in East Africa that threatened 
Arab interests. The most important Arab leader of the nine-
teenth century, Tippu Tip, also had friendly relations with 
the White Fathers, as he did with most Europeans. In 1884 
he offered the Catholic missionaries aid in setting up in 
areas of the Congo under his control.153 
In 1885 the White Fathers expanded their interests on 
Lake Tanganyika. The Association of Leopold planned to close 
out its stations on both shores of the lake. The White 
Fathers did not want to see these centers of civilization 
152Ibid., 73-4. 
l 53P. Aug. Schynse, Zwei Jahre am Congo (Koln, 1889), 
viii. 
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closed and took over their control from the Belgians. 
Another important reason for their action was the necessity 
for them to control these important fortified stations built 
by the Belgians. If not kept up, an important power vacuum 
would occur. They thus occupied them with troops raised by 
the mission and led by one of the former Papal Zouaves, 
Captain Joubert, now serving them in Central Africa. 154 The 
English were doubtful of the White Fathers' ability to succeed 
in this venture. Hore said: "I cannot believe in the ability 
(if they have the desire) of the French Missions to hold these 
places or sustain the responsibilities thus entailed; if they 
do attempt it there will certainly be disaster, especially 
at Karema. 11 155 His fears were ill-founded. The transfer 
led to difficulties, but the White Fathers met them and in 
doing so helped to end Arab domination of Lake Tanganyika. 
The White Fathers thus never had any major difficulties 
with the Arabs before the period of European control. As 
long as they took note of Arab views before they established 
stations, they maintained close and friendly relations. The 
,Arabs did little to stop them in their efforts to spread 
Christianity, and in fact helped them at times so that they 
154J. Cussac, Un Geant de l'Apostolat: Le Cardinal 
Lavigerie (Paris, 1942), 133; M. Pottier, Le Cardinal Lavigerie 
(Paris, 1947), 142. 
155 8 Hore to L.M.S., 22. vi. 5, L.M.S. 
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would set up in areas where they would not be in contact 
with Arab slaving activities. 
F. The Holy Ghost Fathers and the Universities' Mission to 
Central Africa. 
There were two other missions in East Africa, one 
Catholic and one Protestant, that went inland into Tanganyika 
during or before the period under consideration in this 
chapter. Both had been represented in Zanzibar and in 
Tanganyika before the developments of the 1870's brought 
new groups of Europeans to East Africa. 
The French Holy Ghost Mission began work in Zanzibar 
in the early 1860's, following pioneer efforts in that island 
/ . 
by French priests sent from the colony of Reunion. ' Pare 
-
Horner arrived in Zanzibar in 1863; he dominated , the story 
of the development of this mission for many years. 156 Horner 
soon turned to the African coast and established a mission 
in Bagamoyo in the mid-1860's. 157 By 1870 Horner travelled 
156For his biography, Joseph Simon, Pater Anton Horner 
(Lauterbourg, 1934). The English were very suspicious of 
this mission at first; later they saw its value and held it 
up as an example, even to English missions. See Rigby to 
Russell, 1. viii. 61, F. o. 54/18, P.R.O.; Pelly to Forbes, 
10. i. 62, E-31, Z.A.; John Martineau, The Life and Corres-
pondance of Sir Bartle Frere (London, 1895), II, 102. 
157For a summary history of the mission, Mgr. LeRoy, 
"Le Zanguebar, 11 Les Hissions Catholigues Francaises au XIXe 
Si~cle (J. P. Piolet, ed.), (Paris, 1902), V, 469ff; see also 
the journal of the society, Bull. Gen. Cong. St. Esprit. 
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inland to set up new stations for his mission.158 This first 
inland expedition of a European mission raised some opposition 
from the Arabs of Zanzibar. They took no action, however, 
and contented themselves with painting a dark picture of 
all the dangers to be faced with in the interior. The Sultan 
was also fearful of this action, but for different reasons. 
He thought that Horner might get into serious trouble; then 
France would blame him for not being able to protect her 
citizens in the territory he claimed for Zanzibar on the 
mainland of Africa. Horner assured the Sultan that he went 
inland knowing all the dangers to be faced, and that the 
mission would not appeal to France if difficulties resulted. 
The Sultan then gave his permission, and Horner received 
letters of introduction from the Sultan to the African chiefs 
he planned to v1sit. 159 
This expedition, and later ones, led to the founding 
of a series of stations by the Holy Ghost Fathers in the 
interior. None of them were any great distance inland. 
'\fuen the White Fathers came to East Africa, they were given 
the inland regions for their base of operations; the Holy 
Ghost Fathers concentrated on areas nearer to the coast 
until the assumption of European control in East Africa. 
158R. P. Horner, "De Bagamoyo a Oukami," Bull. Soc. 
G~og., 6e-16(1873), 125-39. 
159simon, Horner, 35. 
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This order of missionaries never had any serious problems 
with the Arabs. In Bagamoyo they did not interfere with 
the Arab administration; inland they were not located on 
the main caravan routes. Even when the Arabs fought the 
Germans in the late 188o's, this relationship did not 
change. The Arabs had learned to trust these French 
missionaries, and the priests made sure that these good 
relations continued. l60 
The Universities' Mission to Central Africa, a high 
Anglican order, came to Zanzibar after it had failed to 
establish mission stations on the Zambesi. They had 
answered Livingstone's call to work in this area, but had 
been blocked by the loss of many of their men and by the 
disordered state of this part of Africa.161 They arrived 
in Zanzibar in 1864 and made the island their headquarters 
for future attempts to penetrate inland. 162 Their first 
efforts were towards the Usambara region of Tanganyika, 
an area near the coast, in the late 1860's. There were few 
Arabs in Usambara. They had many difficulties at first and 
16°.As a result, when the mission was once in danger in 
Bagamoyo, the Sultan sent aid at once. See de Gaspary a 
Smith, 9. ix. 75, E-70, Z.A. 
1 61 This story is told in J. P.R. Wallis (ed.), The 
Zambesi Expedition of David Livingstone, 1858-1863 . (L"'"ridon, 
1 956). 
162universities' Mission to Central .Africa, "Zanzibar 
Diary, 1864-1888," (U. I"i .C.A., Zanzibar); their Zanzibar 
mission account is given in liard, Letters of Bishop Tozer. 
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were not able to do important work until the mid-1870's. 
One of the missionaries serving at their station in Usambara, 
Magila, was killed by Arab slavers in 1874. He met a party 
of slavers while returning from Magila. An argument resulted, 
and soon shots were fired. The missionary was badly wounded 
and later died in Zanzibar.163 He was the only missionary 
killed by the Arabs in East Africa before the period of 
European control. He would not have been killed if he had 
not tried to intervene in the affairs of this group of Arabs. 
Slavery was, after all, a legal institution in East Africa 
at this time, and he had no right to act as he did. It was 
treated as an isolated incident and no other difficulties 
followed his unfortunate demise. 
The Universities' Mission also turned its attention to 
the regions around Lake Nyasa. In 1875 they sent a party 
inland from the southern coast of Tanganyika to organize for 
future work. Settlements on the route chosen soon followed, 
but these posts had no significant dealings with the Arabs. 
The Arab slavers, who also had no stations in this area, 
tried to avoid the missionary settlements so that their 
movements would not be reported to the English at .Zanzibar. 
1 63Heanley, Steere, 83ff; "Zanzibar Diary." 
1 21. 
There were no difficulties with the Arabs, therefore, until 
the later Arab war with the Germans.164 
G. European Traders 
The only Europeans to meet with serious difficulties 
from the Arabs of East Africa were the private European 
traders who attempted to compete with Arab traders in the 
1870's and early 1880's. The first European trader to 
establish a post tn the interior was a native of Switzerland, 
Phillippe Broyon. A member of Cameron's expedition in search 
of Livingstone reported him living at Mpwapwa in 1874.165 
1 66 He remained inland in 1875, based in the same area. 
Since there were no Swiss representatives in East A:t'rica, 
he asked and received British protection in 1877. 167 During 
his stay in the interior Broyon became very close to the 
Nyamwezi leader, Mirambo. 168 Thus when the Europeans began 
to go inland in large numbers, they turned to Broyon for 
aid. He worked with them until ruined by a quarrel with 
164Hanna, Nyasaland, 90ff; Heanley, Steere, 113ff; for 
an over-all account of the mission, A. E. M. Anderson-Morshead, 
The Historl of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa, 
1859-1909 London, 1909). 
165Murphy to Consul at Zanzibar, 7. vi. 75, R-14, Z.A. 
166smith to F. 0., 28, viii. 75, E-72, ~· 
167Broyon to Kirk, 16. iii. 77, with a note of Kirk's 
of the same date, E-73, ~· 
168 Smith to Wigram, 23. xi. 76, C.A6/o 22, C.M.S. 
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Mirambo. 169 Broyon did not appear to be in difficulties 
with the Arabs at any time. In fact, part of his troubles 
with Mirambo were due to his close relations with the Arabs. 
In the light of the difficulties of other European traders 
with the Arabs, it would seem that he must have worked 
closely with the Arabs from Zanzibar, perhaps supplying 
them with needed goods, and not competing with them for 
the staples of the East African trade. 
The next European trader to try to establish in East 
/ 
Africa was a Frenchman, Emile Sergere. He planned to organize 
a regular system of transportation between the East African 
coast and the lakes of Central Africa. Tabora was to be 
the site of a large storehouse of merchandise for the needs 
of caravans; thus the cost of this necessary material would 
be much lower in price.170 \ Sergere also entered into direct 
competition with the Arabs in the ivory trade. He had better 
cloth than the Arabs for trading, and soon did very well in 
this venture. The Arabs did not long tolerate this inter-
ference. They prevented anyone from dealing with him by 
threats of force. 171 This action was not enough to drive 
169 Broyon to MacGregor, 1. x. 79, L.M.S. 
17°Hore to L.M.S., 30. xi. 80, L.M.S.; Ass. Int. 
Africaine. Seance du ler Mars 1880, 18. 
171southon to L.M.s., 23. ii. 81, L.M.S. 
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the Frenchman away, so i the Arabs resorted to more direct 
action. ' Sergere was accused of plotting against the African 
/ 
chief of Tabora; this chief then forced Sergere to leave to 
save his life. 172 Although this action had been taken by 
the African leader, Siki, all knew that the Arabs were 
responsible. Serg~re had "really (been ) driven out of 
Unyanyembe by the Arab Governor."173 
The next European merchants to come to Tabora did not 
' fare as well as Sergere. German commercial houses repre-
sented in Zanzibar sent men inland after ivory in 1885 and 
1886. The first two sent in 1885 found themselves in com-
plete isolation on arrival. .The Arabs did not allow anyone 
to deal with them; fever completed the ruin of this venture.174 
Another representative was sent in 1886. 175 He received the 
same treatment at first, but did not succumb to illness as 
his predecessors. This German, Giesecke, was kil1e.d by an 
172Becker, Troisieme Expedition, 152-53; Copplestone's 
uJournal," entries of 25. ii. 81, 1. iii. 81 , 18. iii. 81, 
19. iii. 81, G3.A6/0 1, C,M,S,; Bohm, Tanganjika, 55; Kirk 
to F. 0., 8. iii. 81, Q-25, Z.A. 
173stokes to Wigram, 14. vi. 81, G3.A6/0 1, C.M.S. 
174Lucien Heudebert, Vers les Grands Lacs de l'Afrigue 
Orientale (Paris, 1900), 359-60, 385; Michahelles to Mac-
donald, 20. ix. 87, E-98, Z.A. 
175Kirk to F. 0., 5. vi. 86, E-93, ibid. This incident 
is dealt with here, even though outside of the time limit 
of this chapter, because it belongs to this period of non-
governmental relationships with the Arabs. 
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Arab while in a caravan of Tippu Tip's that was returning 
to the coast. 176 A missionary said: "his crimes were that 
he had good cloths to buy ivory whereas the Arabs only had 
poor ones. ''177 No more trading ventures v1ere attempted 
until European controls were established in the area. 
H. Conclusions 
When the Europeans came to East Africa following the 
death of Livingstone and the travels of Stanley, they were 
received with tolerance, if not friendship, by the Arabs. 
The objectives of these newcomers, both missionaries and 
members of the various nation~l branches of the International 
African Association, made such a reception seem unlikely. 
They were all in some measure devoted to the ending of the 
slave trade, an integral part of the life of the Arabs of 
East Africa. No problem resulted, however, as long as these 
European intruders took no direct action against the slave 
trade. If they -vlished to ·work by gradual means to spread 
the ideas of western civilization, an effective way to 
combat the slave trade, the Arabs were content to let them 
live in peace. The Arabs of East Africa had little power to 
combat these Europeans, backed by the strength of their 
17 6Miasha ya Hamed bin Muhammed, 149, 151; Wilhelm 
Junker, Travels in Central Africa: 1882-1886 (London, 1892), 
560-62; Wissmann, l•Iy Second Journey, 270. 
177Hooper to Lang, 24. x. 86, G3.A5/0 3, C.M.S. 
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governments in any crisis, and preferred to devote their 
main efforts to trade. 
It was in this sphere of trade that major difficulties 
occurred. Competition in trade, from individual merchants, 
forced the Arabs to take action. This competition took 
place at Tabora, the center on the main route to the ivory 
areas of Africa. The Arabs refused to allow competition 
here, and used threats of force and even murder to protect 
their position of dominance in this trade. This illustrates 
the character of the Arab power of Tanganyika. They w·ere 
there for trade, and had set up centers to regulate it to 
their profit. As long as Europeans left them in control of 
these centers and trade routes, and did not interfere 
directly in the slave trade, there would be relative peace 
between Arab and European. With the division of East Africa 
among the European powers and the resulting administration 
of the area, all this would change. Force then became 
necessary to put down Arab hostility and to secure the 
territory for the new ideas of its European rulers. 
CHAPTER III 
THE EUROPEAN OCCUPATION OF TANGM~YIKA 
A. Karl Peters and the Germans 
The European occupation of Tanganyika resulted from the 
actions of Karl Peters and his followers in East Africa 
during the latter part of 1884. In March 1884 the German 
Colonial Society (Gesellschaft f~r Deutsche Kolonisation) was 
organized in Germany under the leadership of Peters. After 
much discussion the Society decided to turn its first efforts 
to East Africa; one of its leading members, Count Pfeil, had 
been a recent visitor to the East African coast, and main-
tained that it would be the best area for their projects. 1 
Karl Peters led a small group of men to Zanzibar in November 
1884. He had been clearly told by his government that they 
would give his party no support. Peters found on arrival 
that a Belgian expedition was preparing to go inland; he 
thought perhaps this party had the same aims as his group, 
1L'AfriSue ex~loree et civilisee, 5e annee (1884), 135; 
7e ann~e (18 q), a 8-70. The background of German colonial 
development is ably summarised in Coupland, Exploitation of 
East Africa, 394ff. 
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and thus he hurried his preparations. Peters' venture left 
Zanzibar in only four days, and with very insufficient 
equipment. 2 Kirk knew of Peters' expedition, of course, 
but he was not unduly worried. He reported that "it is 
understood there are Germans, whether acting for themselves 
or as emmissaries of the Government is not known, looking 
out for concessions in Usagara,"3 and paid no more attention 
to them. 
Peters remained inland for six weeks, returning to 
Zanzibar in mid-December 1884. He had signed treaties 
_giving sovereignty to his society with Africans in Usagara, 
Useguha, Ukumi, and Nguru, territories about 200 miles 
inland, and extending from west of Pangani to west of Dar 
es-Salaam. An English missionary later reported that these 
treaties had been made 1dth mere headmen who had no rights 
to sign away the land of their chiefs. He added that the 
treaties were made uby a German who knew but a little 
English, speaking through an interpreter who also knew· but 
a very little English ••• and no German."4 This fact, 
however, had little importance in the future since the German 
2o. Falkenhorst, Deutsch-Ostafrika. Geschichte der 
G-rundung einer deutschen Kolonie (Berlin, 1890), 13ff. 
3 - - - -Kirk to Granville, l8. xii. 84, F. 0. 84/1679, P.R.O. 
4Kirk to Salisbury, 21. xi. 85, F. 0. 84/1729, ~· 
The reports were from the U.M.O.A. missionary, J. P. Farler. 
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government did not question Peters' methods. The existence 
of these treaties was not divulged, and Peters left Zanzibar 
at once for Germany. Other members of the original party 
remained inland to begin work in establishing the new con-
cessions. One of these Germans, A. Otto, almost let this 
new state of affairs escape its veil of secrecy. He became 
ill and wrote to Captain Bloyet of the French Association's 
station at Kondoa for aid. He said: "The information I can 
give you is so very important that you will be glad to hear 
it." Bloyet, however, was unable to visit him and he died 
alone.5 
In Germany Peters' concessions met with a favorable 
reception. In February 1885 an Imperial Schutzbrief gave 
national backing to his acquisitions. The German Colonial 
Society was given full powers to govern in its new East 
African territories. The only restriction placed upon its 
power was that it must remain a purely German society.6 
This German organization now had to undertake a two-pronged 
offensive to carry its plans through to fruition. First, 
it had to get recognition of its territorial claims in East 
Africa from Zanzibar, a state that claimed the same territory. 
5 '1. 8 Ledoulx a M.A.E., 17. i. 5, P.Z. VII. 
6The Schutzbrief, with a description of its clauses, is 
given in de Courcel a Ferry, 4. iii. 85, Allemagne, t. 63, 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Paris). 
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Second, the Society had to mobilise support in Germany behind 
its program for the development of East Africa so that it 
could gain the capital necessary for the success of these 
plans. 
The overcoming of the conflicting claims of the Sultan 
of Zanzibar was no easy task. The Sultan reacted strongly 
against Peters' treaties and the official German support 
for them. He wrote to the German Emperor: 
We protest against this for these territories are 
ours and we hold military stations there, and 
those chiefs who profess to cede soverign rights 
to the agents of the Society have no authority 
to do so. These places are under our authority 
from the time of our fathers. 7 
He added later: ''As to those who pretend to hav-e obtained 
grants in these countries we would only say they went there 
first taking the usual recommendations C to the local chiefs ) 
from us."8 At the time of the first protest given here, 
Sultan Barghash was so upset that Kirk reported he had to 
dissuade the ruler of Zanzibar from carrying his case in 
person to Germany.9 Barghash was a realist, however, and 
soon saw the diplomatic realities of the situation. He 
threw himself on the mercy of England and France, knowing 
7sultan of Zanzibar to the German Emperor, 27. iv. 85, 
in Kirk to Granville, 28, iv. 85, F. o. 84/1725, P.R.O. 
8KirK to Granville, 9. v. 85, quoting the Sultan, lh11· 
9Kirk to Granville, 1. v. 85, i£1£. 
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that if they did not support him he had no chance against 
the might of Germany. 10 The German reaction to these notes 
from Zanzibar, as was to be expected, paid little attention 
to the Sultan's claims. The Consul in Zanzibar replied: 
Your Highnesses' stations, situated at certain 
points in the interior, are simply mercantile 
settlements established in the interests of 
caravans, by means of which trade between 
Zanzibar and in the interior of Africa is 
carried on. That these stations, also, in no 
way represent sovereignty on the part of your 
Highness, is seen from the fact that native 
Princes have up til now raised tribute from 
caravans passing through their territory, as 
for instance at Nbumi in Usagara. 11 
This German refusal to recognise the traditional claims 
of the Sultan of Zanzibar on the African mainland confirmed 
a trend that began with the decisions taken at the Berlin 
Conference. This meeting, which went on from November 
1884 through February 1885, resulted in Leopold's new Congo 
state securing frontiers in the east that included areas 
claimed by the Sultan. 12 Thus even before the Sultan knew 
of Peters' claims, he was very upset by European activities. 
10 ' 8 8 Ledoulx a M.A.E., • iii. 5, P.Z. VII. The Sultan 
also wrote the United States for support. The reply said 
that the United States did not sanction the German acts, but 
no aid was promised. See Bayard to the Sultan of Zanzibar, 
25. vi. 85, "Consulate of the United States of America at 
Zanzibar," National Archives (Washington, D. C.). 
11 Rholfs to the Sultan of Zanzibar, undated, in Malet 
to Granville, 22. vi. 85, E-85, Z.A. 
12Robert Stanley Thomson, Fondation de l'Etat Ind~pendant 
du Congo (Bruxelles, 1933), 300-01. 
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In an interview with the French representative in Zanzibar, 
Barghash lashed out at the Berlin Conference. He was very 
bitter, particularly against the Belgians, since he had 
aided all the expeditions they had been sending inland 
from his capital for the previous seven years. He now 
threatened death to any of his subjects who gave any further 
aid to Belgian groups. The Frenchman managed to calm 
Barghash down, and dissuaded him from protesting by tele-
gram to Bismarck over the proceedings of the Conference. 13 
Thus, the Belgian expedition present in Zanzibar on the 
arrival of Peters never was able to leave the coast. A 
statement of the future Baron Dhanis, then on his first 
mission to Africa, demonstrates how the Europeans of that 
era often totally disregarded the claims of indigenous 
rulers to territorial rights. Dhanis blamed the poor 
reception of the Belgian expedition on the machinations of 
Kirk: "It appears that Sir John makes him C Barghash J 
believe most foolish things. Knowing that the King was 
at the head of the Congo business which is going to be 
free, he thinks now that Becker C the expedition's leader) 
and us are going to take his kingdom by force and then ••• 
13 \ 8 Ledoulx a M.A. E., 15. i. 5~ . P. Z. VII. 
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hand it over to the Belgians."14 That the Sultan had good 
grounds for suspicion apparently did not occur to Dhanis. 
With this background, then, the Sultan was in no agreeable 
frame of mind when the German acceptance of the Peters 
concessions reached him. 
Germany had to take the position that the Sultan's 
inland posts were mere commercial centers to justify their 
support for Peters' treaties. The Berlin Conference had 
decided on the doctrine of effective occupation for colonial 
claims; the Germans had to prove then that Zanzibar did not 
meet this requirement. Zanzibar had, under this doctrine 
of effective occupation, one good .claim to the territory of 
Usagara, one of the areas claimed by Beters. The Sultan 
had a military post at Mamboia, about 120 miles inland on 
the route to Tabora. This center had been garrisoned by 
soldiers from Zanzibar since 188o. 15 Kirk pointed this fact 
out at once to his Foreign Office to rally support for the 
Sultan's claims. 16 What then was the real nature of this 
14nhanis to his parents (the English is his), undated, 
in "Baron Dhanis Papers" Musee Royal du Congo Belge. 
Additional proof of this hostile attitude to the Belgians 
is given in Giraud a Strauch, 16. vi. 84, "Storms Papers." 
15coupland, Exploitation of East Africa, 264-66; Robert 
Nunez Lyne, An Apostle of Empire (London, 1936), 66. Lyne's 
work is the biography of Gen. Mathews of the Sultan's forces. 
16Kirk to F. 0., 25. iv. 85, E-89, Z.A. 
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station? In the latter part of 1880, General Mathews of 
the Sultan's army led a force to Mamboia to establish a 
fortified center. This action was the result of the death 
of Carter and his aide in a raid of the Nyamwezi chief, 
Mirambo.17 Mamboia was to be the first of a line of 
fortified stations on the main routes to the interior, but 
no . additional posts were ever established. When Mathews 
first arrived at Mamboia, the local chief refused to see 
him, saying that he wanted the resident C.M.S. missionary 
present at any meeting. 18 This reception would seem to 
establish that this local chief had little idea of any 
Zanzibar sovereignty over him. All was eventually arranged, 
however, and a garrison of Zanzibari soldiers was located 
close to the village of Mamboia. Later reports do not 
picture this station as a very effective center of Zanzibari 
control. In 1882 a missionary said: "The soldiers are 
just about the most lawless set of men the country can 
produce." They raided the local Africans for supplies, 
even forcing some to give up cultivating to escape their 
depredations.19 In 1885 a missionary reported that he thought 
the slave trade was on the increase in the area around 
17see above, p. 101. 
18Last to C.M.S., 18. iii. 81, G3.A5/0 1, C.M.S. 
19Edmunds to Lang, 8. ix. 81, G3.A6/0 1, ~· 
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Mamboia; his letter implied that the soldiers of the Sultan 
were involved. 20 As far as numbers were concerned, in June 
1885 the garrison comprised only four men. 21 
Thus it would appear that this post was never a very 
effective center of control for the Sultan of Zanzibar. 
It was a garrison of coastal men under some form of authority 
from Zanzibar, but this authority was never exercised to 
regulate the surrounding area as part of the dominions of 
Zanzibar. The post at Mamboia degenerated into a group of 
undisciplined men, menacing the lives of their African 
neighbors. The Sultan, with Kirk behind him, had to 
struggle for Mamboia, however. This post was the only 
really tangible claim to ownership that the Sultan had in 
the territory claimed by Peters; if the position of the 
Sultan were disregarded there, the same fate might extend 
to all of his posts outside of the area immediately in 
dispute. Unfortunately for Barghash, the Foreign Office 
officials in England did not regard such places as Mamboia 
as effective centers. An official noted on a report by an 
East African Consular representative then in London: 
"Holmwood was very doubtful whether the Sultan could estab-
lish a claim to the parts where the Germans had gone, 
2°Roscoe to Lang, 1. vi. 85, G3.A6/0 2, ~· 
21 Kirk to F. 0.,· 5. vi. 85, E-87, Z.A. 
135. 
though he undoubtedly makes the claim." 22 For general 
diplomatic reasons England did not back these doubtful 
Zanzibari claims. 23 Kirk was informed that, "provided that 
British interests are not injured or the Sultan's established 
rights are not injured H. M. Government are favourable to 
German enterprise in districts not occupied by any civilized 
powers." Kirk was instructed to aid the Germans in settling 
·' their difficulties and to avoid friction in Zanzibar.24 
The German Society did not wait for a decision as to 
the sovereignty of the disputed areas before putting their 
plans into operation. From May 1885 onward frequent German 
expeditions were sent to many new areas in Tanganyika and 
East Africa. Many new treaties were signed to increase the 
territory of the Society. 25 German traders were also active. 
They stepped in to see if they could bypass the Sultan in 
his role as middleman for the trade of the interior. One 
22Note of Sir P • .Anders.on, 29. iv. 85, F. 0. 84/1716, 
P.R.O. 
23England was very occupied. at that ~oment in world 
affairs; there was tension in Egypt, war in the Sudan, and 
threat of war with Russia. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle 
for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1954), 292-3o3. 
24Lister to Kirk, 20 • v. 85, E-85, Z.A. Kirk wrote on 
this message - ''a cowed and kicked Government." Kirk finished 
another note on a despatch of the same date with his descrip-
tion of English policy as "peace at any price ... 
25Falkenhorst, Deutsch-Ostafrika, 39ff; Kirk to F. 0., 
4. iii. 85, F. 0. 84/1716, P.R.O. 
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German went to Mpwapwa and bought ivory for the Zanzibar 
market. 26 
The Sultan was equally active; he had to build up his 
former loose relationships with African leaders on the main-
land to insure his position against future German efforts. 
General Mathews was sent on a mission along the coast of 
Tanganyika to strengthen the Zanzibari garrisons there. 
An Arab, Sayf ibn Sliman, was designated as Governor of 
Usagara, and many Zanzibari flags were sent inland. Letters 
were sent to Tabora and Ujiji forbidding the selling of 
any land to Germans.27 Kirk, it appears, felt that the 
action of the Sultan in sending Mathews to the coast would 
not please his superiors; he reported this trip as a mission 
to deal with matters relating to the slave trade. 28 
Inland African chiefs and local Arab leaders began also 
to react to this continual German expansion. At Mamboia, 
C.M.S. missionaries met representatives of Bwana Heri, chief 
of the coastal town of Saadani, on their way to consult 
with the elderly Arab chief of Usagara, Mwinyi Usagara, 
to see "what had really taken place between him and the 
Germans." Mwinyi Usagara had a feudal type relationship 
26 \ 8 Ledoulx a M •. A.E., 27. iv. 5, · P.Z. VII. 
27Piat a M.A.E., 10. iv. 85 and 14. iv. 85, ~· 
28Kirk to F. 0., 13. iv. 85, F. O. 84/1716, P.R.O. 
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with many of the African chiefs of Usagara, and his involvement 
in the new German claims was unclear. Kirk had heard that 
Mwinyi Usagara objected to German efforts in his territory, 
and he feared that he might take steps that would complicate 
even further German-Zanzibari relations.29 This Arab leader 
particularly worried Kirk since it was reported that Mwinyi 
Usagara had received a letter from the Sultan of Zanzibar 
against the flying of German flags. As a result it was said 
that the Arab leader had forbidden Count Pfeil to hoist any 
new ones.3° 
M~anwhile negotiations were proceeding in Europe to 
settle the problem of the disputed territory without any 
participation by Zanzibar. France entered the dispute to 
try to secure a settlement that would insure against any 
major quarrel breaking out among the European nations 
interested in East African affairs. The French proposed 
that the Sultan recognise Peters' treaties; Germany could 
then join the Anglo-French treaty of 1862 that guaranteed 
the independence of Zanzibar against acts by the signatory 
powers. Kirk welcomed such a solution. He said: it "seems 
a reasonable solution if the whole coast be included C in 
the guarantee ) and limits inland be defined. tt31 
29Kirk to F. 0., 5. vi. 85, ~· 
30 ' 85 P Z VII Fiat a M.A.E., 1. vi. , • • • 
31 Kirk to Granville, 30. vi. 85, F. o. 84/1726, P.R.O. 
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It soon was clear that Zanzibar had no choice but to 
agree to some such solution. In August 1885 a German fleet 
came into the harbor of Zanzibar. An ultimatum was issued 
by its commander, and all Zanzibari claims were rejected. 
The German naval officer reiterated the former German posi-
tion: "You have, it is true, occupied several points on the 
interior of the coast, but not as a Sultan, but as a private 
individual; proof of this is that caravans paid tribute to 
the chiefs of the country through which they passed." Thus 
the Sultan was required to withdraw his military posts from 
the territory covered by the Peters treaties, to recognise 
the new German protectorate in this territory, and to with-
draw his protest to Bismarck against the actions of the 
German Colonial Society. The German commander gave the 
Sultan twenty-four hours to comply with these terms, and 
drew his fleet up in a line facing the palace. After a little 
delay, the Sultan, acting on Kirk's advice, accepted the 
German ultimatum. England and France were not supporting 
him and he could not stand alone.32 
The German Colonial Society had thus secured clear 
title to its territories. An efficient organization then 
had to be established in Germany to allow the Societv to 
32Kirk to Granville, 11. viii. 85, 14. viii. 85, 
21. viii. 85, F. 0~ 84/1727, ~.; Piat a M.A.E., 11. viii. 85, 
enclosing Paschen a Sultan de Zanzibar, 11. viii. 85, P.Z. VII. 
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develop its plans for East Africa. At first the aims of 
the Society were stated in purely humanitarian terms, 
perhaps to draw support from the European bodies devoted 
to working against the slave trade. The German explorer, 
Schweinfurth, in a letter to the Times, listed these prin-
ciples as at the heart of the Society's program: expulsion 
of the slave-trading Muslims, prohibition and regulation 
of the import of arms, ammunition, and liquor.33 
In Germany, however, more definite pla·ns had to be 
announced to secure the necessary financial support. Peters, 
in frequent public meetings, gave his plans for the future. 
He said that the Society planned to establish five posts 
in East Africa as a first step. They would be mainly 
agricultural in character at first; thus at the end of one 
year they would be entirely self-supporting. They would, 
of necessity, be of a military character at first due to 
Arab hostility. To help staff these posts the German 
government would allow its officers to serve the Society. 
These stations were located on the main caravan routes to 
the interior, and thus would control access to the rich 
regions of the watersheds of the Nile, Congo, and Zambesi. 
The Society did not plan to interfere with slavery at 
first, but would at once prohibit slave raiding and the 
33L'Afrigue exploree et civilisee, 6e annee (1885), 261. 
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sale of slaves in public markets. This action would be 
dangerous, but the Society had specially designed Krupp 
guns to defend their posts. All those who came forward 
to help the Society at this time would get land rights in 
East Africa for their support.34 
Peters estimated that in five years the Society's 
revenues would equal its expenses, and thus soon after 
dividends could be paid. Trade through Zanzibar, plantation 
development in the German lands, and the exploitation of 
minerals would make this possible. In all, he painted a 
very glowing picture of the wealth that would flow in time 
from this new "German East Indies.u35 
Peters had a difficult time, however, in gaining quick 
and effective support for his company. A serious hindrance 
to his plans came from the merchants of Hamburg, the German 
group most represented in Zanzibar before the period of 
German colonial expansion. These merchants felt from the 
first that the new Society would cause disturbances in East 
Africa and consequently ruin their markets. A letter from 
a Hamburg merchant in Zanzibar described their fears perfectly. 
9, 
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He was opposed to the new Society and its plans for East 
Africa since he felt that it acted in ignorance of German 
commercial interests in the region. This German thought 
that -these interests would be better upheld by supporting 
the rule of Zanzibar, a system that had always brought the 
Germans good profits. This merchant was disturbed also 
by the fact that no representative of the Society had .ever 
asked any of the German commercial residents of Zanzibar 
for information. Behind this attitude of suspicion was 
the fear that the Society would cause the East African 
Arabs to revolt, and thus block all trade.36 
Meetings of the Hamburg groups and Peters' Society 
were held, with the German government giving its aid, to 
help the formation of a common outlook. The problem remained 
unsolved, however, until mid-1886.37 An agreement was then 
concluded. The merchants gave support to the Society on 
certain conditions. It was not an entirely satisfactory 
arrangement, and a description of it by Kirk is a good 
explanation: "The Hamburg merchants look on it with distrust 
and only joined it under pressure and on condition that the 
36Malet, to Salisbury, 12. vi. 85, F. 0. 84/1714, P.R.O.; 
d'Avricourt a de Freycinet, 31.; vii. 85, Allema,ne, Hambourg, 
t. 11, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Paris • 
37see for example, d'Avricourt ~de Freycinet, 17. ix. 85, 
ibid. 
-
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Company C Society ) should · not trade on its own part for 
years."38 At the same time the merchants made it clear 
that they favored no more expansion by the Peters group. 
Bismarck supported this wish, and told the Society he 
thought they had all the territory they could effectively 
handle under the terms of their present concession.39 
In 1886 an entire reorganisation of the Society's 
administrative structure was completed. A president, council, 
and assembly were created to carry on the necessary work in 
Germany. To please the Hamburg merchants, the Society's 
activities were expressly limited to the mainland, thus 
excluding Zanzibar. The Society said it would carry a 
capital of over six million marks, but it really aimed only 
for one and one-half million for the time being. When the 
Society tried to raise this sum, however, · it had difficulty 
in gaining even half of the reduced total, although the 
Emperor gave one-half million marks to show his support.40 
38Kirk to Mackinnon, 15. ix. 86, uMackinnon Papers, 11 
Box 24. Kirk also said that such terms made sure that the 
Society would fail in the end unless it got oontrol of the 
Zanzibari coastal revenues. 
39d"Avr1court a de Freycinet, 6. vi. 86, Allemagne, 
Hambourg, t. 11. Reichard, the lone member of the German 
International African Association in Tanganyika, was an 
example of these expansionist-minded Germans. He brought 
home concessions for territories both to the east and west 
of Lake Tanganyika. The government refused to accept them. 
See L'Afrigue exploree et civilisee, 7e annee (1886}, 125. 
40d'Avricourt a de Freycinet, 23. x. 86, d'Avricourt a 
Flourens, 28. i. 87 and 25. i1. 87, Allemagne, Hambourg, t. 12. 
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The German Colonial Society's members in East Africa 
kept up a steady pressure on the Sultan of Zanzibar while 
these decisions were being made in Germany. The represent-
atives in East Africa were unsatisfied with the advantages 
gained by the action of the German fleet. The policy they 
followed was so harsh that some observers thought they were 
trying to provoke the Sultan into action against them so that 
they might again call on their government for aid.41 For 
example, they tried to force all the dhows sailing from 
Zanzibar to the African coast in front of their concession 
to hoist a German flag. These dhows were owned by English 
subjects, as well as Arabs, and Kirk therefore protested. 
The German Consul, ignorant of the acts of his countrymen, 
had to intervene to prevent future incidents of this kind. 
Kirk wrote of this affair that it demonstrated 
the ignorance and overbearing temper of the men 
with whom we are in conflict. They are as a rule 
either men in a very humble sphere at home, or 
military officers whose life has been spent in the 
barrack yard and who, tired of the dull routine 
and despairing of promotion in their service, come 
here for change. 42 
Kirk was not an impartial observer, but such actions were 
common and were soon to lead the inhabitants of East Africa 
to regard all Germans with extreme hostility. 
4lLedoulx ~ M.A.E., 8. iii. 85, P.Z. VII. 
42Kirk to Salisbury, 24. viii. 85, F. 0. 84/1727, P.R.O. 
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The Germans in the interior acted in the same fashion, 
but here they had to pay for mistreating the local inhabi-
tants. An episode in the vicinity of ~~mboia is typical of 
their actions. Two German officers had forced two Africans 
to carry loads for them without pay. Their chief followed 
the two men, stimulated by Arab advice. When the Germans 
saw this, they tried to press another African into their 
service. When he refused, he was struck in the mouth with 
a gun. Disorder resulted and the Germans shot a porter. 
The African chief then opened fire upon them. One German, 
Lieut. Schmidt, was badly wounded; the other, hit only 
slightly, was able to escape. English missionaries later 
found Schmidt and carried him to the coast in a very serious 
condition.43 The African chief involved in this affair 
later came to Zanzibar to answer for his deeds. No com-
plaint was filed against him when the circumstances were 
known. The German Consul, as a result, tried to keep his 
countrymen under control in their dealings with Africans, 
but he had no representatives on the mainland to insure 
they did not perform such acts. 44 German mistreatment in 
43Roscoe to C.M.S., 11. xi. 85, in Currie to Kirk, 
15. i.86, E-91, Z. A. 
44 Kirk to F. O., 11. iii. 86, E-93, ~· 
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caravans continued,45 and Arab and African hostility to the 
Society continued to grow. 
On a larger scale, the Society strove to gain more 
freedom for the development of their organisation in East 
Africa. The Germans wanted a new commercial treaty between 
Germany and Zanzibar to meet the needs of the new German 
protectorate in the interior. This request, in itself, was 
xegarded by the English as reasonable. The Society, however, 
wanted a port on the East African coast to use as an entry 
and exit point for goods to and from their inland possessions. 
Kirk considered that such a port, if it were duty free, would 
ruin the commercial prosperity of Zanzibar. The Germans 
would be able to intercept all of the merchandise of the 
interior, particularly ivory, on which the Sultan levied a 
tax before it reached Zanzibar. Present treaties prohibited 
any other taxes as far as Europeans were concerned, and thus 
Kirk felt Zanzibar would lose out in any readjustment.46 
German territory in East Africa was useless without a 
port, however, and the members of the Society had been 
agitating for one since the early part of 1885. By August 
1885 they were "asking urgently" for such a port, suggesting 
45de Cazenave a de Ohimay, 5. vi. 86, "Corres. Polit. 
Consulats," t. 18. 
46Kirk to Granville, 28. v. 85, F. 0. 84/1725, P.R.O. 
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Dar es-Salaam or Bagamoyo.47 To satisfy the English, the 
Germans made it clear they were willing to leave the needed 
port under the sovereignty of Zanzibar, and that they 
planned no naval base. They also said that no force would 
be used if the Sultan refused the Society's request.48 It 
was essential that the Germans and the Sultan have good 
relations, and consequently negotiations were initiated to 
solve this problem. A solution was reached in a relatively 
easy fashion. Dar es-Salaam was given to the Germans for 
use, but it remained in theory under the sovereignty of 
Zanzibar. A new commercial treaty was to be signed, 
facilitating the importation of German goods from the German 
sphere into the Zanzibar coastal area. A uniform import 
duty of five per cent was to be levied; the Sultan's monopoly 
of the trade in ivory and other products was ended. It 
was estimated that this new arrangement would bring Zanzibar 
at least as much revenue as the old method of coastal regu-
lation, and so there was no reason for the Sultan to resist 
the German demands.49 
47Kirk to Salisbury, 30. viii. 85, F. o. 84/17?3, ibid.; 
Kirk to Salisbury, 25. viii. 85 and 28. viii. 85, F. o.-s471727, 
ibid. 
- 48 
Kirk to Salisbury, 1. x. 85, F. 0. 84/1723, ~· 
49Kirk to Salisbury, 31. viii. 85, F. o. 84/1727, ibid.; 
Kirk to Salisbury, 28. ix. 85 and 16. x. 85, F. o. 84/1~ 
ibid. For a comparison of the old and new duties, Plat a 
M.A.E., 25. ix. 85, P.Z. VII. 
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While this problem was under discussion, the European 
powers involved in East Africa decided to send a commission 
to that area to determine the exact limits of the territory 
of Zanzibar. This was necessary before any agreement could 
be made to guarantee the territorial integrity of that 
state. It was soon clear that Germany intended to use the 
commission to work against the claims of the Sultan in East 
Africa. The German representative in London, when speaking 
of the commission, stated that only Zanzibar, Pemba, and 
Mafia islands were under the "immediate control" of the 
Sultan. He then said that the Sultan had no settled 
government on the mainland, holding merely twenty-five to 
thirty widely separated coastal points. Inland, the minister 
continued, the Sultan had no claim to any areas; all the 
inland stations were private possessions of that ruler in 
his capacity as first merchant of Zanzibar.5° The English 
Foreign Office realized that such an attitude would make 
the commission a 11 farce 11 -- since Germany was giving her 
conclusions in advance. Salisbury, however, felt tb.a idea 
of a commission was worth a try; it was the only way to try 
to modify the demands of Germany against the Sultan.51 The 
commission was thus appointed by France, England and Germany 
and sent to East Africa. 
5°Aide-memoire left by Count Munster, 5. v. 85, F. o. 
84/1712, P.R.O. 
51 Lister to Pauncefote, 31. viii. 85, with a note by 
Salisbury, ~· 
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The German delegate acted as feared when the commissioners 
started to work. He reported that the Sultan's coastal centers 
in the southern region of Tanganyika had an effective author-
ity extending only ten miles from each center. Thus, he 
claimed, no other territory on the coast really belonged to 
Zanzibar.52 He made this decision by expressly stating that 
the ordinary rules of international law respecting so~ereignty 
did not apply to states like Zanzibar.53 The German delegate 
gave Zanzibar from Dar es-Salaam to the northern areas of 
the Kenya coast a strip of territory ten miles wide. North 
of this he recognised only isolated points as belonging to 
Zanzibar. The English and French delegates at first gave to 
Zanzibar a forty-mile strip of territory from the southern 
border of the Zanzibar dominions to Lamu in northern Kenya. 
They used the common doctrine that if a coastal power held 
two points on the coast, all territory between belonged to 
that power.54 
The records of the English and French commissioners 
(the only records seen by the present writer) give a clear 
52The Earl of Rosebery said of this: "The German principle 
would be fatal to a railroad company, who would be confined 
to its stations and junctions, and deprived of its lines." 
~his note is on Kirk to Rosebery, 8. vi. 86, F. o. 84/1799, 
112ll· 
53Raffray ~ M.A.E., 17. xi. 85, P.Z. VII. 
54Kirk to F. 0., 3. vi. 86, F. O. 84/1777, P.R.O. 
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picture of the type of sovereignty the Sultan of Zanzibar 
held in this part of Africa. On the southern coast of 
Tanganyika, Kitchener, the English delegate, found that 
"the Sultan's authority and government was represented at every 
place visited," no matter what the size of the individual 
settlement. He claimed that all these governors were Arabs. 
All these villages had in addition "a recognised descendant 
of the former native chiefs of the country'' to assist the 
Arab governor. These African leaders were ''bound to visit 
Zanzibar once a year to pay their homage to the Sul·tan who 
then gives them certain presents." Also in the villages 
were judicial officers, kadis, appointed directly from 
Zanzibar. The French delegate had similar reports for the 
areas visited.55 
The commission next visited the territory between Dar 
es-Salaam and Mombasa. Here we have enough information 
about one of the coastal rulers to analyse the real extent 
of control from Zanzibar. Many visitors have left inform-
ation concerning the so-called Governor of Saadani, Bwana 
Heri. Kitchener described him as the Governor of that 
town, and noted that he ruled without any aid from a body 
of elders. He pointed out that he had been in office since 
55 Kitchener to F. 0., 10. ii. 86 ~ F. 0. 84/1798 , illi·; 
Raffray a M.A.E., 17. xi. 85, P.Z. VII. 
1 50. 
the tlrne of Sultan Majid (1.356-1870}, and that his father 
had ruled in Saadani under Said ibn Sultan, the father of 
Majid and Barghash. There was no garrison from Zanzibar 
at Saadani, as at most of the coastal centers, but Bwana 
Heri had his own force which he paid with money supplied by 
the Sultan. Kitchener noted that Bwana Herl had much influence 
in the interior, especially in Useguha, but could carry on no 
war there unless the Sultan gave his consent in advance.56 
Bwana Heri was actually thus a more or less independent 
ruler on the Tanganyika coast. He ruled with no African 
elders, and had inherited his position from his father. He 
was a man of mixed Arab-African descent -- "a light-coloured 
Swahili with very good features, large eyes and intelligent."57 
The fact that there were no elders in his town, and that the 
people accepted this in peace, demonstrated he was considered 
the legitimate ruler by the majority of the inhabitants. 
He had followed his father i .n office; the Sultan had merely 
confirmed his already established position. Such confirm-
ation was important; the Sultan did have some military power, 
and more important, he controlled the commercial center of 
Zanzibar, the outlet for all the trade passing through 
Saadani. Bwana Heri thus accepted the sovereignty of the 
56Kitchener to Rosebery, 15. iii. 86, F. 0. 84/1798, 
P.R.O. 
57smith, "Earliest Ox-Wagons in Tanganyika," 3. 
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Sultan for the benefits it brought his territory; as long ~s 
the Sultan did not interfere in his internal affairs he 
remained a loyal subject. The Sultan recognised this fact 
and always left men like Bwana Heri in peace, and did not 
call upon them unless a real crisis made it necessary. 
In the interior, Bwana Heri was a power in his own 
right. Missionaries going inland saw at once his great 
influence over the African chiefs in Useguha.58 When one 
of these African leaders visited Zanzibar, Bwana Heri usually 
went along to supervise any discussions held with the 
Sultan.59 One missionary described his relationship to 
these chiefs in a very useful manner; they had a connection 
with Bwana Heri similar to the one he had with the Sultan --
they found a loose alliance necessary and useful as long as 
it did not bind too closely. 60 If intervention was necessary 
in the interior, Bwana Heri acted upon his own to resolve 
the problem. The consent from the Sultan mentioned by 
Kitchener usually came after Bwana Heri had acted. The 
Sultan was satisfied at this since these acts by the ruler 
59 ' Ledoulx a M.A.E., 11. x. 
60R. P. Picard, "Auteur de 
Catholigues, XVIII {1886), 184. 
84, P. z. V. 
Mandera," Les Missions 
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of Saadani kept the interior in order and thus insured a 
constant flow of trade to Zanzibar.61 
Thus Zanzibar did exercise a form o~ sovereignty over 
this coastal leader. He recognised the Sultan as his over-
lord for the benefits it gave him. All his contacts with 
foreign powers were regulated by the Sultan.62 If the 
Sultan had been a European ruler, such a relationship 
would never have been called into question. There was a 
point beyond which rulers like Bwana Heri would not go, 
however, in their leaving of foreign relations in the hands 
of the Sultan. They did not recognise his right to cede 
their territory to Europeans. When he did so, Bwana Heri 
was one of the first to throw off his obedience to the 
Sultan and to fight for his rights. 
In view of Bwana Heri's later career as a leader of an 
anti-German rebellion, his early relations with Europeans 
might be mentioned with profit. In spite of early differ-
ences with the English due to his participation in the slave 
trade -- on two occasions his dhows were seized and burned 
!or violations of the Zanzibar1-English treatie~63 ~- Bwana 
Heri was a firm friend of Europeans before the German 
61 Examples of such actions are given in Ledoul~ a M.A.E., 
16. iii. 81 and 23. iv. 81, P.Z. V. 
62Thus the Sultan signed treaties placing restrictions 
on the slave trade. These treaties caused the local rulers 
to suffer important financial losses, but they seldom 
questioned the right of the Sultan to make them. 
63Kirk to F. 0., 8. iv. 73, E-630, Z.A.; Kirk to F. O., 
29. iii. 75, E-71, !]11. 
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occupation of East Africa. His village was a landing place 
for expeditions into the interior, and members of the L.M.S., 
O.M.S., and International African Association paid tribute 
to his ready aid.64 He broke with Europeans only when they 
tried to seize his territory, and then he made a clear 
distinction in most cases between the offending Germans and 
the other nationalities not involved in the partition of 
Tanganyika. 
The investigation of the East African coast by the 
representatives thus showed that the Sultan either ruled 
that area by appointed governors or by agreements with 
local leaders.65 Therefore, although his rule was not on 
a strict European model, it did amount to some form of 
sovereignty over the coast. The commission, however, could 
not reconcile the views of its members as to the extent of 
this control. Finally they signed a report covering only 
what they agreed on unanimously concerning the Sultan's 
rule; this of course, by implication, held the rest of the 
coast to be outside of the Zanzibar dominions. Zanzibar 
was described as having authority over the islands of 
Zanzibar, ~emba, and Mafia. On the coast the Sultan was 
64For example, Hore, Tanganyika, ix; Last to Wigram, 
2. vi. 79, C.A67o 14, C.M.S. 
65Kirk had pointed this out earlier, Kirk to Granville, 
29. v. 85, F. O. 84/1725, P.R.O. 
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recognised in a ten-mile-wide strip from the southern border 
of Tanganyika (the Minigani River) to Kilwa Kivinji. This 
city was given a ten-mile strip around its borders. Then 
selected villages were recognised from Kilwa Kivinj~ to 
Dar es-Salaam, each with a ten-mile limit around it. The 
territory between Saadani and Pangani had a coastal strip 
accepted varying from five to ten miles. The rest of the 
territory affected, outside of the borders of the present-
day Tanganyika, was treated in a similar fashion. 
The English were unhappy at this result of the commission's 
labors. Kitohener said of this idea of unanimous reporting: 
"I entirely disagree with this doctrine as the expression of 
our opinion." A foreign office official noted on Kitchener's 
report: the German delegate's "mission was not one of inquiry 
into the title of the Sultan but into how much he could be 
despoiled of." This was true, but England, for diplomatic 
reasons, basically accepted this decision in the end. In 
1886 the territory of Zanzibar was delimited by Germany and 
England, with France being informed after the act, and 
accepting the final decis1on. 66 The treaty of 1886 gave 
Zanzibar full title in a ten-mile coastal strip from the 
66Kitchener to Rosebery, 9. vi. 86, F. o. 84/1799, 
ibid.; Iddesleigh to Malet, 24. viii. 86, Kitchener to 
Yddislei~h, 29. x. 86, Lyons to Iddesleigh, 9. xii. 86, 
.F. O. 84/1800, ~· 
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Minigani River to Kipini in northern Kenya. Various towns 
to the north of this were given Zanzibar as separate entities. 
The islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia were also confirmed. 
The English agreed to aid Germany to secure for the German 
Society the lease of the customs of Dar es-Salaam and 
Pangani, already being negotiated for by the Society. The 
coastal territory between the southern border of Tanganyika 
and the Umba River (the present Kenya border) became part 
of a German sphere of interest. In the interior, the German 
sphere in the north followed a line from the Umba River to 
Lake Jipe; then it went north to the northern base of the 
Kilimanjaro range; the line ended on Lake Victoria ·where it 
was hit by the first degree of south latitude. In the south, 
the German sphere followed the Rovuma River, the limit of 
the Portuguese in Mozambique. The other articles of the 
67 
-treaty do- not affect Tanganyika • . -
67coupland Exploitation of East Africa, 474-75. Kirk's 
reaction was: ~All that I can say about the Germans' scheme 
is that it aims at more than appears and that our F. o. is 
utterly useless as a department, they do not appreciate the 
local question and wish to have a quiet time of it C in 
diplomatic relations with Germany J." See Kirk to Mackinnon, 
6. x. 86, "Mackinnon Papers," Box 24. An American reaction 
described the effects of this treaty perfectly: "This is of 
course the end of Arab pawer on the caast forever." See 
E. D. Ropes, Jr., to the Third Assistant Secretary of State, 
20. xii. 86, "Naval Records Collection," Box 4, National 
Archives (Washington, D. C.). 
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The way was now open ~or the German Society to establish 
itself firmly in the new German sphere in East Africa. No 
government organisation was planned; the home authorities 
would act only to make the path smoother for their nationals. 
Members of the Society had been working diligently during 
these negotiations to establish their organisation on a 
sound basis. E,y the end of 1886 there were nine stations 
in operation in the former dominions of Zanzibar. Eight 
were in the German sphere, and one, the headquarters of the 
Society, was in Zanzibar. A total of thirty Germans was 
employed in the centers. 68 The inland stations were not 
very effective. When two Zanzibaris were murdered in 
Usagara, the Sultan tested the Society by appealing to 
them for the punishment of the guilty. The Germans tried 
to recruit a force to achieve this end, but were not able 
to deal with the problem successfully.69 
The Society did not show much respect for the new 
limits drawn up for the Sultan's territory. Before the 
final arrangements had been made, the Society opened up a 
station at Dunda, on the Kingani River, and very close to 
Bagamoyo. Two other stations were set up nearby Dunda. 
All were excessively fortified in the eyes of the Arabs. 
68 ' Raffray a M.A.E., 21. ix. 86, P.Z. VII. 
69Kirk to F. o., 8. iii. 86, E-93, Z.A. For a report 
on some German stations, Heudebert, Vera les Grands Lacs, 
81-2, 200-01. 
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Their treatment of the local African population was so harsh 
that some observers again thought that the Society was 
trying to provoke the East Africans to open warfare.70 
Some reaction did occur against German acts. When the 
Society attempted to establish a post in the Usambara 
district in opposition to the wishes of the Africans 
concerned, they found that the local community would give 
them no support. They finally had to abandon their station, 
Korogwe, and leave their goods for a future attempt. The 
leading Arab of Pangani, Jumbe Kimemeta, then arrived, 
burned their station, and ordered the local Africans to 
care for the Society's · goods until the Germans removed 
them.71 
Thus the atmosphere in East Africa was very tense at 
the time of the Anglo-German agreement of 1886. A tactful 
policy was necessary on the part of the Society to insure 
that the Arabs and Africans, both those under German influ-
ence and those independent, would not turn to active resistance. 
70Arendt to the Sultan of Zanzibar, 8. vi. 86, in Kirk 
to Salisbury, 1. vii. 87, F. 0. 84/1774, P.R.O.; Raffray a 
M.A.E., 28. vi. 86, P.Z. VII. The Germans acted in much 
the same fashion in Zanzibar. The Belgian Consul said that 
the Germans treated Zanzibar like "a conquered country," and 
added: "I have been obliged myself to give asylum in the 
consulate to women ~ureued by them." See de Cazenave a de 
Chimay, 16. 1. 87, Correa. Polit. Consulate," t. 18. 
71 Farler to Kirk, 22. iii. 86, in Kirk to F. 0., 5. iv. 86, 
F. O. 84/1773, P.R.O. 
158. 
The Germans were far from cautious in their policy, however. 
One observer reported of Zanzibar: 
This place is full of Germans. They walk the 
streets with the air of conquerors, taking any 
fruit &c that they want without paying for it 
and raping any women that they see -- you can 
imagine the state the Arabs are in.... Two 
German sailors have already been stabbed ••• 
and more will surely be dittoed. 72 
In spite of the steady efforts of the Society to make a 
success of their concessions up to the time of the Anglo-
German treaty, the German organisation had not been able 
to make any conspicuous headway. Arendt, the German Consul, 
said bitterly that one-half million marks had been spent 
up to July 1886 without any result. A retrenchment was 
thus ordered in the interior, and the Society was to con-
centrate its new efforts on stations nearer to the coast. 
Only one post was kept in Usagara, and that was for prestige 
reasons.73 The new policy required that the Society take 
advantage of the new treaty, and make profits from the 
concessions to be gained in Dar es-Salaam and Pangani. 
Karl Peters, again in East Africa, worked for this end. 
He planned to establish customs-collecting points at certain 
ports along the coast. The Sultan agreed to aid Peters in 
this endeavor,. and promised to give him the same. terms that 
72E. D. Ropes, Jr., to his parents, 29. xii. 86, 
"Ropes Papers," P.M. 
73Raffray a M.A.E., 12. vii. 86, F.Z. VIII. 
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the English capitalists working in the English sphere had 
obtained. 74 This meant that the Germans would cont.rol the 
customs for the Sultan, but that the sovereignty of Zanzibar 
would remain. 
Karl Peters, however, had his own plans for the develop-
ment of the Society. He came to Zanzibar in a very strong 
position, with authority to negotiate directly with the 
Sultan, thus bypassing the German Consular officials. The 
English Consul described him: "He came out here breathing 
coercion, protection and annexation and confident that the 
moment I was removed he would carry out all his plans without 
interference." Peters spent six weeks in Zanzibar and 
found this approach would get him nowhere, and if maintained 
would never allow him to open East Africa to the profit of 
his organisation. He then turned to the British representative, 
Holmwood, and some progress was made.75 Peters' actions had 
been so extreme that he was reprimanded by the German home 
authorities; he was told to concentrate on the territory 
already in the possession of the Society, and not to keep 
74For the English company, see the unpublished thesis 
of M. de Kiewiet, ttThe Imperial British East African 
Company, 1876-1895" (London University, Ph.D., 1955); for 
an older, but still useful account, P. L. McDermott, British 
East Afr~qa or IBEA (London, 1895). . 
75Holmwood to Anderson, 5. vii. 87, F. 0. 84/1853, P.R.O. 
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trying to extend it.76 Even the German Consul admitted that 
Peters was "a great trouble to him," but that his popularity 
at home prevented his reuall.77 
These opinions were due to a minor crisis th~t Peters 
had caused when he visited Dar es-Salaam. He had arrived 
in Zanzibar with thirty-five men described by Holmwood as 
prime troublemakers, and became involved with the Sultan of 
Zanzibar. The English Consul brought the two together for 
a time, but Peters kept up his pressure. Peters went to 
Dar es-Salaam in May 1887 with letters from the Sultan to 
aid him in purchasing land for the aetivities of the Society 
as allowed by the new treaty. At the last moment before his 
departure, the German Consul withdrew his assistance from 
this venture, but the Sultan was not informed. In Dar as-
Salaam, Peters had the representative of the Sultan surrounded 
in his residence by his men, after first committing sundry 
acts of violence in the town. He tried to force this 
official to sign an agreement to place this territory under 
German protection; he said that the Sultan had no real 
authority, and that this official was the ruler of this 
area. When this official refused to comply, Peters put a 
pistol to -his head and forced him to sign. The news reached 
76see note of G. M. Wylde, 3. viii. 87, F. o. 84/1885, 
~· 
77Holmwood to F. 0., 19. xii. 87, F. o. 84/1854, ~. 
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Zanzibar and on Holmwood's advice the matter was referred 
to the German Consul. He promised an immediate investigation. 
After a preliminary inquiry, Peters and his men were summoned 
to Zanzibar to appear before the Consul. In addition, all of 
the Society's forces were ordered out of Dar es-Salaam.78 
An actual trial would have led only to increased friction 
with the Germans, so the Sultan accepted an apology from 
Peters and a promise that no such acts would be committed 
in the future. The Sultan then dropped the whole affair.79 
The English Consul throughout these difficulties tried 
to live up to his orders -- to give Peters .,reasonable 
assistance." England wanted to avoid future Zanzibari-Garman 
hostilities by preventing Peters from causing difficulties 
and then seizing this opportunity to put pressure on Zanzibar 
to yield even more of her influence in Africa. Peters, as 
shown above, was a difficult man to deal with. He thanked 
Holmwood for his aid in securing the customs lease for Dar 
es-Salaam and Pangani, 80 but then immediately asked for a 
new lease covering the whole coast of Tanganyika. When 
Holmwood hesitated, Peters said that, if the Sultan refused, 
78Holmwood to F. 0., 23. v. 87 and 6. vi. 87, E-99, Z.A. 
The Sultan also protested to Bismarck about these actions. See 
Sayyid Barghash to Bismarck, 5. vi. 87, F. 0. 97/60?, P.R.O. 
79Holmwood to F. 0., 5. vii. 87, E-99, Z.A. 
80Ropes, the American, commented on the Germans sent to 
these ports: ••The Germans at Dhar es Salaam and Pangani have 
not been doing much, except getting sick and three have died 
this month." See Ropes to his parents, 26. v. 87, "Ropes Papers." 
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"means would be found to insist on his compliance ... Peters 
was careful to qualify this in his official correspondence, 
however. He claimed that Holmwood misunderstood his attitude, 
and that "it is in no way my intention to press his Highness 
the Sultan to cede anything which he is not inclined to cede 
voluntarily.'' The whole matter, Peters concluded, was after 
all merely "a small business affair." The Sultan replied 
that he was willing to act; he would give Peters terms 
similar to the English concession.81 
The . German government made clear its official disapproval 
of Peters' actions. Count Berchen, in Berlin, told . the 
English representative of Germany's embarrassment to see 
Peters pressing the Sultan for this lease. He said: 
The German Foreign Office had promptly taken Dr. 
Peters to t~sk for this imprudent action, and had 
taken steps to put a decided stop to its recurrence 
in the future, by pointing out to the Company that 
they had as yet done scarcely anything towards 
utilizing the large extent of territory ceded to 
them in East Africa, and that the agents would 
be better employed in attending to this than in 
seeking to obtain extensions of their territory 
in any quarter. 
In an understatement, Count Berchen concluded that Peters was 
"not a very judicious or tractable agent of the Company."82 
The effect of such action on the Society is demonstrated by 
81 Peters to Holmwood, 15. vii. 87, in Holmwood to F. o., 
6. vii. 87, E-99, Z.A. 
82 Scott to Salisbury, 28. vii. 87, in Lister to Macdonald, 
5. viii. 87, E-101, ~· 
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a report of late 1887 about an agent of the Society trying 
to buy coastal territory at yet another port, Tanga.83 
The arrangements for a concession of the customs of the 
Tanganyika coast were agreed to by Sultan Barghash, but 
before he could sign the official documents he died. A 
brother of Barghash, Sayyid Khalifa, had been agreed upon 
by Germany and England in case of the Sultan's death for 
the succession, and he was at once placed in power. Khalifa 
had once been implicated in political intrigues against his 
brother, and consequently had spent most of his adult life 
either in prison or in isolated areas of Zanzibar. He was 
entirely unprepared for his elevation to a position of power. 
He, in fact, at first refused to believe that he was really 
the new Sultan. 84 
Sayyid Khalifa did not approve the plans agreed to by 
Barghash on the transfer of the actual control of his coastal 
dominions to the Germans. The English Consul, however, was 
told to support this concession, 85 and when the Germans said 
83Jenkins to Richards, 20. xii. 87, F. Q .• 84/1915, P.R.O. 
84Paul Armand et E. Marras, "Sidi Barghash Ben Said, 
Sultan de Zanzibar," Bull. Soc. Geog. Marseille, XII (1888), 
262-69; Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 27. iii. 88, F. o. 84/1906, 
P.R.O.; Pauncefote .to Macdonald, 15. ii. 88, F. o. 84/1904, 
ibid.; Macdonald to Salisbury, 8. iv. 88, F. 0. 84/1906, ibid.; 
ror-a useful summary of these events, L. W. Holling~worth;--­
Zanzibar under the Foreign Office, 1890-191.2 (London, 1953), 
Chap. II. 
85salisbury to Euan-Smith, 11. iv. 88, F. o. 84/1904, P.R.O. 
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they would not recognise him as Sultan unless he signed, 
agreement was reached. 86 The new system was to go into effect 
in August 1888. The Germans then would assume control over 
all Zanzibari customs houses on the Tanganyika coast for an 
initial twelve-month period. While in control they were to 
keep a careful account of all revenues, and make a monthly 
payment to the Sultan of Zanzibar. From the total revenues 
of this year's work, an annual revenue would be guaranteed 
to the Sultan for the next three to five years. Then a 
more exact r~adjustment could be made if necessary. One-
half of any surplus over the sum provided to the Sultan in 
the initial period would automatically go to him. A new 
German staff was to be created to administer this arrange-
ment, and Peters was to hold a subordinate position. The 
German Consul added that Peters would, in all probability, 
be kept in Germany in the future since his actions had not 
t'given satisfaction to the Board of Control at Berlin. n87 
86 1 Macdonald to F. o., 6. iv. 88, F. 0. 84 1906, ibid. 
The merchants in Zanzibar di.d not give Barghash a fair--" 
epitaph in view of the troubles of the last years of his 
life: "We are not sorry this man is dead, for the last two 
years he has been very ugly and nasty with white men --
refusing the most trivial requests &c and not appearing to 
attend to business •••• " See Ropes to his parents, 8. 1v. 88, 
"Ropes Papers." 
87Macdonald to F. o., 8. iv. 88, F. 0. 84/1906, P.R.O.; 
Macdonald to F. 0., 7. vi. 88, F. o. 84/1907, ~· 
165. 
Peters was recalled almost at once for explanations. 
They were held unsatisfactory and he was kept in Germany 
for the time being. A definite break between Peters and 
the Society was avoided, however, and he was employed by 
the Society to publ1cise its work in East Africa. He set 
up an exhibition in Berlin showing all the products of the 
stations of the German sphere -- fruits, vegetables, cotton, 
tobacco, silk, cocoa, tea -- to show that this area was "~n 
full prosperity.u Peters admitted that no profits were 
being made at present, but tried to show a good groundwork 
for such profits in the near future.88 
A new administrator was appointed to carry on the work 
of the Society in East Africa. He was E. Vohsen, formerly 
a German official on the west coast of Africa. Another 
significant appointment was that of Herr Michahelles as 
German Consul. The French representative at Hamburg noted 
that he had close ties with the merchants of that city, and 
thus would act to end the friction between those merchants 
and the Society.89 He arrived in Zanzibar before the death 
of Barghash and did try to insure better relations between 
Germany .. and Zanz1 bar. 90 
88Bull. Soc~ Ge9g. Marseille, XII (1888), 54; L"A.frigue 
~plor~e __ et civi).isee, 9e anne'e {1888), 36, 67. · 
89d'Avricourt a Flourens, 19. vi. 88, Allemagne, 
Hambourg, t. 11. 
9°Piat a Flourens, 8. vii. 87, P.Z. IX. 
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Vohsen arrived in Zanzibar in mid-1888 and energetically 
began to prepare the Society for its new labors on the 
mainland. In opposition to Peters, he worked very closely 
with the German Consul. The English Consul considered him 
an excellent choice, tta man of vigorous intelligence and 
undoubted energy and ability.n9l Vohsen told the French 
representative that he was critical of all Peters' w·ork in 
East Africa; he planned to proceed slowly on the coas.t, and 
to treat the Arabs so favorably that they would cooperate 
in full with the Society.92 
The German plans called for their taking over the 
coastal concession on the Tanganyika coast on the fifteenth 
of August 1888, the beginning of the Zanzibari fiscal year. 
A force of some sixty Germans was ready for this take-over. 
Seven main ports were to be created for the collection of 
customs: Tanga, Pangani, Bagamoyo, Dar es-Salaam, Kilwa 
Kivinji, Lindi, and Mkindani. There would also be seven 
minor posts with limited stations: Saadani, Bweni, Kikunyia, 
Samange, Chole or Mafia, Kilwa Kis1wan1, and Sud1. A 
proclamation was issued requiring all trade to pass through 
these ports. The development of the farther interior was 
to be --dropped . by the . Society for a time; Peters •. i.nl.and 
91Macdonald to F. o., 1. vi. 88, F. 0. 84/1907, P.R.O. 
92 \ 88 Lacaux a M.A.E., 25. v. , c.c.z. v. 
stations were to be withdrawn or handed over to German 
missions. Only a few locations, as Mpwapwa, on caravan 
routes were to be retained.93 
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A group of German and Arab officials visited the coast 
in June 1886 to prepare for the occupation in August. They 
were welcomed by all the local Arab representatives and had 
a very successful trip. The English Consul was skeptical 
of the future, however, since he felt that the Arabs, 
including the Sultan, did not really understand that the 
Germans were -to take the administration of the coast com-
pletely out of their hands. A "deep and bitter" hostility 
to the Germans remained from their earlier harsh actions and 
would require careful action on the part of Vohsen and his 
men to avoid difficulties.94 
After the visit to the coast Vohsen issued another 
proclamation to make clear how the coast was to be admin-
istered. A district was to be created around each German 
port and would be administered from it. Each district was 
divided into sections run by the local chiefs already in 
possession. All land in each sector had to be registered 
at the district center by a certain date, and each owner 
93Macdonald to F. o., 1. vi. 88 and 23. vi. 88, F. o. 
84/1907, P.R.O. 
94Macdonald to F. 0., 26. vi. 88, ibid.; Macdonald to 
F. 0., 26. vii. 88, F. 0. 84/1908, ibid:---
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had to "prove his rights of possession by purchase or 
otherwise." If proof was not offered or accepted, the land 
became publ~c domain. An overall plan was made for the 
growing of crops in each sector, with rewards given for the 
achievement of good results. Another proclamation established 
courts in the seven major ports. Each was under the direc-
tion of the German administrator, aided by the Arab governor 
and by Arabs and Indians appointed by the German official.95 
These proclamations thus called for sweeping changes in the 
old way of life on the coast without the consent of the local 
inhabitants. Careful administration would be needed to 
insure a peaceful acceptance. 
This was the background .for the Arab-German war of 
1888-1889. The German Society had first established itself 
in the interior, and later prepared to administer the coast 
for the Sultan of Zanzibar. In all, in Eastern Africa in 1888, 
there were eighteen posts in various stages of development 
under the Society.96 Many were in poor shape, however; one 
traveller described some as "in anything but a flourishing 
condition."97 The Germans serving the Society also were an 
95Macdonald to F. 0., 30. vii. 88, 1£11., Lacaux a 
M.A.E., 10. v111. 88, C.C.Z. V. 
96Falkenhorst, Deutsch-Ostafrika, 48. 
97Hans Meyer, Across East African Glaciers (trans. 
E. H. S. Calder) {London, 1891 ) , 1x. 
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important factor in this poor establishment. The future 
Lord Lugard said they seemed "the most ill-suited for the 
life they proposed to engage in that it is possible to 
conceive.u98 The Society thus had very difficult problems 
to solve. How they fared will be related below. 
B. The Situation in the Interior 
The German occupation of East Africa did not extend 
inland for any great distance in the period discussed above. 
Their activities on the coast, and the resulting diminution 
of the power of the Sultan7 did have an effect in the interior, 
~on - ~o'-th Arab and European. Kirk, in his reports, was dis-
posed to stress the sovereignty of the Sultan in Central 
Africa; he once said that although this control might at 
times be weak, the Sultan did have absolute authority over 
his subjects as far inland as Manyema "where his order 
would be obeyed as readily as anywhere a few days inland. t•99 
We have seen, however, how unstable the Sultan's authority 
was at the best of times in such places as Tabora and Ujiji. 
His loose relationship with the Arabs of the interior of 
Tanganyika and elsewhere was certain to degenerate : now that 
a European power had interposed itself between Zanzibar and 
the inland centers. 
98F. D. Lugard, The Rise of our East African Empire 
(London, 1893), I, 14. 
99Kirk to Granville, 7. vii. 85, E-87, Z.A. 
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Tabora soon became a center of disorder, and appeared 
to pass entirely from any control by the Sultan. Much of 
the unrest in the Tabora area was due to the death of the 
capable Nyamwezi leader, Mirambo, in 1884. No able successor 
appeared, and his territory near Tabora broke up due to a 
series of petty wars by those aiming to replace the departed 
leader. 100 Siki, the Nyamwezi chief of Tabora, began to 
play a more effective role in this area at the death o! 
Mirambo. 101 He became in time the most powerful African 
ruler of this section of Tanganyika. Siki continued to 
have a close relationship with the Arabs living at Tabora, 
but -he now seemed to lead them rather than be completely 
under their influence as in the past. 102 
The White Fathers had a post in Tabora and began to 
worry about this new tendency towards disorder in the in-
terior.103 To counteract this situation, Cardinal Lavigerie 
tried to marshal European support behind a plan to protect 
100Abb{ Nicq, Le P~re Sim{on Lourdel (Alger, 1922-third 
ed.), 261ff. 
101 For Siki, see above, p. 32. 
102 Capt. Storms, of the I.A.A., reported he had fifteen 
to twenty thousand guns in his armed forces; this was an 
exaggeration, but it did show his power. See, Bennett, 
"Captain Storms," 62. 
103For other difficulties of the White Fathers in the 
Lake Tanganyika area, see above, p. 116. 
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the Europeans from these new disorders. The Cardinal 
claimed, as did many others, that the Sultan of Zanzibar 
was directing a conspiracy against Europeans in East Africa. 
He therefore suggested holding the Sultan responsible for 
the safety of all Europeans in the interior. If any actions 
were taken against them, he would be seriously punished.104 
Nothing came of this plan -- it would have been difficult to 
enforce in any case -- particularly due to the opinions of 
Kirk. He did not agree that the Sultan had anything to do 
with the inland unrest; he claimed, in fact, that but for 
the Sultan's intervention, all the Germans wandering in the 
interior districts would have been killed. Kirk blamed 
the unrest on the German acts against Zanzibar. He concluded: 
the idea of making the Sultan responsible ''in his 
life and throne" for what happens in the interier 
in consequence of the lawless acts of private 
Germans and the foolish action of their Govern-
ment is absurd, and it is ridiculous to suggest 
that we of all nations should depose the Sultan 
and so make way for the final success of the fili-
busterers. 105 
Another report on Tabora came from an independent Irish 
trader, Charlie Stokes; he had earlier been a member of the 
C.M.S. His agent in Zanzibar wrote: "The Arabs of Unyanyembe 
appear to be very bitter against Mr. Stokes because he has 
taken to trading, and as Stokes tells me, they have ope.nly 
104 Playfa1r to Lister, 3. ix. 86, E-95, Z.A. 
105Kirk memo, 8. ix. 86, ~· 
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threatened to mUrder him, if he goes to Unyanyembe, as they 
did Gissecke [Giesecke )."106 Stokes himself characterised 
Tabora as "a den of thieves and murderers." 107 When the 
English Consul looked into these charges, he found there was 
no appointed Zanzibari governor in Tabora. The Sultan said 
that he feared to act in this matter due to the diplomatic 
quarrels over the extent of his territory. The Germans 
might accuse him of wrongly extending his sovereignty. Siki 
was happy at this situation; if he had been sure of the roads 
to the coast, he said, he would expel all of the Arabs. As 
a result of this lack of Zanzibari control, trade suffered 
greatly; $150,000 worth of ivory had been blocked in Tabora 
for a year. 108 
Although this unrest continued around Tabora, Stokes 
was not killed, and the White Fathers were not driven away. 
Minor friction was constant, but until actual war began on 
the Tanganyika coast between European and Arab, no overt acts 
of hostility took place at Tabora. 109 
106Muxworthy to Holmwood, 7. iv. 87, E-97, ~· For 
Giesecke, see above, p. 123. 
107stokes to Kirk, 11. ii. 87, z.A. 
108stokes to Holmwood, 16. vii. 86, E-90, ibid.; Holmwood 
to F. o., 10. vii. 87, E-99, 121!·; Boustead, Ridley and Co. 
to L.M.S., 1. viii. 87, Hore to L~.S., 11. ii. 87, L.M.S. 
109For details of the actions of the Arabs before the 
war on the coast, Pere Schynse, A Travers l'Afrigue avec 
Stanlez et Emin-Pacha (Paris, 1890), 9ff. 
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Conditions at Ujiji and in other areas around Lake 
Tanganyika were in a state of flux also. The Belgian stations 
of the International African Association were transferred in 
1885 to the White Fathers. Kirk felt this was a good step: 
The transfer of the International stations on 
Tanganyika to the French Mission will no doubt 
have a good effect for it seems the agents of 
both the Belgian and German branches of the 
Association have lately been involved in several 
warlike operations causing a strong antagonism 
to white men and making the position of our miss-
ionaries difficult. 110 
There was a new danger, however, not mentioned by Kirk. 
The Arabs might see this transfer as an opportunity to drive 
out Europeans, now that the military force of the Association 
had left. 
The determining factor in the affairs of the Arabs 
settled around Lake Tanganyika was a change in the leader-
ship of their community. Mwinyi Kheri, the long-time Arab 
chief of Ujiji, was now an old man; even before he died in 
1885,11 1 he had ceased to play an active role. The new 
leaders were Tippu Tip and his partner, Muhammad ibn 
Khalfan or Rumaliza ("the man who utterly finishes or 
destroys").112 They had long had quarters in Ujij.i, but 
11
°Kirk to Salisbury, 1. viii. 85, E-87, Z.A. For 
these hostilities, Bennett, "Captain Storms, 11 60. 
11 1Kirk to Salisbury, 26. x. 85, E-88, Z.A. 
112swann, Fighting the Slave Hunters, 75, 87. 
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in the past had concentrated upon economic affairs. Before 
the death of Mwinyi Kheri, they started to reorganise the 
Arab groups in this part of Tanganyika. They had Mwinyi 
Kheri's consent for their actions, and he participated in 
some of their plans before his death.113 
This new ferment in the Lake Tanganyika area began 
before the German moves against Zanzibar. In April 1884, 
Tippu Tip returned from a visit to the Sultan of Zanzibar; 
Hore of the L.M.S. felt that he and the Sultan had made some 
form of agreement concerning this part of Africa. Hore 
suspected Tippu Tip was acting, if not exactly under formal 
orders from the Sultan, "at least under the cognisance of 
Seyd Barghash -- a suspicion I am encouraged in by the 
information from Zanzibar that the Sultan is showing symptoms 
of considerable jealousy of the advance of Europeans into 
the interior."114 A change in attitude by the Arabs of Lake 
Tanganyika seemed to confirm Hore's suspicions. One observer 
reported: "There is a great stir amongst the Arabs in the 
interior, large caravans are scouring the country, bringing 
all under subjection to their rule.u1 15 By December 1884, 
Tippu Tip's partner, Rumaliza, was reported as the new 
leader in the lake area. Mwinyi Kheri was left in charge 
113 11 Journal," 22. iii. 85, "Storms Papers." 
114Hore to L.M.S., 23. iv. 84, L.M.S. 
11 5 . 84 Swann to L.M.S., 9. viii. , ~· 
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in Ujiji, but Rumaliza led the actions to extend Arab control 
in other areas around the Lake. At the end of 1884 Rumaliza 
was fighting at the north end of Lake Tanganyika, the first 
section where the renewed Arab pressure was felt.116 Early 
in 1885 similar reports came in from the southern sections 
of the Lake.117 
This revival of Arab activity came just as the Berlin 
Conference gave the west side of Lake Tanganyika to the 
Belgian ruler Leopold's new state. Tippu Tip, the de facto 
ruler of much of the area between Lake Tanganyika and Stanley 
Falls, was certain to react against this decision in some 
manner, possibly to the detriment of the Europeans in areas 
under his influence. Hore, seeing the danger to the L.M.S., 
did not feel that the claims of the Belgian ruler were very 
sound. He said: 
now to my personal knowledge Hamed ben Muhammed 
(Tippu Tip) lays claim to and actually holds in 
absolute possession the whole of the route from 
Mtowa to Stanley Falls whether as an independent 
116Jones to L.M.S., 2. xii. 84, ~.; The Arabs were 
defeated in this venture; see Griffith to L.M.S., 2. xii. 84, 
ibid. Later Arab efforts in this area also met with failure; 
see-the letters of J. M. Josset, 19. xii. 86, and J. B. 
Oharbonnier, 8. ii. 87, in Missions d'Afrigue, (188, ), 77, 
149 and the letter of Josset of 10. xi. Sb in Les Missions 
~oliq~~' XIX(1887), 327-28. 
11 7"Journal de la Station de Mpala," 21. xi. 84, "Storms 
Papers"; "Journal," 13. vi. 85, ibid.; Frederick L. Maitland 
Moir, "Eastern Route to Central Africa," The Scottish Geo-
graphical Magazine, I(1885), 110-11. This area had long been 
a prey of Arab slavers; for example, see Bennett, 11 Captain 
Storms," 55. 
maurauder or as the agent of Seyd Barghash I 
cannot say. He tells me himself that he claims 
right to the coast and could take it if he likes 
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but he has enough and does not wish to raise his hand 
against the Europeans.... Tippu Tip the biggest 
slaver and by far the most powerful in all these 
regions is fully capable of suppressing slavery and 
establishing peaceful rule and passage from Zanzibar 
to Bananna. 118 
In spite of the fears of Hore and others about this 
potential clash of interest between Leopold and Tippu Tip, 
there was no immediate crisis. Reports through 1888 kept 
mentioning "l'effevervescense_ .Arabe" in the Lake Tanganyika 
regions, but .the Arabs seemed concerned to avoid any incidents 
with the European residents of the area.119 The Arabs awaited 
the events on the Zanzibar coast and in the Congo. When they 
saw a direct threat to their positions on Lake Tanganyika by 
organised European occupation, a reaction would occur and 
European force would be applied to settle the conflicting 
claims of Arab and European. 
c. The . l~ssionaries and the Germans 
In view of the approaching conflict in the German sphere, 
the position of the foreign missionaries in Tanganyika, all 
non-German .at the time of this expansion of German interests 
118 . 
Hore to L.M.S., 24. vii. 86, L.M.S. Hore had said 
earlier of Tippu Tip: "Tippu Tip is the only one of his 
class who shows signs of overcoming prejudice and joining 
with Europeans to open up roads for commerce &c &c and I do 
think that it would be quite possible for a prudent European 
government to obtain his help for the improvement of Africa." 
See Hore to L.M.S., 28. xi. 85, ~· 
11 9Moinet ~Storms, 10. ii. 86, z. v. 86, z. ix. 88, 
"Storms Papers." 
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to this area, should be defined. The English Protestant 
groups, the Church Missionary Society and the Universities' 
Mission to Central Africa, were very worried by this German 
assumption of control. The C.M.S. at once asked the English 
Foreign Office to ask the German government for a statement 
of policy as to their future. The Germans replied that they 
held all missions as essential to the future development of 
their colonies and that they would "protect and assist them 
to the best of their ability and to the same extent as 
German missions."120 The C.M.S. leaders had to be content, 
officially, with this reply, but they carefully watched all 
possible future threats to their interests. 
The U.M.C.A., directly involved in the areas first 
taken over by Karl Peters, took a different stand at first. 
They questioned the validity of the treaties made by Peters, 
and brought forth evidence to support their claims in miss-
ionary and other literature. Their position, as stated 
publicly, was: "We might be disposed to welcome German 
influence as likely to conduce to peace and order; on the 
other hand the high-handed treatment of the Baptist Mission 
at the Cameroons by Prince Bismarck's representatives is not 
enc.O-uraging. "· . Thus meetings were held and "pl-ans were formed 
120 86 84/ Pauncefote, to Kirk, 10. iv. , F. 0. 1771, P.R.O.; 
Lister to C.M.S., 10. iv. 86, G3.A5/0 3, C.M.S. 
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for obtaining accurate information and making representations 
to the Government." They received the same guarantees as 
the c.M.s.121 
Both societies became dissatisfied with the Germans as 
time went on. The English Consular officials in East Africa, 
Kirk and Holmwood, began to advise them to leave the German 
sphere and to set up in English dominated areas. This advice 
was not taken, however, and the societies remained to see 
how German administration would work.122 They tried to 
concentrate on mission work alone. If German-African diffi-
culties came about, they tried to act as a mediating force 
without becoming officially involved.123 
The two French Roman Catholic societies, the White 
Fathers and the Holy Ghost Mission, had to face similar 
problems. The Holy Ghost Mission was particularly involved 
since it was located in areas near and on the coast, and 
had many missionaries whose birthplaces were in .Alsace. 
121 central Africa, III(1885), 87. The troubles in the 
Camerouns took place in 1884. African hostilities followed 
the assumption of German rule; as a result, mission work 
became impossible, and the Baptist Mission had to withdraw. 
See W. H. Bentley, Pioneering on the Congo (Oxford, 1900), 
I, 103. 
122 1 4 Parker to Lang, 18. i. 85, G3.A5 0 , C.M.S. 
123For example, Price to Lang, 2. i. 88, Pruen to Lang, 
2. i. 88, F. O. 84/1916, P.R.O.; Lister to Smith, 22. iii. 88, 
E-102, Z.A. 
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The Germans quickly moved to deal with them in 1885. They 
insured the Mission it would receive protection from them 
and tried to establish a close relationship. These Roman 
Catholics welcomed the supposed order that would follow 
from European rule, but managed to avoid any official ties 
to the German Society.124 
The Germans then turned to Roman Catholic missionaries 
from Germany. They brought their case to Rome. In 1887 a 
division of territory was made in East Africa between German 
and other Roman Catholic missions. Tanganyika was divided 
at the seventh parallel; the Holy Ghost Fathers kept the 
areas to the north of this line, and the German Catholics 
were given the open areas to the south-. of it. This boundary 
was extended inland to the territory of the White Fathers 
around Tabora; they were left in co.ntrol of the terri tory 
they already held. 125 Both the White Fathers and the Holy 
Ghost Fathers then began to follow a policy of training · 
German -pries-ts .to play a prominent role in their organisations 
124Ledoulx ~de Freycinet, 21. iv. 85, P.Z. VI-I: Mgr. de 
Courmont, "Le Sultanate du Zanguebar," ;&_E}s Missions Catholiques, 
XVIII(1886), 414. 
, 125de Monbel ~ de,Freycinet, 18. x~. 85,,~, ~ 
Siege, t. 1082, Ministers des Affaires Etrangeres (-Paris); 
de Monbel a Flourens, 17. xi. 87 and 22. xi. 87, ibid., 
t. 1088. The Holy Ghost Fathers solved this matter on their 
own and did not ask for the support of France; see Flourens 
a Behaine, 20. ix. 87, ibid., t. 1087. 
so that they might avoid friction in the future.126 
Thus in 1888 the existing missionary societies in 
Tanganyika had no close official ties with the German 
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Colonial Society. The only exceptions were one new German 
Protestant and one new Roman Catholic mission located near 
Dar es-Salaam. 127 When hostilities finally began, these 
non-German societies were, therefore, in the main let alone 
by the Arab forces. 
D. Conclusions 
The Arabs of East Africa enjoyed uncontested control 
in this area until the moves of Karl Peters in 1884. This 
independent adventurer secured questionable claims to 
territory which had long been considered as under the influ-
ence of Zanzibar, and in 1885 received the support of the 
German government. These territories needed coastal ports 
to be of value to the Germans, and, aided by the German 
government, Peters' group kept up continual pressure until 
126The missions had some Germans in their ranks in 
any case, and therefore could deal with the Germans on 
better terms than could the English. P. Schynse (see 
footnote 109 of this chapter) was a well-known German 
member of the White Fathers, for example. 
127 ' 88 Lacau a Flourens, 27. ii. , P.Z. X. 
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they received permission to administer the Sultan's coastal 
dominions in his name. Their success or failure in this 
venture would mean peace or war in East Africa. 
In the more distant interior, no moves were made by 
European authorities before the war began on the coast in 
1888. Arab po,ver around Tabora was beginning to break up 
due to lack of support from Zanzibar against the rising 
strength of the local Nyamwezi chief, Siki. Around Lake 
Tanganyika, the Arabs, led by Tippu Tip and Rumaliza, were 
trying to extend the authority of Zanzibar by forceful 
means. No clashes occurred in the interior, however, 
between Arab and European. The only Europeans represented 
were missionaries; they were careful to confine their oper-
ations entirely to religious aims. All inland waited the 
future moves of the European powers -- the Germans and 
the Congo Free State. 
CHAPTER IV 
WAR WITH THE GERMANS AND BELGIANS 
A. The War on the Coast: 1888-1890 
On the sixteenth of Augus~ 1888; the Germans began their 
occupation of the territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar on the 
coast of present-day Tanganyika under the terms of the 
recent treaty which gave them the right to administer it for 
the Sultan. The officials sent by the German Society, how-
ever, had instructions that were bound to cause difficulties. 
They were told to hoist the flag of their Society on the 
flagstaffs bearing the flag of Zanzibar; they were to leave 
the flag of Zanzibar flying and were to run theirs up under 
it. This action was not covered by the treaty, and the 
English representative, Euan-Smith, at once began to fear 
that hostilities might occur.1 
In two days there were reports of difficulties. At 
Pangani, the Germans landed and hoisted their flag in the 
1Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 18. viii. 88, F. o. 84/1908. 
A general account of this and the following events is given 
in Rochus Schmidt, Gesch.ichte des Araberaufstandes in Oat-
Afrika (Frankfurt a. Oder, 1892). A shorter account -in 
English, based on Schmidt, is given in H. Brode, Tippo Tib 
(London, 1907), 222ft'. 
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absence of the Arab governor. When he returned and protested, 
the Germans landed an armed force from their vessel in the 
harbor. He fled inland. The Germans then began a series of 
highhanded acts. They entered a local mosque in the midst 
of a service, bringing their dogs along with them -- a serious 
insult to a Muslim people. Next they broke into the governor's 
home and "shamefully mistreated his women." Then they opened 
the prison and let all the inmates escape. The German vessel 
left Pangani after these acts, but a group of twelve Germans 
was left behind to administer the port. They continued to 
behave in much the same manner. At Bagamoyo the Germans 
acted in a similar fashion as far as the flag was concerned. 
Permission to raise it was refused; an armed force was landed 
from a waiting vessel which cut down the governor's flagstaff 
and erected one of their own. This led to a brief riot and 
the looting of the marketplace, but all soon was quiet.2 
To re-establish order along the coast, the Sultan, acting 
with the advice of the English Consul, gave the Society the 
use of two hundred of his troops. They were to be distributed 
in garrisons along the coast and the Society was to pay them. 
On the twenty-ninth of August, the director of the Society, 
2T. Lacmidas Marunji and Seventeen Others to Euan-Smith, 
18. viii. 88, 0-1-16 Z.A. (This letter was from the Indian 
merchants of Pangani); Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 21. viii. 88 
and 22. viii. 88, F. o. 84/1908; Memo of Gen. Mathews, 
14. ix. 88, in Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 22. ix. 88, ~· 
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Vohsen, left Zanzibar to distribute them. When he .tried to 
land at Pangani on the fifth of September, he was met by 
heavy gun fire and was forced to abandon the attempt.3 An 
English vessel in this area at that time attempted to 
investigate this situation by sending a native interpreter 
ashore. He was fired upon and landed only after great 
danger. He was met by a crowd of armed people who loudly 
and violently complained of the recent proceedings of the 
Germans in their village. The leaders of the mob declared 
that they were going to put a stop to such actions. When 
the interpreter pointed out that he came from the English, 
he was told "they knew or cared little about flags, that 
all white men were the same and only came to seize the 
country and rob the natives. tl The mob continued to threaten 
the interpreter and he left to avoid serious bodily harm. 
The captain of the English vessel then visited Vohsen to 
inquire as to his course of action. He replied that he and 
the Society were helpless; unless the Sultan of Zanzibar or 
the German navy sent aid, he could take no steps to restore 
Pangani to order.4 
Other Germans had tried to land with the Sultan's 
forces at Tanga. They also were driven back by firing 
3Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 1. ix. 88 and 6. ix. 88, ibid. 
-
4Berkeley to Euan-Smith, 9. 1x. 88, E-105, Z.A. 
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from the shore. The next day these Germans attempted to 
reach the beach by using armed boats from the German vessel 
present, the ~· They were again repulsed. The Mowe 
-
therefore bombarded the town; no further effort to land was 
made. 
The Sultan of Zanzibar was of course very troubled by 
these acts of resistance. Euan-Smi th, holorever, made him 
control his resentment at the Germans and persuaded him to 
send the leader of his army, General Mathews, on a mission 
to attempt to restore order. There was some difficulty in 
arranging this mission due to the opposition of Vohsen. He 
appeared to have lost control of himself after meeting 
hostility on the coast and could think only of having the 
German fleet bombard all the centers of resistance. The 
German consul joined Euan-Smith at this instant and over-
ruled Vohsen. He said that he would hold off the navy until 
Mathews had an opportunity to settle affairs peacefully.5 
Mathews went to Pangani where he found a well-organised 
rebellion; he reported 8000 men under arms and the building 
of fortifications. The Germans liho had landed there, the 
cause of the original difficulties, were unharmed; they 
were kept confined in their station. Mathews had these 
Germans sen.t back to Zanzibar. He managed to do the same 
5Euan-Sm1th to Salisbury, 12. ix. 88, F. 0. 84/1909. 
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for the Germans left in Tanga. He also brought back some 
of the leaders of Pangani to negotiate with the Germans 
concerning the future of the German Society on the coast.6 
Euan-Smith advised the German officials to hear these leaders. 
The German Consul agreed, but refused to admit that the 
inhabitants of the coast had any cause for revolt. The 
Pangani delegates took a firm line. They refused to allow 
the Society to return to its former position; they said in 
the future that it must limit itself to the operation of the 
Customs House alone. The German Consul did not approve of 
these terms, but he was wise enough to see that the Society 
could never return by force without strong support from 
the German government. He asked Euan-Smith for his solution 
of this problem. Euan-Smith recommended that the Sultan of 
Zanzibar be given broad powers to put the coast in order, 
and that Gen. Mathews be sent as a first step to quiet the 
more troubled areas.7 This was a wise plan since Mathews 
was an extremely popular man, well-liked by most of the 
important Arabs of East Africa. If any one man could use 
his influence to bring about a peaceful solution, he was 
that man. 
6Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 12. ix. 88 and 21 • ix. 88, 
.ibid. 
7Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 14. ix. 88 and 21 • ix. 88, 
ibid. 
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The Germans accepted this plan, at least until new 
instructions came from their government. The Sultan was 
given the power te appoint all of the officials resident 
on the coast; the Germans agreed to send only non-Germans 
to occupy the Customs Houses in the designated ports. 
Vohsen continued to insist on forceful measures, but he was 
completely bypassed. In Germany, Bismarck gave his ·· consent 
to this course of action; he gave the Sultan a month to 
show that his efforts were meeting with success.8 Euan-
Smith was satisfied with this arrangement. He saw that 
the use of force would end all authority of Zanzibar on 
the coast. The leaders of the rebellious centers had made 
it very clear that they considered the Sultan bad no right 
to make agreements concerning their territory without 
their consent.9 
Euan-Smith sent home a summary of the causes of this 
disorder on the coast that covered the main grievances of 
the coastal population. He mentioned first the Germans in-
experience of Arab ways; they felt that an order would 
sett.le eve.ry:thing, and made no attempt to conciliate the 
8Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 15. ix. 88, 17. ix. 88, and 
20. ix. 88, ~· At this time Bismarck favored a very 
restrictive policy; he told the English Ambassador that the 
Society ''must trust to the effect of time to restore their 
influence along the coast." See Lister to Euan-Smith, 
20. ix. 88, E-106, Z.A. 
9Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 21. ix. 88, F. o. 84/1909. 
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local population before they interfered with their established 
customs. The second cause was what Euan-Smith called the 
"sovereign blunder" of hoisting the Society's flag.10 A 
third cause was the poor character of the German employees, 
a charge fully substantiated by their actions in Pangani 
and Zanzibar. Next came the mass of petty regulations, 
introduced all at once, in the coastal towns; they were to 
apply to everyone, including the proud and independent 
rulers of these towns. Finally, the Germans on the coast 
loudly proclaimed they were equal, or even superior, to the 
Sultan as the sovereign power in this part of the Zanzibar 
dominions. Many Germans in Zanzibar accepted these conclu-
sions, as A. O'Swald, the leading German merchant, Consul 
Michahelles, and Admiral Deinhard.11 
Conditions on the coast did not improve, even with the 
sending of Mathews. He, in fact, was forced to return to 
Zanzibar on September twenty-third. Mathews had at first 
been welcomed, but a meeting called by an Arab leader, 
Bushiri ibn ,Salim, the future commander of Arab forces 
against the Germans, changed the attitude of the population 
of Pangani. Mathews' house was surrounded and he was 
threatened- w1th death on the grounds that he was a German 
1 0see above, p. g:o, , for the earlier episode of resistance 
against the hoisting of an English flag on Lake Tanganyika's 
shores. 
11Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 21. ix. 88 and 23. ix. 88, 
F. 0. 84/1909. 
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spy. When he saw that he could no longer trust his troops, 
he left. 12 This event demonstrated the depth of the anti-
European feeling then present on the coast. 
At about the same time news of a serious riot in 
Bagamoyo reached Zanzibar. In this village, according to 
German reports, an employee of the German Society was fired 
at by some Africans recently arrived from the interior. They 
might have been guilty of merely celebrating their arrival 
on the coast in the customary manner; this, however, was a 
question never to be answered. The Germans returned this 
fire and general fighting broke out. Reinforcements landed 
from a German vessel in the harbor. They were met by 
Africans armed only with primitive weapons. The Germans 
slaughtered this force and then ran wild in the town. Over 
one hundred Africans were killed; the Germans suffered no 
losses. 13 
The Germans then began to worry about their men stationed 
in the ports of the south Tanganyika coast. An influential 
Arab, Nassur ibn Suliman, was sent to Kilwa with ample funds 
to insure that . this area remained calm. He returned to 
12Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 23. ix. 88 and 25. ix. 88, 
ibid.; Herbette ~Goblet, 27. x. 88, quoting a newspaper 
account from Zanzibar of 24. ix. 88, .Allemagne, t. 84. 
13Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 25. ix. 88, Arbuthnot to 
Admiral Freemantle, 25. ix. 88, F. 0. 84/1909; Churchill to 
Euan-Smith, 20. ix. 88, E-105, Z.A. 
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Zanzibar, however, on the twenty-eighth of September with 
the news that the revolt had spread to the south. The rebels 
had not allowed him to land. It was soon learned that the 
two Germans established at Kilwa had been killed, while the 
employees of the Society at Lindi and Mkindani had been able 
to escape due to the warnings of the British Indians in 
these ports. Thus by the beginning of October the Germans 
had been expelled from all ports on the coast except Bagamoyo 
and Dar es-Salaam. The presence of German vessels in the 
harbors of these ports kept the rebels at bay. 14 
In spite of the threats against Mathews in Pangani, 
it soon became clear that this rising was not directed 
against Europeans in general. There were English missionaries 
at the Universities' Mission station at Magila, not far 
from Pangani. Euan-Smith feared for their safety and had 
the Sultan send a force to convey them to the coast. This 
group was fired on when it tried to land at Pangani, but 
finally managed to make contact with the Arab leaders in 
that center. The Pangani Arabs told the visitors from 
Zanzibar that the English missionaries had nothing to fear; 
14Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 4. x. 88, F. o. 84/1909. 
The American, E. Ropes, Jr. summed up the situation on the 
coast: "The German Company 1s operations have resulted in 
ruining themselves, trade, and the Sultan's revenues, and 
arousing the whole country against white men. 11 See Ropes 
to his parents, 21. x. 88, "Ropes Papers." 
1 91 • 
their quarrel was with the Germans alone. A letter formally 
expressing this sentiment was given on request. The Bishop 
of the Universities' Mission in Zanzibar was satisfied with 
this pledge, as was the experienced Gen. Mathews. Euan-Smith 
then dropped all direct rescue attempts since he could do no 
more without the direct intervention of England.15 He wished 
to avoid this so that the Arabs would have no cause to direct 
their hostility against the English in general. Similar 
reports of friendship to the English came from Kilwa. An 
English vessel visited that port to check on the safety of 
the resident British Indians. The leaders of the revolt 
there promised that they would not harm them. They added 
that they would again accept the sovereignty of Zanzibar 
if the Sultan did not compel them by force to submit to 
German control.16 
Admiral Deinhard continued to maintain his attitude 
against direct German intervention, although it was now 
clear that the Sultan on his own could never re-establish 
the Germans in his dominions. Mathews, who had already 
failed in the northern coast, did not even wish to try in 
the southern area; most of his men were drawn from this 
15Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 28. ix. 88, enclosing 
Bushiri ibn Salim to the English Consul, 26. ix. 88, 
F. O. 84/1909. 
16Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 8. x. 88, enclosing Hall to 
Freemantle, 27. ix. 88, Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 10. x. 88, 
ibid.; Lewins to Smith, Mackenzie and Co., 19. x. 88, 
unlisted, Z.A. 
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region and could not be trusted to obey orders if sent 
there. 17 Euan-Smith saw only one solution-- to have the 
Sultan buy all the rights of the Society on the coast.18 
The German Admiral agreed; Euan-Smith said that Deinhard 
"vehemently advocates entire immediate evacuation of coast, 
and is bitterly hostile to German Company."19 
The months of October and November passed in relative 
quiet. Trade to Zanzibar from Kilwa and Pangani began to 
flow again. Some Germans from the more inland stations 
were allowed to reach safety, and no moves at all were made 
against English and French missions. Much friction occurred 
in Zanzibar, however. Sultan Khalifa showed hlmself to be 
entirely incompetent; he retired from active rule for long 
periods and isolated himself in his country estates. The 
Society in Zanzibar kept up a steady pressure on the Sultan. 
Vohsen, in Euan-Smi th' s opinion, treated him ''more as if he 
were a defaulting monarch than an independent prince whose 
present losses and difficulties are mainly due to their 
C i.e., German J action." The Consul, Michahelles, allowed 
this to go on since he suspected the Sultan of aiding the 
17 ' Lacau a M.A.E., 25. ix. 88, with p.s. of 30. ix. 88, 
C.C.Z. VI. 
18 Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 16. x. 88, F. o. 84/1913. 
19Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 20. x. 88, ~· The quotation 
given here is from a telegram. 
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rebels. There was no proof at this date of such action, 
however, and Admiral Deinhard refused to believe the 
Consul. Euan-Smith thought that Mlchahelles acted as he 
did because of his earlier reports on East Africa. He had 
early praised the Society and its work in the Zanzibar area; 
he therefore needed excuses for his lack of perception, and 
found the Sultan the easiest to blame. 20 
In the midst of this friction, the Sultan of Zanzibar, 
aided by Bishop Smythies af the Universities' Mission, 
almost got himself into serious trouble. The Sultan began 
to circulate a petition to all the Consuls protesting against 
the German bombardments of the East African ports. Euan-
Smith quickly stopped this before the Germans could seize it 
as a pretext for retaliatory action against Zanzibar.21 The 
English Foreign Office was extremely upset at the participation 
of an English bishop in such intrigues. It was already 
concerned at the refusal of the Protestant mission societies 
to evacuate their stations on the mainland for the duration 
of the rebellion. Their devotion was understandable, but 
20Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 22. x. 88, 13. xi. 88, and 
14. xi. 88, F. o. 84/1910. Friction' among the Germans was 
~iven two additional explanations by the French representative: 
(1) Vohsen was a Jew; (2) Deinhard was upset because many of 
his men were ill from fever caught on the coast. See Lacau 
a M.A.E., 25. ix. 88 and 29. x. 88, C.c.z. VI. 
21Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 17. xi. 88, with enclosures, 
F. 0. 84/1910. 
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the Foreign Office feared that they might be raided, in 
spite of Arab assurances, and then England would be forced 
to intervene to rescue them. Sir Percy Anderson, an official 
concerned with African policy, commented on the act of 
Smythies: "The Bishop is losing his head. Should the 
Universities' Mission be warned of the impropriety of this 
step?" Lord Salisbury replied: "Better not. Their 'head' 
is not much better than his. '' 22 The fears of the Foreign 
Office would soon prove to be justified. 
The Universities' Mission almost became involved in the 
feared incident in November 1888. Smythies went to Pangani 
to see if he might be allowed to visit Magila. He wanted 
to evacuate the women at that station; the men were to be 
offered their choice of leaving or remaining. Smythies' 
vessel was fired on; but he made shore safely. On shore, 
when all seemed settled to allow him to go inland, he was 
threatened by an Arab mob. The Arab leader, Bushiri, inter-
vened to save him; in Smythies' words, Bushiri made it clear 
that "unless they killed him they should not touch them." 
The mob dispersed at this attitude. Smythies reached the 
inland station and succeeded in getting all of the women 
and some of the men to leave. He remained at Magila with 
22 Notes on Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 16. xi. 88, F. o. 
84/1913. 
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the other missionaries. 23 In the opinion of the Foreign 
Office, this supported what they earlier had noted of the 
C. M.S.: "Apparently they do not wish to discourage martyr-
dom.u24 
The breakdown of German control on the East African 
coast had, of course, to be dealt with in some manner by 
the German government. The authorities in Berlin had to 
come to a decision as to the future of their interests in 
this area. Many Germans had said from the outset that this 
rebellion w-as due to an Arab conspiracy organised to protect 
the slave trade. This saved German prestige by removing 
German inefficiency as the primary cause. Consul Michahelles 
was an exponent of this view.25 The widespread support for 
this view made some form of German intervention all the 
more necessary to satisfy public opinion .. . Bismarck soon 
23Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 19. xi. 88, enclosing Smythies 
to Euan-Smith, 15. xi~ 88, F. 0. 84/1910; Edward Francis 
Russell, The Life of Charles Allen Smythies (London, 1898), 
1 29ff. 
24 . 8 88 Note on Euan-Smi th to Salisbury, 1 • vii. , F. o. 
84/1913. 
25Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 12. xi. 88, F. o. 84/1910; 
d'Avricourt a Flourens, 8. xi. 88, reporting on an article 
by Michahelles dated 30. x. 88, Allemagne, Hambourg, t. 12. 
There were many protests against this interpretation; Bishop 
Smythies said the war was entirely due to uthe monstrous 
conduct of the German Company, 11 and that "everyone knows 
the slave trade has nothing to do with it." See letter of 
Smythies dated All Saints Day 1888 in Mn. 3(561), Ministere 
du Congo Belge et Ruanda-Urundi (Brussels). 
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made it plain, however, that he favored no "heroic measures" 
in East Africa. He was ready to let the rebellion run its 
course for some time, even if this did mean that Germany 
would suffer a loss in prestige. Bismarck saw that if the 
Germans intervened too heavily, all of the authority of the 
Sultan on the coast might be ended. This would stop East 
African trade completely, an event that would rouse the 
German merchants in East Africa, already hostile to the 
Society, to actively oppose governmental policy. Bismarck 
placed the blame for the rebellion on the activities of the 
Society and told the English representative in Berlin that 
they had "acted with too much precipitancy, and had shown 
want of judgment." The best program to follow, he stated, 
was to wait twenty years, and then to have a German society 
try again. The experience gained in the interval would 
insure that it did a better job.26 When Euan-Smith was 
informed of this conversation, he was quick to formulate a 
program for the Germans. He recommended that the Sultan 
occupy one place on the coast for the Germans; when emotions 
in that region quieted, the Germans could try again. The 
26currie to Euan-Smith, 1. xi. 88, enclosing Malet to 
Sal-isbury, 26. ix. 88 and Leyden to F. o., 8. x. 88, E-106, 
Z.A.; d'Avricourt a Flourens, 16. xi. 88, Allemagne, Hambourg, 
t. 12. 
Germans accepted this proposal, at first, and suggested 
Tanga. 27 
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The German government did not carry this policy out; 
they saw that public opinion required more active steps. 
They suggested a blockade of the East African coast to 
deprive the Arabs of war materials and to block the slave 
trade. The English, fearing that the Germans, acting alone, 
might antagonise the Arabs so much that a general rising 
would result, and thus endanger their sphere in East 
Africa, decided to join the blockade. Salisbury also saw 
the German need for some form of action, "for a striking 
measure which should satisfactorily appeal to public opinion 
in Germany." The English had another reason for joining 
the Germans; they feared the Germans would not respect the 
independence of Zanzibar; joint action would allow an English 
flee~ to keep close watch on any German activity.28 Parti-
cipation in the blockade was easy to justify in England 
it was simply a continuation of the traditional English 
27Salisbury to Euan-Smith, 13. x. 88 and 18. x. 88, 
F. 0. 84/1912. Salisbury had rejected Euan-Smith's earlier 
idea of the Sultan buying out the German Society, since "it 
is the national susceptibilities of the German public which 
it is necessary to satisfy, and not the pecuniary interests 
of the German shareholders of the Company." See Currie to 
Euan-Smith, 18. x. 88, E-105, Z.A. 
28currie to Euan-Smith, 25. x. -88, E-106, ibid. 
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policy of striking at the slave trade whenever possible.29 
This blockade was officially agreed to in November, 
with the actual details to be worked out by the English and 
German naval commanders in East Africa.30 The Sultan of 
Zanzibar was "requested" to join the blockade and to issue 
a proclamation authorising it in his territorial waters.31 
The Sultan could do little but agree to the blockade. He 
was very unhappy with the Germans by this time, however, 
since he had received no revenues from the coast after the 
rebellion began, and consequently could not meet the royal 
expenses.32 Before he could issue the proclamation for the 
blockade, the Sultan changed his mind and attempted to plead 
illness. When this did not remove pressure from him, he 
requested the Consuls not to compel him to act since his 
forc.es would never obey the order -- a correct statement. 33 
29 
Salisbury made certain that others involved in East 
Africa knew that he was aware of the true causes of the re-
bellion. He told the French Ambassador: "The Germans 
have provoked this rising by the rough and brutal conduct 
of their agents, who treated the Arabs as Negroes, and forgot 
that the Arab race is one of the proudest in the world." 
See Waddington a Goblet, 3. x. 88, Angleterre, t. 834. 
3°currie to Euan-Smith, 5. xi. 88, E-106, Z.A. 
31Euan-Smith to the Sultan of Zanzibar, 6. xi. 88, 
0-1-16, 1.!2.!i· 
32sultan of Zanzibar to Euan-Smith, 28. x. 88 and 
8. xi. 88, ,!lli. 
33sultan of Zanzibar to Euan-Smith, 18. xi. 88, ibid.; 
Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 19. xi. 88, F. 0. 84/1910. ----
In the end, the blockade was issued in the name of the 
Sultan, but without his signature.34 
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Meanwhile, on the coast, Bushiri ibn Salim was assuming 
control of the Arab forces. Bushiri was a man of mixed Arab 
and Swahili descent whose residence in 1888 was near Pangani. 
Little is known of his background. He had fought in the wars 
against Mirambo, and he gained a good reputation for his 
bravery. Later he had settled in the Pangani area where he 
came into conflict with the Sultan of Zanzibar; he won in 
this struggle and thus gained considerable prominence in this 
region.35 Euan-Smith left an excellent picture of Bushiri: 
he was 
stout, strongly built, seems thirty-five or 
thirty-six years of age •••• He is strikingly 
intelligent and is said to be extremely good 
humoured and even kind hearted. He is, however, 
capable of great severity when roused to anger. 
He keeps his head in the midst of dangers and on 
one occasion when seated in a house at Bagamoyo 
1vi th Pere Etienne C of the Holy Ghost Mission J, 
while shells from the German man of war were 
bursting around him, he entirely refused to 
listen to the prayers of his attendants to seek 
a place of safety ·until his negotiations were 
terminated. 36 
Bushiri placed himself at the head of the Arabs when 
the difficulties began at Pangani, and kept this primacy 
34Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 3. xii. 88, F. 0. 84/1911. 
35oscar Baumann, Usambara und seine Nachbar~ebiete 
(Berlin, 1911 ), 64-5; Schmidt, Geschichte des Araberaufstandes, 
29; FalKenhorst, D~ut~9h-Ostafrika, 51. 
36 4 8 Euan-Smith to F. O., • iii. 9, E-110, Z.A. 
200. 
during the length of the rebellion. Bwana Heri, whom we 
discussed above, was the only other important leader. He 
never allied with Bushiri and confined his activities to 
the regions around his home village, Saadani. 
While the blockade was being organised, desultory 
fighting went on. Bushiri, with a large body of men, moved 
to a location near Bagamoyo, and waited a chance to strike 
successfully at the Germans. By a clever strategem he 
managed to bring his men between the Germans in the village 
and those on the vessels in the harbor. A German force 
landed, however, causing his men to panic and flee before 
any battle began. In the retreat, the rest of Bagamoyo 
was destroyed. Bushiri then established a camp outside of 
Bagamoyo, but he contented himself with small raiding 
actions for the time being. The Germans contented themselves 
with shelling a few towns along the coast; this meant little 
in an area where houses were made of mud and straw. This 
shelling soon degenerated into a haphazard destruction of 
property and of innocent lives. The Germans fired in the 
middle of the night and oared little where the shells landed. 
Admiral Deinhard was dissatisfied with the whole campaign; he 
described the two occupied towns, Bagamoyo and Pangani, as 
being ''as bad as they possibly could be," and as being 
11 absolutely ruined and deserted.u37 
-~------------~---------------- --- -- -
37Euan-Smith to F. o., 3. i. 89, E-120, ibid.; Euan-
Smith to Salisbury, 20. xi. 88, F. 0. 84/1910; Euan-Smith to 
Salisbury, 3. xii. 88 and 14. xii. 88, F. 0. 84/1911. 
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Conditions did not improve when the blockade began. 
Euan-Smith reported, with sarcasm, that "it seems that the 
German naval authorities are making use of the E. African 
coast and of the present opportunity to train their youngest 
and inexperienced crews on the details of practical warfare.n38 
The German Consul admitted that the blockade had little use; 
it did not reach those at war with the Germans, and it drove 
others to join their ranks by its harsh character. Deinhard 
said, however, that he had orders to carry it on for six 
months, and the orders would be obeyed.39 
This blockade did not satisfy public opinion in Germany. 
Bismarck had to develop a new and more active policy. In 
mid-December 1888, he called the experienced African traveller, 
Hermann Wissmann, to see him. It was reported that Wissmann 
would visit East Africa to observe the rebellion and to make 
recommendations for future policies.40 By January 1889, 
German public opinion wanted even more than this. Salisbury 
was told by the German Ambassador that his government would 
ask the Reichstag for f100,000 for the organisation of a 
force of African .police to hold the two German p.orts in East 
38Euan-Smith to F. o., 14. i. 89, E-120, Z.A. 
39Euan-Smith to F. o., 2. ii. 89, ibid. 
40d'Avricourt \ Flourens, 16. xii. 88, Allemagne, a 
Hambourg, t. 1 2. 
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Africa.41 These plans became associated with the name of 
Wissmann; he was to lead this new group.42 
In the Reichstag debates, the main point made by the 
government was that colonies were necessary; therefore steps 
had to be taken to save German territory in East Africa. 
Since the Society could not do this, the German government 
had to intervene.43 Anti-slave trade aspects were stressed 
to attract wide support; earlier, in December 1888, elements 
usually hostile to the government had passed a resolution 
against the slave trade in the Reichstag. 44 Thus Bismarck 
asked for an appropriation "to put down the slave trade and 
protect German interests in East Africa.u He also asked 
for the appointment of a commissioner with extended powers 
to direct the new operation.45 Bismarck's wishes were 
approved. Wissmann became the director of Germany's new 
East. African policy. 
41 Salisbury to Euan-Smith, 23. i. 89, F. 0. 84/1973. 
42d'Avricourt ~Goblet, 16. i. 89, Allemagne, Hambourg, 
t. 15. 
43d'Avricourt ~Goblet, 16. ii. 89, ~· The head of 
the C.M.S. station at Mombasa concluded after a talk with 
Vohsen "that the Company is defunct -- nothing for it but 
either to abandon the enterprize or for the Imperial Govern-
men-t to take it in hand. 11 See W. Salter Price, My Third 
Campaign in East Africa (London, 1890), 282-83. 
44Herbette a Goblet, 17. xii. 88, Allemagne, t. 85. 
45Herbette ~Goblet, 19. 1. 89, ~., t. 86. 
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The main activities in East Africa during these deli-
berations revolved around the various missionary societies 
established on the mainland. The C.M.S. missionaries at 
Mpwapwa and Mamboia, particularly those with families, 
decided finally to leave their stations. The first party 
to leave reached the coast near the end of November. ~ 
route, they met Abdullah ibn Heri, the son of Bwana Heri of 
Saadani. He escorted them to the coast. This Arab leader 
complained bitterly to them of Sultan Barghash "selling" 
their homeland to the Germans; he stated firmly that the 
Arabs in his area would never return to their former 
relationship under the Sultan.46 Abdullah's treatment of 
these missionaries clearly demonstrated that the Arabs 
still held the Germans alone responsible for the present 
difficulties. 
As the English continued to aid the Germans in the 
blockade, Arab hostility developed. Early in 1889, a 
missionary of the L.M.S., Brooks, set out from the C.M.S. 
stations at Mpwapwa and Mamboia for the coast. He came 
from farther inland and disregarded all warnings about 
danger from the Arabs. Brooks met men from Saadani; he 
was killed by them. Early reports blamed Bwani Heri, 
usually a friend to all Europeans, though there was little 
46Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 1. xii. 88, enclosing Pruen 
to Euan-Smith, 24. ix. 88, F. o. 84/1911. 
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proof of his direct involvement. 47 Euan-Smith considered 
Bwana Heri guilty. In spite of his earlier career, Euan-
Smith described him to Salisbury as "a man of bad character 
whom I have repeatedly but unsuccessfully pressed the Sultan 
to remove." We have demonstrated above, however, that Bwana 
Heri was an. independent ruler, and that the Sultan would 
have needed considerable force to remove him. Euan-Smith 
went to extremes in this description because he thought 
that this first murder of an Englishman required vigorous 
action. He advised making the Sultan responsible for the 
capture and punishment of Bwana Heri. If the Sultan would 
not act, Euan-Smith recommended he be fined a substantial 
amount.48 Salisbury saw the difficulties of this approach 
and did not accept it; it would mean that the Germans could 
ask similar terms for their murdered subjects. The Sultan 
then would be in a very dangerous position if he did not 
capture the offenders. Salisbury felt it best to have the 
Sultan recall Bwana Heri, and then punish him.49 This was 
beyond the power of the Sultan; Brooks' death thus passed 
with no retaliation from the English.50 
47Boustead, Ridley and Co. to L.M.S., 3. ii. 89, L.M.S.; 
John Roscoe, Twenty-five Years in East Africa(Cambridge, 1921 ), 36. 
48Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 24. i. 89, F. o. 84/1984. 
49salisbury to Euan-Smith, 25. i. 89, F. o. 84/1983. 
50Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 29. i. 89 and 6. ii. 89, F.O. 
84/1984. Kirk, now retired, said of this incident that the 
Sultan had ''undoubtedly given the orders that caused the murder 
of Mr. Brooks." Kirk offered no proof. See Kirk to Mackinnon, 
20. iii. 89, Box 25, ''Mackinnon Papers.'' 
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German missions fared very badly during this period. 
German Protestants had built a center for the settlement of 
freed slaves close to Dar es-Salaam. They remained there 
when the rebellion began since they thought the presence 
of German vessels in the harbor guaranteed their safety. 
The Arabs attacked this station in early January 1889. All 
the missionaries escaped unharmed; the former slaves, how-
ever, were recaptured by the Arabs. This episode clearly 
demonstrated German impotence against Arab methods of war-
fare, and proved the uselessness of the blockade as a 
protection of German interests. 
The German Roman Catholics fared even worse. Priests 
of the Benedictine order had built a station near Pugu, a 
four or five hours walk from Dar es-Salaam. Shortly after 
the attack on the German Protestants, the Arabs raided 
Pugu. Of the nine missionaries, both men and women, two 
were killed, four were captured, and three escaped. All 
the mission property was destroyed. The Arabs used the 
captured missionaries to pressure the Germans for some 
concessions. They said at first that they would accept no 
ransom money for their prisoners; they wanted the complete 
evacuation of Bagamoyo and Dar es-Salaam as a condition 
of their return. The only alternative offered was conversion 
to Islam on pain of death. In spite of the Arab demands 
experienced officials in East Africa began to think about 
paying a ransom. The French priests of the Holy Ghost 
Mission at Bagamoyo set about to accomplish this. They 
206. 
had full liberty to visit Arab camps due to their long 
history of cordial relations with the Arabs of East Africa. 
The fact that the French government was not involved in the 
blockade kept their Arab friends in a satisfied mood. 
The negotiations for the release of the German mission-
aries were very difficult. The chance for success improved, 
ho"rever, when Bushiri ibn Salim managed to obtain possession 
of the priests from the original captors. Bushiri, at this 
period of the war, was a rather gentlemanly opponent; he 
was willing to accept a ransom in money for their return. 
The actual amount was soon arranged, but the Arabs then 
asked for an additional concession. They wanted the return 
of some captured Arab slavers. The Germans finally accepted 
these terms; the prisoners were released unharmed.51 
With this raiding of missionary stations, the C. M.S. 
changed its attitude about its posts of Mpwapwa and Mamboia. 
More of the missionary families there set out for Zanzibar 
a few remained to insure future trouble. When this group 
reached Bushiri's camp, they found that he planned to hold 
them for a ransom. .After .tedious negotiations, carried on 
----------·~ ··-~----------------· 
51 Euan-Smith to F. 0., 4. iii. 89 and 12. iii. 89, 
E-110, Z.A.; Euan-Smith to F. 0., 1. ii. 89, E-111, ibid.; 
Mgr. de Courmont in an undated letter, A.P.F., 61 (18~ 
304-06. 
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again by French priests, this C.M.S. group reached Zanzibar 
in safety. This episode was complicated by some scheming 
by the Sultan of Zanzibar. Two German explorers, Meyer and 
Baumann, had earlier been captured by Bushiri. They bought 
their freedom. The Sultan, perhaps with English persuasion, 
refused to let them pay the promised sum to the Arabs; he 
said he could not allow such things to happen in his domin-
ions, and promised to pay the fine himself. He made no 
steps to meet this promise, in spite of English pressure. 
Bushiri became very angry; he used the captive C.M.S. group 
to make his opinions known. Bushiri remained basically 
friendly to non-Germans, however. When new promises were 
made, he released his prisoners. He even promised to aid 
other missionaries in reaching the coast.52 
The war on the coast was fairly quiet, apart from these 
acts against missionaries. Both Germans and Arabs were 
waiting the arrival of Wissmann from Germany.53 No direct 
information as to his plans was available in East Africa, 
even among the German officials, but plenty of rumors were 
circulating due to his forceful speeches in Germany. He . 
52Roscoe, Twenty-five~ Ye~, 37-41; Euan-Smith to Salis-
bury, 14. i. 89, 18. iii. 89, 1. iv. 89, E-120, Z.A.; for 
Meyer's account, Rev. John Anderson Dougherty, The East -
Indies Station: or the Cruise of H.M.S. 'Garnet', 1887-§0 
(Malta, 1892), 51, and 0 1Swald to Euan-Smith, 20. xii. - 8, 
E-105, Z.A. 
53Euan-Smith to F. o., 4. iii. 89, E-110, ibid. 
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seemed to advocate a quick suppression of the revolt of the 
Arabs, followed by a program to revive the trade of the 
area. Euan-Smith felt such a plan would lead to ruin of 
European interests in this area; the Arabs knew of Wissmann's 
speeches and said they were prepared to defeat him. They 
planned never to meet the Germans in an open battle; they 
would concentrate on raiding and the stoppage of trade. 
They said they were willing to fight on for ten years and 
allow the climate to finish off the Germans. Euan-Smith 
was worried because he thought this Arab design would 
succeed. He suggested that the Germans use the appropriations 
voted for East Africa "in an effort to conciliate the majority 
of the people, and buy off the more hostile of the leaders 
and to afford proof that the friendship was better than the 
hostility of the Germans •••• " Euan-Smith, of course, had 
the safety of the English missionaries in mind; he feared 
an extension of the war would be fatal to them.54 
If Euan-Smith had known Hermann Wissmann, he would not 
have been over-sanguine about a policy of conciliation being 
adopted. Wissmann, born in 1853, had early turned to African 
exploring. In t880 he accompanied the veteran German explorer, 
Dr. Pog.ge, in an .expedition to the Angola-Congo region; they 
54 8 Euan-Smith to F. o., 1. ii. 9, E-120, ~.; Euan-
Smith to F. 0., 4. iii. 89, E-110, ibid.; the merchants of 
Hamburg had the same opinion as Euan:8mith, see d'Avricourt 
'a Spuller, 16. iii. 89, Allemagne, Hambourg, t. 15. 
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founded there a station of the German International African 
Association. Shortly after this Wissmann became the first 
European to cross Africa from west to east. Interestingly 
enough, at the conclusion of this trip in November 1883, he 
was the guest of Bwana Heri at Saadani. In 1883 Wissmann 
worked for King Leopold in the Kasai region of the Congo 
Free State. When his tasks were completed, he made another 
trip across the African continent. In all this African 
experience, Wissmann had gained a bitter hatred of the 
slave-trading Arabs. He made this quite clear in the 
printed accounts of his travels.55 Thus when he was 
appointed to East Africa, he at once rejected conciliation 
as a policy; he prepared to end the Arab threat once and 
for all. 
Wissmann's first problem was the securing of troops 
to carry out his schemes in East Africa. Africans were 
needed to form the main body of such a force because of the 
unhealthiness of the coastal regions. After some diplomatic 
pressure, England allowed Wissmann to recruit a body of 
troops in Egypt from natives of the Sudan. Three hundred 
and -sixty were secured at once; a German remained in Egypt 
55schmidt, Geschichte des Araberaufstand·e·s, 41-4, for 
a brief account of Wissmann -r5 life; an example of Wissmann's 
feelings towards the slave trade is given in Lieut. H. 
Wissmann, "On the Influence of Arab Traders in West Central 
Africa,"~' X(1885), 525-31. 
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to collect a similar force as Wissmann left for Zanzibar.56 
Before Wissmann reached East Africa, a sharp skirmish 
took place at Bagamoyo. The Arabs were easily beaten.57 
Shortly afterwards, an emissary from Bushiri visited Zanzibar. 
He told Euan-Smith that Bushiri had been fired on by a 
Swahili in his own forces during this skirmish. The bullet 
passed through Bushiri's clothes. The Arab leader thought 
that this action was due to a German bribe. Euan-Smith 
reported that this messenger said he was sent t•to tell me 
in confidence that he C Bushiri] would come over and give 
himself up to me at the British Consulate if I would send 
a verbal message to him to the effect that I would guarantee 
his life." Euan-Smith took no action since the message 
was accompanied by no written statement from Bushiri.58 
Bushiri followed this proposal with a more concrete 
offer. A new agent visited Euan-Smith to report that if 
Bushiri was given 10,000 rupees to distribute to hi s 
followers, he would leave East Afr!·ca for Arabia under an 
English promise of safe-conduct. Bushiri was willing that 
the money be kept from him till he had safely embarked for 
56Lister to Euan-Smith, 21. ii. 89, enclosing Sir E. 
Baring to Salisbury, 1. ii. 89 and Salisbury to Baring, 
29. i. 89, E-114, Z.A.; Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 9. iii. 89, 
E-110, ~· 
57Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 11. iii. 89, ~~. 
58Euan-Smith to F. 0., 9. iii. 89, ibid. 
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Arabia. Euan-Smith thought that the Germans should accept 
this offer. He believed that Bushiri was not responsible 
directly for any German deaths -- all had occurred where 
he was not in command -- and, therefore, could be sent away 
without German retaliation. He said: 11 He has, it is true, 
been waging open war with the German Admiral at Bagamoyo 
for months past but I am not aware that in so doing he has 
forfeited his right to honourable treatment if captured." 
Euan-Smith concluded that 10,000 rupees was a cheap price 
to pay to be rid of him.59 The Germans seemed interested. 
They preferred he go to India to insure he would be under 
some form of European control. Euan-Smith was asked to 
determine if Bushiri would accept this, and to ask the 
Sultan if he would support Bushiri in India. All this was 
to be done in "absolute secrecy. 11 60 
Nothing came of Euan-Smith's attempt to pe rsuade 
Bushiri to follow up his original offer. Bushiri waited 
the arrival of Wissmann before he made any final decision. 
The Arab leader did make an arrangement with Admiral Deinhard; 
they concluded an armistice to last until Wissmann took 
over the German command.61 
59Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 20 • iii. 89, 1£1£. 
60Lister to Euan-Smith, 13. iii. 89, E-114, ibid.; note 
by Salisbury on Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 20. iii.~ F. 0. 
84/1977. 
61 Euan-Smith to F. 0., 1. iv. 89, E-110, Z.A. 
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When Hermann Wissmann reached East Africa, he plunged 
into activity with his characteristic energy. To outside 
appearances, he wanted no negotiations with Bushiri, and 
preferred to crush the revolt at once. 62 Wissmann did make 
an offer to Bushiri, however. A relative of Bushiri's 
brought it to Hawes, the new English Consul, for advice. 
Wissmann offered Bushiri a place in the German administration 
of the coastal territory; he would be governor from Tanga to 
Bagamoyo. Bushiri would command all of the African army 
of the Germans except the forces directly under Wissmann. 
For his services, he would receive 3000 rupees a month. In 
addition, Wissmann proposed to correct the faults that had 
led to the rebellion. An alternative scheme, no doubt the 
one Wissmann preferred, proposed that Bushiri accept 10,000 
rupees, and then leave the German concession. Bushiri's 
agent told Hawes that these terms interested the Arab 
leader. The Arabs, however, did not trust the Germans; 
they felt that if Bushiri accepted the offer to enter German 
service, Wissmann would soon find an excuse to put another 
in his place. Hawes urged the Arabs to trust Wissmann, but 
he counseled them to accept the second alternative since he 
felt that friction would inevitably arise in the future. 
Hawes, an experienced English official, reported to the 
62 ' Lacau a M.A.E., 29. v. 89, c.c.z. VI. 
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Foreign Office after this interview that this German scheme 
might prove to be unwise. Such generous terms could lead 
Bushiri to believe that the Germans feared his strength. 
Perhaps Hawes was right; in the end Bushiri rejected the 
German offers. 63 
The armistice on the coast did not last very long. 
Bushiri had broken it first, in the opinion of the Germans, 
by sending Wissmann an African whose hands had been cut off. 
He had been caught working for the Germans.64 Thus stimu-
lated, Wissmann's forces attacked Bushiri's camp near 
Bagamoyo in the beginning of May 1889. The Arab center was 
taken, and the Arabs suffered heavily. Wissmann prepared 
to take Pangani next. The Arabs there began to show they 
were tired of this war; they sent to a new English Consul, 
Portal, to arrange peace. No settlement was accomplished, 
however. 65 
63Hawes to F. o., 21. iv. 89, E-110, Z.A. A missionary 
told Hawes that the Germans had asked Bushiri to submit his 
terms to them so that they might make him an offer. The 
terms listed are roughly similar to those Wissmann offered. 
See Taylor to Hawes, 28. iv. 89 in Hawes to Salisbury, 
29. iv. 89, ibid. The French representative sent home a 
report similar-to Taylor's. See Lacau a M.A.E., 29. v. 89, 
c.c.z. VI. 
64Bulletin de la Socie'te' Antiescl~vagiste d,e FraD.ce, 
( 1 889 ) ' 389. 
65Portal to Salisbury, 16. v. 89 and 28. v. 89, F. 0. 
84/1978. 
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The effort for peace on the part of the Pangani Arabs 
demonstrated that Bushiri was losing his position of leader-
ship among the Arabs. He never really recovered from the 
defeat of his men by Wissmann near Bagamoyo, and he now 
began to look to African tribes to come to his aid to 
compensate for the unenthusiastic behavior of the .Arabs. 
Wissmann soon ended the war in a large area of the northern 
Tanganyika coast. He took Tanga and Pangani, and the inter-
vening regions, with little trouble.66 A special effort was 
made by the Germans to win Bwana Heri of Saadani by peaceful 
means. Sefu, the son of Tippu Tip, visited Saadani on a 
mission from the Germans to talk the coastal leader into 
accepting terms. He failed in _one trip, and then returned 
to try again. The second time he had to flee for his life 
when the Arabs accused him of being a German spy. Wissmann 
thus began preparations to take Bwana Heri by force.67 
Bushiri, meanwhile, had not given up the fight against 
the Germans. He struck at the German station at Mpwapwa. 
There were two German officers here, ,supported by a small 
African body , of troops. They had been asked to leave this 
66Portal to Salisbury, 24. vi. 89, ibid.; Portal to 
Salisbury, 17. vii. 89 and 18. vii. 89, ~. 84/1979. 
67 Portal to Salisbury, 6. vii. 89, enclosing Bwana 
Heri to Wissmann, 2. vii. 89, Portal to Salisbury, '28. vii. 89, 
~.; Muxworthy to L.M.S., 2. viii. 89, L.M.S. 
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location by the German command on the coast, but had 
declined because, in the words of an English missionary, 
the Africans in this area seemed "thoroughly cowed."68 
The local inhabitants did remain peaceful, but Bushiri was 
able to surprise the station in June 1889. One German was 
killed and the other escaped. The entire station was 
destroyed.69 The English missionaries there had been 
warned of the attack and had fled to safety in advance 
the Germans had disregarded the same warning. One missionary 
returned after the raid and met with Bushiri. He seemed 
friendly. An African follower of Bushiri then warned the 
Englishman that Bushiri planned to capture him so that 
he might be held for ransom. .The missionary fled and 
escaped capture. The mission station there was entirely 
destroyed, however.70 These actions showed the desperation 
of Bushiri. He had given up all attempts to win the favor 
of the English and no1v was an avowed enemy of all Europeans. 
On the coast, all was quiet. Trade began to revive 
in the northern ports, and the Germans sent messages inland 
to tell the Africans of the interior that it was now safe 
to visit the coast for trade. Firm action against slavers 
68Ashe to Euan-Smith, 1. xii. 88, in Euan-Smith to 
Salisbury, 1. i. 89, F. 0. 84/1975. 
69Price to Euan-Smith, 28. vii. 89, F. o. 84/1979; 
Schynse, A Travers l'Afrique, 221ff. 
7°Price to Lang, 25. vii. 89, G3.A5/0 6, C.M.S. 
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won respect for the Germans in many sections of the African 
populations near the northern ports. The Germans, in fact, 
introduced new methods against the slave-traders; they did 
not imprison the guilty as the English did; they hanged them 
as soon as they were convicted of this crime.71 An unsigned 
memorandum, probably written by Portal, gives us a good view· 
of Wissmann and his policy at this time: 
Major Wissmann is restoring order with vigour. 
As far as I can see, very successfully. Major 
Wissmann shows himself very willing to defer to 
suggestions from Foreign Consuls as to any 
measures which they may think dangerous. He is 
popular with the natives. He has a rough sort 
of oriental justice. If he does not hang a man 
he probably imprisons him and lets him out after 
a few days. He is merciless in his treatment of 
slave dealers. 72 
The raid on Mpwapwa caused Wissmann to turn inland. 
He also offered a large reward for the taking of Bushiri.73 
Wissmann left the coast with a large party at the end of 
September. Captive Arabs accompanied the group in a 
fashion described by the French representative as ''la 
.. 
/ 
maniere antigue 11 : they wore chains and had to carry heavy 
burdens. Thus all could see what resistanc.e to the. Germans 
- 71 Portal to Salisbury, 2. ix. 89 a.I;ld 9. ix. 89, E-112, 
Z .A. 
72 8 Memo, E-11 , Z. A. 
73Lacau a M.A.E., 25. viii. 89, with p.s. of 1. ix. 89, 
c.c.z. VII. 
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would bring.74 Wissmann met no opposition on his march to 
Mpwapwa. He built a new fort at this location and returned 
to the coast; this section of East Africa was now safely in 
German hands.75 
Bushiri made his last major effort while Wissmann was 
in the interior. He led a force of 6000 warlike Africans, 
of the Mafiti tribe, into battle against the Germans near 
Bagamoyo. The Germans, under von Gravenreuth, were seriously 
outnumbered, and defeated Bushiri only after a hard fight. 
Bushiri fled to the north with a few followers.76 He tried 
to reach his home area near Pangani, but found the Germans 
close on his trail. They almost captured him in one instance; 
he managed to escape although most of his group were taken. 
Bushiri was eventually handed over to the Germans by a 
Zeguha chief, Muhammad Sowa, who had harbored a grudge 
against him from the pre-war period.77 Bushiri was brought 
to Pangani where he was tried, sentenced, and hanged on 
December fifteenth. 
74 ' Lacau a M.A.E., 27. i. 89, ibid.; Portal to Salisbury, 
9. ix. 89, E-112, Z.A. 
75Price to Lang, 18. x. 89, Cole to Lang, 2. xi. 89, 
G3.A5/0 6, C.M.S. 
76 ' 8 Lacau a M.A.E., 1. xii. 9, c.c.z. VII; Muxworthy to 
L.M.S., 2. xi. 89, L.M.S.; this event and others following 
October 1889 are given in Wilhelm Langheld, Zwanzig Jahre 
in Deutschen Kolonien (Berlin, 1909), 5ff. · 
77Mgr. A. LeRoy, Au Kilima-Ndjaro (Paris, n.d.), 449-50; 
Lacau a M.A.E., 31. xii. 89, O.O.Z. VII, estimates it cost 
over 20,000 francs in reward money for his capture. 
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Later reports did not portray a very humane ending for 
this brave and often chivalrous Arab. Bushiri was not told 
of his fate until about two hours before the hanging. The 
Germans then dressed him in his best and photographed him. 
They immediately stripped him, and then ''with bare head, 
chains on his legs and arms and a halter round his neck, 11 
photographed him again. Bushiri then went to the gallows. 
As reported to Euan-Smith: "in his case as in those of two 
of the chiefs executed at Bagamoyo, the ropes were so badly 
adjusted as visibly to prolong the suffering of those 
unhappy men for more than twenty minutes.u78 
Wissmann, after presiding at the trial and execution, 
returned to Zanzibar; there, he met with Euan-Smith and 
informed him "that Bushiri had made certain revelations 
regarding the Sultan and other Arab notables and that he 
had also received from him a box containing a large number 
of papers, letters and other documents, which were believed 
to contain certain treasonable matter."79 The Arab governor 
of Pangani later verified these charges. He told the Sultan 
that Bushiri, before he died, ''made certain statements to 
Major Wissmann of a character highly injurious to H (is). 
H fighness]. and, indeed, directly implicating him in the 
78Euan-Smith to F. 0., 26. xii. 89, E-113, Z.A. 
79Euan-Smith to F. 0., 23. xii. 89, 1£!1. 
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recent disturbances on the German coast line. 11 Euan-Smith 
did his best to keep this report from becoming public 
information in East Africa. 80 Both England and Germany 
agreed that it was best to keep the report secret, so that 
they would not be compelled to take action against the 
Sultan.81 Such a step might have led to additional Arab 
resistance. These charges were probably true; Sayyid 
Khalifa had naturally tried to work against the Germans as 
they deprived him of the dominions of his ancestors. Sayyid 
Khalifa died in February 1890 and a Sultan friendly to the 
English was installed. 82 
Bwana Heri remained the only rebel leader active on the 
northern Tanganyika coast. He realised now that his defeat 
was inevitable and began to look for a solution. In March 
1890, he sent to the French representative to ask that his 
area of Africa be given French protection. This was refused.83 
Thus, in April, he offered terms to the Germans; their main 
point was that he and his family be allowed to retain control 
of Saadani. Wissmann decided that it was better to conclude 
peace with_ this influential ruler, and to use his. infLuence 
80 Euan-Smith to F. o., 13. li. 90, unmarked, Z.A. 
81 currie to Euan-Smith, 21. xii. 89, E-116, 1£1£. 
82 Hollingsworth, Zanzibar under the Foreign Office, 36. 
83 ' Plat a M.A.E., 15. iii. 90, C.C.Z. VII. 
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for German ends, than to continue the war. With this 
arrangement, the rebellion on the northern coast was over.84 
The southern coast remained to be pacified; there were 
no significant Arab leaders there, and their activities in 
the rebellion up to this point had been entirely defensive. 
The new Sultan wished to conclude the war and offered to 
send an Arab to the south with full powers to arrange peace. 
The Germans, however, l-rere preparing a military force to 
deal with this region and did not pay .much attention to this 
offer. 85 They did accept it in a half-hearted manner when 
the Sultan persevered in his efforts for peace, but the 
resulting peace feelers did not lead to a positive end. 86 
Wissmann led his forces to the south in ¥~y and easily put 
down all opposition. The Germans bombarded Kilwa and then 
landed forces; the rebels evacuated the village without 
fighting. Mkindani and Lindi, the other main centers, 
surrendered with little resistance. 87 The rebellion was 
over. 88 The Arabs , of the coast had never mounted a unified 
84 ' Piat a M.A.E., 17. iv. 90, ibid.; Euan-Smith· to 
Salisbury, 26. v. 90, F.o. 84/2061; Schynse, A Travers l'Afrigue, 
256ff. 
85Euan-Smith to F.O., 11. ii. 90 and 24. ii. 90, unindexed, 
Z.A. 
86Euan-Smith to F.O., 13. iii. _90, ibid.; Euan-Smith to 
Salisbury, 1. v. 90, enclosing a letter from the Arabs of 
Mkindani to the Sultan of Zanzibar, 22. iii. 90, F.O. 84/2061. 
87Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 7. v. 90, E-125, Z.A.; Euan-
Smith to Salisbury, 21. v. 90, F.O. 84/2061. 
88
wissmann t;ent home for a rest in June since he considered 
all dan~er past. See Euan-Smith to Salisbury, 2. vi. 90, 
F.O. 84/2062. 
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front against the Germans; Wissmann's arrival and his deter-
mination to reoccupy East Africa for the Germans really had 
made this defeat but a matter of time. 
In Europe, negotiations followed which finally disposed 
of the claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar to the coast of 
Tanganyika. A treaty was concluded on the first of July 
between Germany and England arranging for t he Sultan to cede 
his coastal strip in return for "an equitable indemnity.u 
A new German sphere of influence, embracing the interior of 
Tanganyika, was also established. The Sultan and the Germans 
made their arrangement for the transfer of the coast in 
September; the Sultan received f2,000,000 as compensation.89 
The German Society and the German government concluded an 
agreement in November which ended the . role of the Society 
in the administration of the ceded area. When the terms of 
the agreement went into effect at the beginning of 1891, the 
German government assumed the direct rule of the former 
dominions of Zanzibar.9° 
B. The Occupation of the Interior 
The war on the coast had immediate repercussions in 
Tabora. The White Fathers living there reported that the 
Arabs were extremely excited; the fathers learned the Arabs 
89Hollingsworth, Zanzibar Under the Foreign Office, Chap. III. 
90d'Avricourt ~Ribot, 29. xi. 90, Allemagne, Hambourg, t. 17. 
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had asked the Nyamwezi chief, Siki, to kill them. Siki 
refused and gave his protection to the priests -- for a 
large gift.91 The London Missionary Society had a mission 
station at Urambo, near Tabora, and had to face a similar 
threat. The missionaries there were told that "orders" had 
come from the Tabora Arabs to kill them. The chief declined 
to act against the L.M.S. men.92 
In Tabora, Siki continued to protect the White Fathers, 
but became more and more exacting in his demands for compen-
sation for his support. The fathers wished to leave Tabora 
to escape his rapaciousness; they were hampered, however, by 
concern for the orphans cared for by the mission. Finally, 
in June 1889, they made careful plans to steal away unobserved. 
Through the treachery of one of their retainers, they were 
discovered by the Arabs and stripped of all their possessions. 
One Arab, Sayf ibn Sayd, did intervene to protect their 
lives; he told the other Arabs he would defend the priests 
if they were attacked. Thus saved, the White Fathers were 
able to leave Tabora in safety.93 No other violent measures 
were taken by the Arabs in this part of Tanganyika. 
91see undated letter of P. Coulbois in Lacau a M.A.E., 
26. vii. 89, c.c.z. VII. 
92 8 Draper to L.M.S., 21. x. 9, L.M.S. 
93schynse, A Travers !'Afrique, 10ff. 
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The Germans made no attempts to extend their authority 
inland past the post of Mpwapwa until the war on the coast 
was ended. Wissmann then made plans to secure this region. 
At this time there was a new German arrival in East Africa, 
one of Africa's most famous personalities -- Emin Pasha. 
He was recovering from an injury suffered after his arrival 
on the coast with the famous expedition of Henry M. Stanley 
sent to rescue him from his isolated position in the Sudan.94 
Emin Pasha had originally planned to work for the English 
(he had earlier been an officer of Gordon in the Sudan). 
A series of difficulties with Stanley and the English, how-
ever, made him receptive to offers from his native land.95 
Emin Pasha was appointed to lead an expedition inland that 
had as a goal, in the words of Wissmann, the undermining of 
Arab influence "as far as possible in all directions." Emin 
Pasha was also ordered to sign as many treaties as possible 
with African chiefs in the region between Kavirondo and 
Uganda. No final agreement between Germany and England had een 
fuade for the division of this section of Africa at this time, 
and Wissmann wanted to secure a good basis for any- future 
94The story of this expedition is given in Henry M. 
Stanley, In Darkest Africa (New York, 1890). 
95For these difficulties, see an account of an interview 
with the Pasha in Piat a M.A.E., 24. iii. 90, C.C.Z. VII. 
Other views may be found in A. J. Mounteney-Jephson, Emin 
Pasha and the Rebellion at the Equator (New York, 189or;-
467-78, and Schweitzer, Emin Pasha, II, 12ff. 
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settlement.96 
The expedition left the coast in April 1890. Some 
White Fathers accompanied the group. Wissmann had asked 
' Pere Schynse to go along so that Emin Pasha might profit 
from his experience in East Africa; he was one of the priests 
expelled from Tabora by Siki. Schynse accepted since he felt 
that the expansion of German rule could lead to peace in the 
interior, and to the re-establishment of the White Fathers 
in Tabora.97 
As the Emin Pasha expedition went inland, another 
German-led group was approaching the coast from the interior. 
Karl Peters commanded this party which had crossed northern 
Kenya and visited Uganda. Peters had set out to find Emin 
Pasha, but had given up the search when he learned that 
Stanley had found him first. Peters, unknowingly, had 
prepared the way for Emin Pasha. He met Muhammad ibn Omari, 
one of the leading Tabora Arabs, near Irangi, a small Arab 
center on the route to the coast. Peters asked if this 
Arab community wished peace or war. The Arabs of course 
opted for peace, and told Peters that they had already 
96Ibid., II, 42; Euan-Smith to F. o., 14. iii. 90, 
unindexea;-z.A. (this dispatch transmitted information from 
Casati, the Italian companion of Emin Pasha in the Sudan). 
97Karl Hespers, P. Schynse's letzte Reisen - Briefe und 
Tagenbuchblatter (Koln, 1892), 2-3. 
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written to the coast to secure terms.98 Whether they had 
written was uncertain; in any case Peters could now bring 
their wishes to the German authorities. 
Karl Peters met Emin Pasha and his party as they went 
inland. Peters advised that the Pasha occupy Tabora before 
he went on to Lake Victoria. He said it was unsafe to leave 
such an Arab center in the rear • . The White Fathers present 
naturally agreed and offered to place their old station at 
the disposal of the expedition. An Arab, Ismayal Baluch, 
attended this conference. He had been sent earlier by 
Wissmann to talk with the Tabora Arabs; he told Emin Pasha 
he had already hoisted the German flag there, although Siki 
had protested against this action. Emin Pasha, won over 
by all this advice, decided to go to Tabora.99 The decision 
was of importance since Wissmann had not authorised Emin 
Pasha to occupy the Tabora area; it led to friction between 
the two German leaders. 
The Arabs Emin Pasha met on his march to Tabora quickly 
came to terms. The Arab community of Kondoa accepted the 
German flag and promised to end the slave trade. The Irangi 
Arabs made the same arrangement •. 1 00 When the party neared 
98nr. Carl Peters, New Light .on Dark Afri~(trans. 
H. w. Dulcken) (London, 1891 ), 517-18. 
99Ibid., 541-42; Langheld, Zwanzig Jahre, 46. 
100schweitzer, Emin Pasha, II, 50-6. 
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Tabora, an influential Arab, Sayd ibn Saad, wrote to Emin 
Pasha to welcome him t6 that center. Although many of the 
Arabs there w·ere hostile to the Germans, they recognised 
the futility of resistance and agreed to negotiate with 
Emin Pasha. A treaty was signed on the first of August. 
Its terms were: (1) the Arabs agreed to accept German rule 
and to fly the German flag; (2) a governor to be appointed 
by the Arabs would carry out German orders, and the Germans 
would pay his salary; (3) the Germans pledged no interference 
in matters of religion and social life; (4) the Germans 
recognised the present possessions of the Arabs and agreed 
to aid them in trading with the coast; (5} the Arabs agreed 
to end the slave trade and slave raiding.101 
The negotiations. with Siki were much more difficult. 
He finally gave in when he saw the Germans were ready to 
use force. Siki accepted German sovereignty, paid an 
indemnity for ivory stolen from the earlier German traders 
and for his acts against the White Fathers, and returned 
some weapons taken from a previous Belgian party at T~bora.102 
These agreements, made by Emin Pasha with no authorisation 
from his superiors, were not welcomed at German headquarters. 
Wissmann. opposed all treaties with Arab.s or . Afric-ans. that 
, 101 Langheld, ~wanzi,g Jahre, 46-7; Hespers, P. Schynse, 
6; Pere G. Leblond, ~ere August Achte (Alger, 1928 - second 
ed.), 71-9 (Achte was a White Father accompanying the expedition). 
102 Langheld, Zwanzig Jahre, 49; Schweitzer, Emin Pasha, 
II, 77-9; Euan-Smith to F. o., 22. ix. 90, unindexed, Z.A.; 
Musa and Tharia Topan to Euan-Smith, 16. ix. 90, B-11, British 
Residency (Zanzibar). 
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did not provide for effective enforcement. The Germans did 
not have sufficient forces for a meaningful occupation of 
Tabora; without them the treaties would never be upheld. 
Wissmann was also upset because Emin Pasha's actions had 
blocked one of his plans for spreading German influence 
inland. The Irish trader, Stokes, had recently been given 
an important position in the German service. He was to use 
his influence to build up the German position with the African 
chiefs in the Nyamwezi area. Stokes had married the daughter 
of an influential African chief who lived near Tabora; he 
had more influence in this region of Tanganyika than any 
other European. When Stokes heard of the Pasha's treaties, 
he resigned his position. He was a strong opponent of the 
Arabs and he made it clear that he had not planned 11 to 
coquette with Arabs and Turks" as Emin Pasha had. After 
additional signs of disobedience from Emin Pasha, Wissmann 
recalled him. 103 
Emin Pasha had left for Lake Victoria before he was 
recall-ed. He hurried . there after receiving news that the 
l03Schweitzer, Emin Pasha, II, 62, 148-49; Herbette a 
Ribot, 22. xii. 90, Allemagne, t. 99, and 1. i. 91, Allemagn,, 
t. 100, for reports of letters given in German newspapers 
concerning these events; Herbette a Ribot, 26. i. 91, ibid., 
for an interview with Karl Peters -- he upheld the Pasha's 
actions; Stokes did go some distance inland before resigning 
-- for the comments of a missionary accompaning him, Charles 
F. Harford-Battersby, Pilkington of Uganda (London, 1898}, 
82ff. 
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missionaries in the kingdom of Buganda were in danger. News 
of the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 reached him before he 
set out for Buganda, now in the English sphere of influence, 
and he abandoned his effort to visit there. He did, however, 
deal with the Arabs on the German shores of Lake Victoria. 
They had an important settlement at Masansa; the Pasha sent 
for them to come and sign treaties with the Germans. When 
they did not come, an expedition was sent that completely 
\ destroyed their station. By v~rch 1891, ~ Schynse reported 
that the slave trade in the southern regions of Lake Victoria 
was ended.104 Emin Pasha then left the German service, and 
went on his own into the area to the east of Lake Victoria. 
He was killed by the Arabs shortly after he reached this 
region. 105 
Me~while, the German administration decided to accept 
the Tabora treaties of the Pasha. An occupying force under 
an able German officer, Lt. Sigl, arrived there in early 
1891 •. 1 OEi The White Fathers reopened their s.tation. at .about 
104For the difficulties in Buganda, see Sir John Gray, 
"The Year of the Three Kings of Buganda," JLI, 14(1950), 15-52. 
For the Pasha's activities on Lake Victoria, Schweitzer, 
Emin Pasha, II, 106; Hespers, P. Sc~nse, 82; Emin Pasha to 
Karl Peters, 10. x. 90, in Herbette a Ribot, 26. i. 91, 
Allemagne, t. 100; Leblond, Pere Achte, 80-1. 
105schweitzer, Emin Pasha, II, 291ff. 
106Langheld, gwanzig Jahre, 82. 
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the same time. 107 The German administration of Tabora found 
that IVissmann' s fears were well founded. The Arab governor, 
Sayd ibn Saad, did his best to aid the Germans, but most 
of the Arabs regarded him as a renegade and made the German 
occupation a farce. An English visitor described the activi-
ties of these Arabs in September 1891; they were "smuggling 
guns and ammunition galore, without any interference from 
Germans."108 
Siki finally became so unahppy over German rule that he 
passed to open hostility. He made a new treaty with the 
Germans in October 1892, but the problem of lack of power to 
enforce it still remained. As a missionary at Urambo said: 
the Germans have 11 a ridiculously small force to 'reduce' so 
large a district let alone keeping some sort of authority 
over the rest of the country. "1 09 War immediately follo1.;ed 
this treaty. The Germans scored an initial success, but 
were not able to follow it through, and the situation remained 
dangerous. The Arabs were given a prominent role in causing 
107see a letter of P. Gerboin, in A.P.F., 64(1892), 205-18. 
108Jose:ph A. Hb.loney, With Captain Stairs to Katanga 
(London, 1893), 57, 68, 70-1. It is interesting to note that 
Siki was so upset at German control during this period that 
he asked for English ~rotection. See C. Smith to Salisbury, 
30. iv. 91, F. o. 84/2147. 
109shaw to L.M.S., 30 • viii. 92, L.M.S.; d 'Avricourt k 
Devel.le, 23. ii. -93, Allemagne, Hambourg, t. 22; The Gazette 
for Zanzibar and East Africa, 1. ii. 93. 
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these differences. The fact that no neighboring chiefs aided 
Siki proved this; they all hated the Arabs too much to -vrork 
with an ally of theirs. 110 
The Germans finally decided to stop this unrest. A new 
military force arrived in Tabora at the end of 1892 under 
Lt. Prinz. He learned that Siki awaited aid from the warlike 
Hehe tribe to drive the Germans away. Prinz, therefore, 
attacked Siki in a surprise movement and carried his strong-
hold. Siki saw that he 1vould be captured and attempted to 
blow himself and his wives up before he was taken. The 
Germans found that he was yet alive, although badly burned, 
and strung him up outside the ruins of his fort to die. A 
woman ruler was then appointed to rule Tabora under close 
German supervision.111 
With German rule firmly established, Tabora lost its 
importance as an Arab center. A visitor in July 1893 reported 
that only about six Arabs continued to reside there. Trade 
fell off also due to the cutting off of the ivory that 
formerly came from the Congo; this ivory now went down the 
110Rodd to Rosebery, 6. i. 93, F. o. 107/2; d'Avricourt 
~ Develle, 19. iv. 93, Allemagne, Hambou(g' t. 22; Dr. Oscar 
Baumann, Durch Massailand zur Nilguelle Berlin, 1894), 105. 
111 Gaz. Zan. and E. A., 1 o. v. 93; Missions d' Afrique, 
(1893), 155-63, reprinting an article from the German journal, 
Gott Will es; Rodd to Rosebery, 15. v. 93, F. o. 107/4; 
Labosse'a Develle, 26. xiii. 93, P.Z. XVII. 
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Congo River to ports under Belgian control. In the words of 
an English missionary at Urambo: 
Most of the Arabs have left Tabora and returned 
to the Coast as there is no trade for them this 
way. The Belgians have stopped all trading between 
the country East and West of Tanganyika, so we do 
not see a caravan at all now passing through 
Urambo. 112 
c. Lake Tanganyika -- Belgians and Germans 
The area bordering on Lake Tanganyika was unoccupied by 
the forces of any European government when the Arab rebellion 
began on the coast. Shortly before this uprising occurred, 
Cardinal Lavigerie announced a· plan to insure the safety of 
missionaries in the far interior of Africa. In August 1888, 
he made a speech in Brussels designed to stimulate Christian 
Europe to organise an "Anti-slavery Crusade" against the 
Arabs of Africa. This speech made a great impression in 
Brussels; it dwelt on the horrors of the slave trade and 
abounded with phrases calculated to draw attention. He said, 
for example, that so many Africans were killed in slave raids 
"that the hyaenas, gorged with human flesh, would no longer 
eat them." A committee was formed at once in Belgium to 
carry on the Cardinal's plan.113 
112L. Decle, Three Years in Savage Africa (London, 1898), 
353; Draper to L.M.S., 11. xii. 93, L.M.S. 
11 3vivian to Salisbury, 16. viii. 88 and 25. viii. 88, 
F. o. 123/244; Le Mouvement Antiseclavagiste, I(1888-9), 29, 
42, 53. This journal follows the French and Belgian efforts 
closely in the succeeding years. 
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Lavigerie spoke next in France and England. He made a 
similar impression in both countries. A French committee 
began at once to recruit a group for service in Africa.114 
Englishmen had thoughts of similar action. The famous 
African explorer, V. L. Cameron, went to the Foreign Office 
with a scheme to set up stations designed to act against 
/ 
slavers; they would extend from the northern Shire region to 
the territory at the north _of Lake Tanganyika. This proposal 
was submitted to Sir John Kirk. He ruled against it. He 
said: "There is no use crusading in a country you cannot 
keep after you have conquered it, and no use driving the 
slavers out unless you put something better in. 11 Lord 
Salisbury agreed. 11 5 Cameron, therefore, let his scheme 
drop. It was left to Belgium and France to combat the 
Central African slavers -- they were ready for the task. 
It should be added that English missionary societies 
were strongly against this crusade. They suspected the 
motives of the Catholic Cardinal too much to give his plan 
any support. 11 6 The L.l-1. S. men in t ·he field were also 
, 
114For Lavigerie's speeches in England, see Waddington 
a Goblet, 28. xi. 88, Angleterre, t. 835; for the French, 
Bull. Soc. Antiesclavagiste Fr., (1888), 179. 
115
cameron to Kirk, 24. Yiii. 88, Kirk to Hill, 27. viii. 88, 
with notes by Salisbury, Slave Trade Correspondence Presented 
to Parliament in 1888. -
116Thompson to Swann, 25. i. 89, Thompson to Wright, 
22. i. 89, L.M.S. Thompson, Corresponding Secretary of the 
L.M.S., said: tti wish I could feel that they were entirely 
disinterested in their purposes." 
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skeptical of the crusade's chances of success. One of the 
most influential missionaries on Lake Tanganyika, A. J. Swann, 
had this to say: 
The crusade being preached by the Popish Arch-
bishop is in motive excellent, in practise 
impossible and I hope if even 300 or 3000 
volunteers start for Tanganyika on such a mad 
errand, some power will stop them from leaving 
Zanzibar, for their~ sakes and ours. 117 
Swann agreed with the future Sir Harry Johnston, then 
exploring in Central Africa. He thought that the movement 
against slavery had to begin on the coast and work inland, 
and that in the interior the Europeans nee~ed the aid of the 
Arabs to civilise the Africans.118 
While this movement was debated in Europe and Africa, 
the Germans made their first contact with the Arabs of Ujiji. 
Emin Pasha, while making his treaties at Tabora, had a plan 
to continue on to Ujiji to deal with the Arabs. When he was 
diverted to Lake Victoria by news of the difficulties of the 
missionaries in Buganda, he had to settle for a letter to 
the Arabs of Ujiji asking them to accept the terms given at 
Tabora. Rumaliza, the Arab leader at Ujiji, said he favored 
these terms, but that he would wait the arrival of the 
Germans to sign a treaty. 119 Wissmann planned . to lead a-
11 7 8 I Swann to L.M.S.,3p. i. 9, L.M.S. The italics are Swann s. 
11811Report by Mr. H. H. Johnston ••• on the Nyasa-Tanganyika 
Expedition: 1889-90," F.O. 403/127. The French representatives 
in Zanzibar took a similar view. See Lacau 'a M.A.E., 15. iv. 89 
and 8. ix. 88, Plat 'a M.A.E., 24. v. 90, enclosing Tippu Tib a 
Consul de France, 30. i. 90, c.c.z. VI. 
11 9schweitzer, Emin Pasha, II, 83, 86, 107; Langheld, 
Zwanzig Jahre, 55. 
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party to the lake regions in 1891. A crushing defeat of 
German forces by the Hehe, hov;ever, caused these plans to 
be cancelled. 120 Therefore, it was left to the Europeans 
already on the Lake's shores, and to the new groups forming 
in France and Belgium, to solve the Arab problem. 
The Europeans settled in various posts on the shores 
of Lake Tanganyika were in no danger until the war began on 
the coast. The vfuite Fathers occupied most of these loca-
tions; they reported numerous Arab raids in their vicinity, 
but the Arabs were always careful not to strike at Europeans. 
The w~ite Fathers insured their safety by forming a military 
group of their own. A former Papal Zouave, Captain Joubert, 
organised a capable force ready to meet any Arab thrust.121 
Conditions became more dangerous after the coastal war 
began. Near the end of 1888, the L.M.S. station, then at 
the south of the Lake, was threatened with destruction by 
the Arabs. A visit from Rumaliza immediately followed this 
threat. He told the English missionaries that it was his 
will alone that preserved their safety. In return for this 
service, Rumaliza asked the missionaries to intercede on his 
behalf with the English Consul in Zanzibar; he wished to be 
recognised as the - de jure governor of the entire Lake 
120d'Avricourt 1. Ribot, 18. vi. 91 and 4. xi. 91, 
Allemagne, Hambourg, t. 18. 
1 21 Moinet 'a Storms,?- • ix. 88, "Storms Papers. u 
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Tanganyika area. The missi .onaries complied; they said they 
favored him as "this one is the best of a bad lot."122 The 
Consul, how·ever, refused to intercede with the Sultan. He 
merely urged the Sultan to send orders to his subjects to 
protect these Europeans from danger. The value of such 
orders was very doubtful.123 In spite of this rejection, 
Rumaliza kept up his protection. He told the missionaries 
that Tippu Tib had said he must defend t hem even if he had 
to fight the other Arabs.124 Rumaliza was as good as his 
word, and did intervene a little later to restrain the 
hostility of the Arabs. 125 Other Arab leaders at the south 
end of Lake Tanganyika, not connected with the Ujiji Arabs, 
also favored peace with the Europeans. 126 In all, the 
responsible Arabs of the Lake showed that the war on the coast 
did not concern them; they wished peace so that trade might 
continue to be profitable. 
In 1890, this more or less peaceful balance on the Lake 
began to change. Captain Joubert and unruly Arab elements 
started to fight in the middle of the year. The inc-idents 
122carson to L.M.S., 7. 1. 89, Swann to L.M.S., 30. 1. 89, 
L. M.S. 
123carson to L.M.S., 15. viii. 89, ibid. 
124 Carson to L. M.S., 9. ix. 89, ibid. 
125
s,vann to L. M.S., 14. viii. 89, ~· 
126 8 Carson to L. M.S., 27. vi. 9, ibid. 
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followed pressure from Rumaliza; he asked Joubert to pay 
compensation for Arab losses suffered in a previous minor 
skirmish. Rumaliza, however, did not start a general Arab 
attack on the French mission. His motives in this whole 
affair are unclear. All that can be said is that Rumaliza 
never favored the French as much as the English, and might 
have been in this instance pressuring the French merely to 
gain some tangible concessions from them. Joubert was not 
a man to give concessions, even though some of the White 
Fathers favored this policy. He prepared for future action, 
and also wrote to the newly formed anti-slavery organisations 
of Europe for aid.127 He did not write in vain. An expedi-
tion, led by a French officer, Captain Jacques, reached the 
Lake in October 1890. The two captains met, formed a common 
policy, and waited for the Arabs to act.128 
The English became involved l.Yith the Arabs of Lake 
Tanganyika at this time. Harry Johnston, then on a mission 
to organise a future British territory in Central Africa, 
wanted to extend British influence to the north of the Lake. 
Johnston was unable to travel to the north, but he talked 
the L.M.S. missionary, Swann, into carrying on his plans. 
Swann, always a close friend of the Arabs, went to Ujiji to 
127Le Mouvement Antiesclavagiste, III(1890-1 ), 18-20. 
128 Maloney, With Captain Stairs, 111ff. 
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talk to Rumaliza. He found the Arab leader very upset over 
the various pressures put on him by the European nations 
involved in Central Africa. Rumaliza thought that the 
Arabs were getting a poor return for all the aid they had 
given to earlier European travellers -- as vlissmann and 
Stanley. Rumaliza was ready to accept the English flag for 
Ujiji. Swann could not accept this offer since Ujiji was 
in the German sphere, but he could ask the Arab leader for 
his permission to conclude treaties in the regions to the 
north. Rumaliza gave this permission, and Swann visited 
these regions to try for treaties. He was successful.129 
These treaties came too late; the Anglo-German agreement of 
1890 closed this region to the English. This incident is 
of importance since it marked the only time in East Africa 
that a member of the L.M.S. went against the orders of his 
society to involve himself in politics. The Directors wrote 
Swann to express their disapproval of his actions; they did 
not censure him, however. When Swann became upset over this 
reply, his superior had this to say to console him: "The 
feeling here, with most of us at any rate, was that if we had 
been in your position we should have been incl.ined to do as 
129swann to L.M.S., 21. viii. 90, L.M.S.; Roland Oliver, 
Sir Harr~ Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (New York, 
1958) ' 1 6ff. 
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you did." 13° This attitude showed how worried the English 
missionaries were over the unstable conditions around Lake 
Tanganyika. 
Captain Jacques, meanwhile, received orders in mid-1891 
to administer the eastern side of the Lake for the authorities 
of the Congo Free State.131 Swann expressed grave doubts 
as to the outcome of this new situation. He reported a 
conversation with Tippu Tib that did not augur well for the 
future. Tippu Tib said: 
I came to this country and by my own wealth and 
power and at risk of my own life conquered this 
people years before you knew they existed and 
now you question my right to do with them what 
I please. 132 
Swann, therefore, took an active role as peacemaker 
between the Arabs and Jacques. Hostilities began in April 
1891; Swann at once visited both sides to arrange peace. 
In December, he talked with Rumaliza at Ujiji. The Arab 
leader said he preferred peace, and Swann took his message 
to Jacques. He said of his talk with the French captain: 
"After I had enlightened him concerning the gigantic and 
impossible task being attempted, he asked me to do the best 
130Thompson to Swann, 13. xii. 90 and 24. x. 91, L. M.S. 
131Jacques to Johnston, 22. xi. 91, in Johnston to 
Salisbury, 13. ii. 92, F. 0. 84/2197; for complaints of 
Jacques' administration gathered at a later date from the 
Arabs, Decle, Savage Africa, 307-09, 331-32. 
13~ Swann to L.M.S., 10. vii. 91, with p.s. of 31. viii. 91, 
L. M.S. 
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I could for him at Ujiji, where he positively refuses to 
accompany me." With this mandate, an armistice was arranged. 
The Arabs promised to send a negotiator to Jacques; 81-vann 
later learned that no Arab ever visited the Frenchman. 133 
General hostilities began after the Arab war started in 
the Congo Free State. The fighting led to no decisive result, 
even though Jacques and Joubert received aid from a Belgian 
expedition returning from a visit to Katanga. 134 By the end 
of 1893 it became apparent that Rumaliza was planning to go 
to the aid of the Arabs in the Congo. The Germans tried 
to head this off by offering Rumaliza the chief office at 
Ujiji, but he had already decided to try to win control over 
all of the territory of Manyema. 135 He met the Belgian 
forces in Manyema in early 1894, was defeated, and managed 
to escape. 136 He later turned up in Zanzibar. With this 
133 . Swann to L.M.S., 4. xi. 92, L.M.S.; Swann, Fighting 
the Slave-hunters, 490. 
134For the causes of the Arab-Belgian war, Ceulemans, 
La question arabe et le Congo, Chap. IX; for the fighting on 
the Lake, Alex. Delcommune, Vingt annees de Vie africaine 
(Bruxelles, 1927), II, 465ff. 
135 7 ~ Dhanis, 1. ix. 93, Marie~ Dhanis, 24. viii. 93, 
"Dhanis Papers"; Shaw to L.M.S., 7. vi. 94, L.M.S.; Plunkett 
to F. o., 21. iv. 94, F. 0. 123/327. 
136sidney L. Hinde, The Fall of the Congo Arabs (London, 
1897), 234ff: Le Commandt. Dhanis, "La Conquete du Manyema," 
Le Congo Illustre, III(1894), 152-60, IV(1895), 25ff; Lt. 
Gillain7 11 La· poursuite des Arabes jusqu'au Tanganika. Les 
operations contre Rumaliza •••• ," in Dr. Dupont et. al., ~ 
Baron Fran s Dhanis au Kwan o et endant la cam a ne arabe 
Anvers, 1910 , 22ff. 
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defeat, the Arab power in Tanganyika was at an end. A 
German garrison came to Ujiji in 1896 to seal the defeat. 
The remaining Arabs met them in peace. 137 
l37nraper to L.M.s., 6. vi. 96 and 12. ix. 96, L.M.S. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Muslim peoples of ~ abia and the Persian Gulf 
established colonies on the East African coast soon after 
the death of Muhammad. The earliest recorded for Tanganyika 
was the settlement at Kilwa in 975 A.D. No significant 
movement inland occurred, however, until the nineteenth 
century. Then, under the able leadership of the Sultan of 
Muscat and Zanzibar, Said ibn Sultan, the development of 
the Arab power of Tanganyika really began. Every year after 
1830 saw more and more caravans pushing inland and then 
returning with new information from yet unvisited areas of . 
Africa. 
In the process of penetration, various centers were 
created to meet the needs of these Arab traders. The two 
most important for Tanganyika were Tabora and Ujiji. The 
government established at each of these localities was 
typical of almost all Arab centers in Tanganyika ~~ and also 
in Central Africa. An Arab leader of a local community of 
traders was designated by his peers, or at times simply 
chose himself, to rule. The Sultan of Zanzibar then accepted 
241. 
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this governor as his official representative for the region 
concerned. The governor, however, received little actual 
strength from this appointment. His power depended upon 
his personal qualities and upon the amount of force he was 
able to use when a crisis arose. This governor made little 
attempt to interfere with the indigenous leadership in the 
place selected for Arab residence. He rather sought alliance 
with the local rulers; a mutually profitable agreement then 
kept a balance of power between Arab and African. Such a 
system worked particularly well at Tabora and Ujiji. The 
Africans of these areas had no large and powerful tribal 
organisations. The Arabs chose one of the local chiefs, 
such as the Nyamwezi chief of Tabora, and tied him to them 
by frequent presents. This, of course, limited areas of 
Arab settlement. Large and strong tribes, like the Hehe of 
central Tanganyika, had to be avoided. 
When a center was organised, it existed only for the 
trade with Zanzibar. They were the key to the economic 
prosperity of Zanzibar in the nineteenth century, but because 
of the informal governmental system of that island were left 
with little regulation or control. The Sultan was not 
really a powerful ruler in Zanzibar. He was merely the 
leading Arab of that island, and he had to remember he had · 
little or no force to uphold his authority. Therefore, he 
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hardly ever interfered in matters concerning his East African 
"dominions"; as long as profits came to Zanzibar, the Sultan 
was satisfied. There was, indeed, little else the Sultan 
could do. Without military force, he had to await the return 
of an offending Arab to Zanzibar before punishment could be 
inflicted. 
The Arabs of the interior had no concern for the spread 
of Islam. If an African was willing to become a Muslim, the 
Arabs would accept him, but the initiative had to come 
from the African. Many Africans did make this step, either 
from conviction or from the desire for the obvious advantages 
of joining the ranks of the leadfupg force in Tanganyika. 
With this preoccupation for trade alone, the Arabs of 
East Africa did not react strongly to the founding of 
European centers for religious or scientific reasons. As 
long as these newcomers did not interfere in their way of 
life, they had almost complete freedom to achieve non-
political aims. The Arabs might try half-heartedly to drive 
these Christians away by making life unpleasant for them at 
times, but force was never used. The Sultan of Zanzibar 
also accepted these Europeans; he saw the danger of the 
situation, but was powerless to do anything in face of 
European ability to threaten Zanzibar with blockade or 
bombardment. 
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The mission centers established in the interior remained 
small and insignificant when the age of imperialism reached 
Zanzibar. The Germans, stimulated by the actions of Karl 
Peters, declared a protectorate over areas inland from the 
East African coastline. This was followed by an agreement 
for the Germans to administer the coastline for the Sultan. 
When this administration began, German brutality and ineptness 
caused the Arabs of the coast to revolt. This rising made 
clear the defects of Arab organisation in East Africa. No 
unified resistance could form against the Germans; one 
Arab, Bushiri ibn Salim, did try to lead all Arabs, but he 
failed after a few initial successes. 
The Arabs of central Tanganyika did not contest the 
issue when the Germans moved inland. The campaign on the 
coast had proved the folly of such resistance. On Lake 
Tanganyika, the Arab.s had a stronger leader, Rumaliza, and 
were farther away from powerful groups of Europeans. Their 
defe~t was inevitable; they joined the Congo Arabs in their 
rising against the Belgians and were broken. 
Thus the fragile Arab creation, little over a half 
century in age, crumbled at the first determined push of the 
Europeans. Trade in Tanganyika had always been based on 
contacts with areas beyond the regions now encompassed by 
German rule -- Uganda, the Congo, the Lake Nyasa region. 
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These plac es now kept their products for their respective 
ruling European conquerors. The remaining Arabs in inland 
Tanganyika were thus in a ££1 de ~' and most returned to 
the coastal areas. 
What influences remained after these years of Arab 
domination? They had opened the territory by their explor-
ations, and the routes they used then are the routes used 
today in Tanganyika. The Arabs introduced new crops and 
trees to all their settlements in the interior. They left 
small groups of Muslims in the interior that vrould grow 
from new influences in later years. As a whole, however, 
these influences look small ~<Then contrasted to the devasta-
tion that followed the slave-raiding Arabs in Africa. 
In summary, the Arabs _had built up an "empire" that 
outwardly appeared powerful, and that impressed many Europeans 
-- as Burdo, Becker, Swann. There was no vitality in it, 
however, The Arabs were a small body of men using their 
influence, gained by trade, to keep more powerful African 
groups under their control or influence. When Europeans 
introduced ne1v factors into East Africa, Arab weakness was 
obvious and their dominion soon passed away. 
B I B L I 0 G R A P H Y 
I. REVIEW OF WORK ON THIS TOPIC 
The bases for any historical study of East Africa are 
the two works of Sir R. Coupland, East Africa and Its 
Invaders and The Exploitation of East Africa. These 
pioneer studies, however, deal mainly with Zanzibar, and in 
addition neglect non-English printed and non-printed 
resources. Coupland also did not utilize the archives of 
the various English missionary societies interested in East 
Africa. Roland Oliver, in writing The Missionary Factor in 
East Africa, did consult some of these archives, but his 
book only touches on the Arabs of Tanganyika. The Arabs 
of Tanganyika have no historian, apart from the many articles 
of Sir John Gray. It is to meet this need that this study 
was made. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to describe the rise and 
fall of the Arab power in Tanganyika during the nineteenth 
century. The research for this topic was carried on in public 
and private centers for East African materials in Salem, 
Washington, London, Paris, Brussels, Zanzibar, Dar as-Salaam, 
Bagamoyo, and Kampala. 
Muslim Arabs and Persians established centers on the 
Tanganyika coast from 975 A.D., and perhaps even earlier. 
Not until the nineteenth century, however, did a significant 
penetration of the interior begin. Arabs soon visited most 
areas of Tanganyika, and went beyond into Central Africa. 
Three main routes through Tanganyika were used. The first 
went from the area opposite Zanzibar through central Tangan-
yika to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika and the regions to the 
west of it. The second route started at Kilwa and went to 
the Lake Nyasa area. The third left the northern coast of 
Tanganyika and led to Kilimanjaro, Lake Victoria, and the 
surrounding regions. 
The Arabs created settlements on these routes to 
facilitate their trading activities. Tabora and Ujiji, on 
the central route, were the two most important Arab posts. 
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Few Arabs ever resided in these centers for long periods of 
time. A small group of Arabs, however, did become attached 
to each settlement. They organised their own system of 
government and were usually left with no regulation from 
their Sultan in Zanzibar, although they kept a loose relation-
ship with him to enable trade to prosper. The Sultan accepted 
this arrangement; he had little military force to use in the 
interior of Africa even if he desired to play a more active 
role. The Sultan was interested in trade above all, and as 
long as profits continued to come to him, he took little 
interest in matters of administration. The Arabs in these 
centers had practically no interest in affairs unconnected 
with trade. They made no effort to set up new states or to 
spread Islam among the pagan Africans. 
In the 1870's European missionaries and explorers 
began to come to Tanganyika in ever increasing numbers. 
Such organisations as the London Missionary Society, the 
Church Missionary Society, the International African 
Association, the White Fathers, the Holy Ghost Fathers, and 
the Universities' Mission to Central Africa founded stations 
in the inland regions. A study of the relationships of each 
of these groups with the Arabs before 1885 shows that the 
Arabs were willing to live in peace with the newcomers. 
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The Arabs o~ Tanganyika remained interested in trade alone, 
and left the Europeans in peace as long as the Europeans did 
not try to interfere in their affairs. 
This peaceful relationship changed in 1885, when the 
Germans declared a protectorate over areas close to the 
coast. While they were extending this control along the 
coast, their ineptness and brutality caused a revolt of the 
Arabs. The latter, as always, were unable to organise a 
unified resistance, but they kept up a war for two years. 
When the Germans defeated the Arabs on the coast, they 
extended German influence into the interier. The Arabs 
of central Tanganyika, in the Tabora region, made peace at 
once. The Arabs settled around Lake Tanganyika were less 
receptive to European control. In the end, however, they 
were drawn into the Arab-Belgian conflict in the Congo 
and were crushed. 
Thus, at the beginning of 1894, the Arabs of Tanganyika 
were finished as a significant force. The remaining Arabs 
in the interior returned to the coast since trade no longer 
flourished. They left few influences behind to commemorate 
their half century of domination of the interior of Tanganyika. 
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